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

PAST AND PRESENT

Lincoln C. Chen
Stanley Hoffmann
George Armstrong Kelly
Gail W. Lapidus
Frank E. Manuel
Aleksander Smolar
Gregory F. Treverton
Tu Wei-ming

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Past and Present

Spring 1987

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Preface to the Issue: "Past and Present"

EVERY TWO OR THREE YEARS, *Dædalus* publishes an issue devoted not to a single theme, but to a collection of themes that are expected to figure more prominently in the Journal in the years ahead. In our last such issue, "Anticipations," published in the summer of 1984, we opened with an article on artificial intelligence. An entire issue devoted to that subject will be published early next year. In the present issue, many subjects are treated, several of which we plan to cover extensively in upcoming issues; others we introduce because we wish to test readers' opinion, to learn whether they would have us explore these topics further in future issues of *Dædalus*.

This issue opens with an essay on "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System." At a time when the mass media are much preoccupied with what the Soviet leader appears to be doing, when recent first-time visitors to the Soviet Union return to tell of their exciting encounters with him, finding him "politically savvy, energetic and committed to change," and when more experienced hands find it not at all strange to suggest that "[Gorbachev] really does have a plan, that the plan is well thought out," it is refreshing to read an essay that avoids all such hyperbole, while in no way denying a reality that today so impresses the world, which acknowledges that the Soviet Union may indeed be at a major "crossroads," experiencing a struggle scarcely less important than the one that followed Stalin's death in 1953. Not the least of the strengths of Gail Lapidus's essay is that it seeks to explain happenings that, however inchoate and confused, need to be interpreted in a context that is both historical and international. It is well to look back to the rule of Brezhnev,

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Khrushchev, Stalin, and Lenin, to ask whether major Soviet changes today may not be the reaction of Russia's political culture to "a set of challenges and responses characteristic of post-totalitarian communist systems more generally."

To pose the question in this way is to invite the reader to understand that these are not simply a set of bold policies, stemming from decisions made by a "young and aggressive leader" responding to specific economic difficulties, all the while confronting an entrenched and established bureaucracy ready to resist him. The author knows that what we are seeing resembles certain other earlier reform efforts made in various parts of the communist world, and that it is useful to recall that "the reform of Leninist systems is both difficult and reversible."

Such *caveats* do not lead Professor Lapidus to undervalue the significance of what is now going on in the Soviet Union; she does ask, however, what Gorbachev's intentions may be; whether his reforms, particularly in the cultural sphere, are indeed intended to recreate a "civil society" in the Soviet Union, and whether such a project is either conceivable or realizable seventy years after the Revolution. While inadequate Soviet economic performance lay at the base of the problems that Gorbachev encountered when he assumed power, broader social and demographic changes had also occurred, fundamentally affecting popular support for traditional Communist Party policies, and introducing new strains into the society. If Gorbachev's concern has been less with substantive reform and more with affecting the political process, seeking to alter behavior, thereby contributing to social renewal and economic change, the obstacles to such policies are formidable.

This is what makes his espousal of *glasnost',* cultural liberalization, so central; in the author's view, it breaks with the tradition that "only a small elite can safely be entrusted with the truth." Its implications for the Party are enormous; so, also, for what Gorbachev has called "democratization," a greater engagement of the Soviet people. The intention to enhance initiative carries with it the hazard of a loss of Party control, a truly "revolutionary" development within the Soviet system. Using the media in wholly new ways, hoping for new kinds of domestic support, Gorbachev has gone on to fashion a new foreign policy, which, in the author's view, may be seen as "a direct outgrowth of his domestic priorities." Hoping to

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win time to consolidate his position and carry out his domestic reforms, Gorbachev has tried to overcome his regime's "political isolation and economic marginality, in Asia quite as much as in Europe." This strategy, according to Gail Lapidus, is "high-risk," internally, within the Party, and also in the bureaucracy; but also externally, in the communist world, which cannot fail to be affected by such change, and whose ultimate responses to it cannot be predicted.

It is significant that, in an essay on Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, Gail Lapidus should speak so frequently of Eastern Europe, of China, of how all these communist regimes may in time be affected by events in the Soviet Union. While communist Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China have long figured on what may be called a traditional "cold war" scholarly agenda in the United States, each being considered principally in terms of how its individual policies may contribute to an enhanced or diminished Soviet power, only now are all being studied more systematically for themselves, for reasons not fundamentally linked to what may be called "Soviet bloc" politics, or communist dissension and rivalry.

For a generation of Americans habituated to thinking about World War II largely in terms made memorable by the radio and press, but also by the six volumes of Winston Churchill, which passed through so many editions and served so importantly to define what World War II was all about—how it came to be fought, what the experience of battle was, and why diplomacy was so important—events in Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union were always somewhat secondary. There is an urgent need today to look at this region more critically. Conditions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German People's Republic, not to speak of the others in the Eastern European "bloc" and in Yugoslavia, are generally attended to by the American mass media principally at times of "crisis," when revolution threatens, when the Soviets appear ready to intervene to reassert their authority, or when they actually proceed to do so. There is too little understanding of this vital geopolitical area, of its social, economic, and intellectual evolution in the last forty years. To remedy this, *Dædalus* proposes to publish an issue on Central and Eastern Europe. The essay in this issue by Aleksander Smolar on "Jews as a Polish Problem" is intended to do many things, not least to whet the reader's appetite for that larger study.

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On one level, Smolar's essay needs to be read in the context of an ongoing debate on what happened to the Jews of Eastern Europe during World War II, on why the question continues to provoke heated controversy, as the April 8, 1987 correspondence columns of the *New York Review of Books* suggest. On another level, however, the essay goes far beyond such concerns to ask more fundamental questions: Has there been a concerted effort, as Aleksander Smolar suggests, "to eliminate Jews from Polish memory"? Is it only now, with the arrival of a new generation of Poles who have no personal memories of these tragic events and cannot possibly be held responsible for them, that new inquiry is being made? While the author's concern is only incidentally with the prewar period, with a time when antisemitism in Poland was rife and when mutual recrimination between Poles and Jews was common, his major objective is to learn how the "specific conditions of life under the occupation in Poland affected both Poles and Jews, the relations that existed between them, and why the images of this past, as represented by Poles and Jews, are so dramatically different."

To do this, Smolar considers the various stages of the war, beginning in 1939, when Poland fell victim to the two occupying powers, the Nazi and the Soviet; later, in the summer of 1941, when the Nazis overran all of Poland, making it a vassal state; and, still later, when the Soviet armies returned to create a Polish communist regime that has existed, with some changes, to this day. Smolar, concerned principally with what he calls the rendering of "a moral judgment on Polish attitudes toward the destruction of the Jews," believes that what has governed the Polish position toward Jews since the war has been the Polish perception of the Jews' attitude toward the Soviet invader in 1939. As he explains, in no other country in Europe was there a comparable clash of Jewish interests and attitudes with those of the rest of the population. The Jews in Poland were seen as traitors, collaborating with the enemy. For most Poles who considered the matter at all, the Jews simply refused to be identified with the defunct Polish state and its values, having no stake in the idea of Polish independence. In these circumstances, antisemitism was compatible with Polish patriotism, and indeed, after the German takeover of the whole of Poland, with nationalist calls for a restoration of democracy. As the Germans moved to exterminate the Jews, the Polish reaction, according to Smolar, "ranged from dislike and

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fear to indifference." After knowledge of the Holocaust became more widely known in Poland, there was simply silence. Yet, except for the Kielce pogrom of 1946, which "saw civilians go after and kill several dozen Jews," the Poles acted (and wrote) as if antisemitism in their country was wholly a thing of the past. This was never so. According to the author, the war did nothing to purge Poland of its antisemitism. On the contrary, with the arrival of the Soviet armies, and with the establishment of the Polish communist state, some Poles went so far as to argue that the Jews, in effect, had "won." Even the Church remained silent; in the "civil war" that raged, openly and covertly, Jews were thought simply to be "paying a price for certain Jews being in power." To antisemites, both the Party and communist government were made to appear predominantly Jewish. Though this was patently untrue, the Church's dilemma was real: how to show itself patriotic and yet not compromise itself by calling for compassion for the Jews, seen by many as a political group *par excellence.*

Aleksander Smolar, in commenting on the Jewish presence in the communist government until 1956, in showing where and how conditions in Poland resembled those of Hungary and Rumania, emphasizes the changes produced by Gomulka in 1956, when thousands of Jews were dismissed; even more, in 1968, when the government went to extraordinary lengths to prove that it was no longer Jewish-cosmopolitan; it had become Polish-national. The new Polish nationalism of the Party, its clearly antisemitic overtones, was never wholly convincing to the ordinary Pole; for it to become entirely credible, it had also to be anti-Soviet, which it could never be. During the 1970s, when still more Jews emigrated, the Jewish question receded, coming to the fore again only in late 1981 with the declaration of martial law. The government then discovered that it had a problem—it had to prove itself to foreign Jews, showing its good credentials, particularly to American Jews. Gestures, to commemorate the Warsaw ghetto uprising, for example, were now *de rigeur.* Only today, with a new generation of Poles coming to maturity, is a more honest assessment of the true situation possible.

It is certainly significant that Tu Wei-ming, in his "personal reflection" on the modern Chinese intellectual quest, begins his essay by dwelling on how much "forgetting" there has been in China during the contemporary period. Concerned with the "profoundly iconoclastic attitudes" that have been common in China in respect to

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the country's traditional cultural heritage, the author sees that these negative attitudes have generally been accompanied by a remarkable interest in certain of the older "Confucian" presuppostions. The idea of a total rejection of traditional Chinese culture has been almost unthinkable, even to those Chinese most beguiled by Western thought and models. In China, when there has been a wish to introduce Western ideas, it has generally involved some blending with ideas that are indigenously Chinese. Underlying all such belief, Professor Tu tells us, was "the strong faith in the ability of human consciousness to understand and to shape historical reality." While many of the most articulate Chinese intellectuals, particularly those who went abroad to study, virtually abandoned their ties to the traditional culture, there was never in China, as there was in Japan, a total abandonment, a "cutting loose from Asia." Fidelity to China's past, a concern with that past, made Chinese cultural iconoclasm almost unique; even the effort to forget, when it was most deliberate, was never fully realized. In behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and commitments, Chinese intellectuals maintained certain continuities with the culture of the past, and this was true in every aspect of their lives.

After 1895, when Japan's transformation into a fully Western-style military and industrial power was complete, when the threat posed by this to China became apparent, the struggle within China to cope with this situation never defined itself as essentially a struggle between traditionalists and westernizers. It was infinitely more complex, carrying with it the inevitable politicization of the whole Chinese culture. This, in the author's view, contributed to a weakening of the Chinese intelligentsia in a way unprecedented in that country's long history. Though Marxist–Leninist ideology, strengthened by the success of the Russians in making a revolution, impressed Chinese intellectuals and won a certain support from them, Tu Wei-ming emphasizes that "it was the participation of the peasantry, the perpetual carriers of traditionalism, that fundamentally changed the political dynamics of the country and eventually brought about a revolution." However important the Chinese intelligentsia may have been in providing the "symbolic resources" that the revolution required, it was not itself the principal beneficiary of that communist revolution. The author argues that even Mao, despite his clear commitment to iconoclasm, needs to be seen as something of a traditionalist. In his constant wrestling with intellectuals, Mao

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learned much of the "complex art of social control," characterized by more frequent appeal to cultural values and social norms than to the coercive power of the state (which could be used when absolutely necessary). Ideology, the author says, was never an inconsequential matter for the communist; Chinese intellectuals were never "rootless cosmopolitans"; they were always seen as "dangerous" shapers of public opinion. Given the opportunity, as during the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1957, they emerged as outspoken critics. Tu Wei-ming reminds us, however, that to be a critic is very different from being a dissident; in Chinese political culture, the possibilities of becoming the latter are very small.

If China's intellectuals today are faithful to Marxism–Leninism, it is because they know it is a system they have helped shape to suit Chinese conditions; they are themselves, in a literal sense, the "builders" of the new China. Saving the nation, for most of them, is the first and most urgent task; aware of the suffering that China has experienced in this tragic century and wishing for a strong nation, they are less hostile to dictatorship than they are to weakness, backwardness, and poverty. The political culture of the country, Tu Wei-ming writes, shows "a pattern of domination that combines feudalist traditionalism with Leninist collectivism." Within the Communist Party, still controlled overwhelmingly by peasants, workers, and soldiers with scant education, the intelligentsia remains "marginalized and suspect." This, however, does little to diminish the intellectual's commitment to the Party; the idea of taking a road of one's own, separating oneself from what is most vital in the society, does not even occur to the Chinese intellectual.

Today, the debate has entered yet a new phase that concerns the relevance of two new mountains: Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism. It is much too early to know what the force of either of these will prove to be; how they will come to be incorporated into the ideological debate; what, over the long run, they will produce. However, the author's recent experience in China, narrated here in very personal terms, has confirmed for him that Confucianism remains an important part of the "psycho-cultural construct" of the Chinese intellectual, as it does of the Chinese peasant. This heritage, in the author's view, must be critiqued again, so that it is not seen simply as "the embodiment of authoritarianism, bureaucratism, nepotism, conservatism, and male chauvinism." There is an urgent need

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to see whether there can in fact be a "creative interaction between Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism in a socialist context." This is not an objective that an earlier generation of Chinese intellectuals were at all concerned with; it may, in today's circumstances, be the most compelling task for an intelligentsia anxious to set the agenda for the nation, wishing for it to avoid the suffering, humiliation, weakness, and disorder that have been such paramount features of Chinese life in this chaotic century.

While the first three essays in this *Dædalus* issue deal with changes occurring in the communist world, Gregory Treverton's essay on covert action deals principally with developments in the United States that are inspired to some extent, certainly, by events abroad. If the essay's title is interpreted to mean that it is one more reflection on the embarrassments caused the Reagan administration by the revelations of secret arms sales to Iran and the consequent siphoning-off of funds to the *contras* in Nicaragua, this actually is a very small part of the story told. The author's interest is principally to explain why American covert action, independently of what has happened recently, is proving increasingly difficult to sustain, not least because of changes in American domestic politics. Indeed, Treverton argues that all American action in the Third World, covert or overt, is proving harder to manage. It is with covert action, however, that he is principally concerned: with the secret dispatch of funds or weapons, with the training of foreign forces seen to be the beneficiaries of American aid.

When covert actions were relatively small, as they were in the 1950s, it was easy to maintain their secrecy; today, when such actions are on a much larger scale, the chances of keeping the operations secret are greatly reduced. Also, those whom the American covert actions are principally intended to harm, according to the author, are generally more accomplished in knowing how to deal with the matter; they may even see the advantage to themselves, politically, of inciting the American "devil" to do his worst. Their own revolutionary purposes may well be served by American intervention. While certain Third World regimes are undoubtedly vulnerable today, not least because their economies are disordered and their governments appear to have such limited control over their populations, Treverton questions whether "relatively small American interventions" will cause any of them to fall. Why, then, does the United

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States continue to resort to covert action? To understand that, it is important to know more about the CIA, an agency that has an extraordinary reputation, at least in Washington, for being able to get things done. Still, covert action is not simply the invention of the CIA; to understand its continued use, one must also consider the modern American presidency, with its penchant for getting things done quickly, efficiently, secretly.

Gregory Treverton, in giving attention to the institutional structure of the CIA, in reflecting on why "covert action," much more than "espionage," has been the classic route for career advancement in the Agency, understands that such action, by its very size, drama, and speed, by the prospect of its bringing the intelligence officer into touch with officials at the highest levels, both within and sometimes outside the Agency, cannot fail to appeal to those who are ambitious. The activity is thought to be highly professional; politicians and officials outside the main circle of the intelligence community are viewed as interlopers whose opinions need not always be taken seriously. Indeed, there may be compelling reasons for not consulting them. In any case, political leaders, understanding the imperative need for secrecy, will usually be reluctant to expand their circle of advisers when a specific course of covert action is being considered. The predominant concern is to minimize the risk of a "leak." In these circumstances, the operation goes forward with relatively little criticism from outside, and not always very much criticism from inside; the CIA, we are told, is highly compartmentalized. When, as with the Iran affair, the White House itself denies CIA involvement, the possibilities of the operation becoming truly bizarre, conceived and executed by a few, are greatly increased.

Lest the reader imagine that presidents are frequently the victims of the CIA, forced to do what the Agency wishes, the author emphasizes that the true initiative for most important covert actions generally comes from the White House. The history of American covert action is not a tale of histrionic bureaucrats run amok, responding principally to their own definitions of political and strategic necessity. The CIA, which sees itself as being in the business of taking risks, will occasionally act upon its own initiative, but its characteristic mode of operation is to follow instructions that reflect the major foreign policy decisions made at the highest levels. The Agency generally executes what the White House assumes to be a reasonable or

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necessary policy. However, as Treverton says, when a decision is made to engage in covert action, few reflect sufficiently on what will happen if that covert action fails or is suddenly revealed. The long-term costs of failure or premature revelation are too frequently ignored; even when taken into account, there is a wish to believe that the costs will not have to be borne.

This kind of shortsightedness neglects the moral dimensions of the problem, the repercussions that are likely to follow both at home and abroad from those who ask whether a democratic state, claiming to be respectful of the rights of other states, ought to be intervening in certain ways. As the author acknowledges, even overt policy actions are subject to review by constituencies at home and abroad; these policies may well generate dissent; however, they at least do not suffer from the additional stigma of being regarded as surreptitious. Non-intervention, according to the author, is not "just a moral principle"; it has positive instrumental value, helping to distinguish American policy from Soviet policy, doing much to give America its influence in the world. When American and Soviet interventions are viewed as comparable by others, the United States knows that it has suffered a significant "foreign policy loss."

The question, then, is how a country like the United States can help its "friends," what it ought to try to do in today's international environment. So long as the possibility of covert action remaining secret was good, arguments could be made for taking such action in special circumstances. Today, where the chances for maintaining secrecy are small, the arguments for openness are more compelling. Openness, however, is not always easy to accomplish; in some instances, covert activities will still be called for. Even if they are less numerous, it is important to establish some rationale for their use. Treverton asks whether there may not be good reason for the military conducting such actions more frequently, rather than choosing to leave them always in the control of the CIA. The important issue, however, is that of accountability. Americans are increasingly intolerant of operations that are freewheeling, where secrecy does indeed provide some flexibility, but where no one is ultimately responsible for what happens, where no one asks the "what next" question: What follows if the action becomes public? A secret operation must be able to bear the test of sudden and unexpected disclosure. If such

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disclosure will create great problems within the country, with America's allies abroad or with others, if it is seen to contradict official American policy—as the Iran arms deal clearly did—then it cannot be deemed a viable option. There are other guidelines of this sort that ought to govern action; conducting covert activities in the 1980s in the spirit and manner of the 1950s is not only injudicious, it is positively dangerous and should be avoided by reasonable officials who acknowledge some sort of public responsibility.

To move from these essays, overwhelmingly concerned with the communist world today and with the United States, to consider questions of a more deliberately historical character, may seem like a major leap. In fact, the two principal segments of this issue are intimately linked. All the essays in the first section are informed by a historical concern and interest; yet they are not the ruminations of journalists or politicians translated to a world that is said to be changing, where excitement reigns, whose languages they do not know, whose institutional and other landmarks are largely unfamiliar to them. So, in this second part, where the subjects are putatively historical, the point of view is wholly contemporary. There is good reason why the issue is entitled "Past and Present"; the title is equally appropriate to both major parts of the issue.

Frank Manuel, in "Lovejoy Revisited," is concerned with the present status of the history of ideas. How, he asks, is this discipline faring? How do we today esteem the work of one of its great practitioners, Arthur Lovejoy? To place Lovejoy's work in some sort of historical context, Manuel goes back to the seventeenth century, and then to the Greeks, the Jews, the Arabs, and the medieval Christian thinkers, to demonstrate how ancient is the tradition of seeking to explore and explain the "chain" of opinion on specific subjects. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was great interest in tracing and chronicling "the spread of individual myths and discrete religious and philosophical ideas in the ancient lands of the Mediterranean." Much of this writing was intended to show erudition, both historical and philological, and some of it was produced as a sort of academic exercise—learning for learning's sake. However, it also involved the consideration of major abstractions, such as happiness, luxury, virtue, and a good many others. While some today will seek to produce intellectual histories in this tradition, considerably more ambitious goals for the field have existed since the

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nineteenth century, when increased attention was given to defining the nature of the *Zeitgeist*, to the "spirit of the age." With these preoccupations, it became common to speak of "isms," to look into the origins and evolution of everything from rationalism and romanticism to liberalism, socialism, and communism. The question of influence—of ideas on ideas, of gifted individuals, recalled and commemorated particularly on the principal anniversaries of their birth or death—became major "industries" in the field of intellectual history. Much of this work, however, was done somewhat haphazardly, without any firm theoretical foundation. According to Professor Manuel, it was Arthur Lovejoy who proposed the establishment of a discipline called the History of Ideas, who sought to endow the field with some semblance of theory.

Lovejoy, with his wide learning in many areas, wanted to arrange inquiry into the history of ideas in such a way as to facilitate study in a modern university. His intention was not so much to establish a "party platform" for the intellectual historian as to illustrate approaches that might be profitably used. Frank Manuel's purpose, in reassessing Lovejoy's approach, is to welcome the invitation implicit in the life work of this famous Johns Hopkins historian, to continue "discourse with the higher mental systems and literatures of the past," thereby avoiding the lamentable idea that the storage and cataloguing of ideas is a sufficient task. While praising the objective, Manuel sees a certain parochialism in the Lovejoy approach; very American, pre-Freudian and pre-Marxist, it shows many of the advantages and disadvantages characteristic of intellectual endeavors of the period. The American academic world, according to the author, was at that moment too cut off from Germany, not only from the Germany of the Nazis, but also from the Germany of Wilhelm and Weimar, with its distinctive intellectual and scholarly preoccupations. The major tendencies of German twentieth-century thought, with certain minor exceptions, were too little known in the New World. While the growth of an American interest in ideas coincided with the worst years of the Great Depression, when concern with such matters seemed almost to deny the material suffering of the society, Lovejoy, as a very American intellectual, was largely interested in method. He saw ideas as analogous to chemical compounds, waiting to be broken down into their constituent elements. Hostile to all moralizing, and also to the rendering of whole epochs in grandiose

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adjectival descriptions, Lovejoy had no use for such humbug. His purposes were more modest: he wished to study an idea in its several historical environments, and this involved "isolating it and separating it from the matrix." Analyzing and synthesizing, he was searching always for the components that were essentially identical over time.

Today's historians of ideas pay little attention to such concerns; their interests are of a very different kind. Some of their work, as the author implies, demonstrates little more than virtuosity, and much of it goes largely unread. The history of ideas does not even exist as a discrete subject in some places; the subject must compete with a Marxist analysis that dwells largely on social and economic issues. Today, when there is a certain vogue for marrying the two, for being concerned with the ideas of ordinary people as expressed in popular literature, the study of popular culture, in the author's mind, can easily become imprisoning, condemning the historian to life in an intellectual ghetto. Lovejoy, for all his interest in folklore and his concern with minor thinkers and poets, never imagined that he would discover seminal thinking in such popular literature. Professor Manuel, surveying what French scholars in the field have recently done, and paying particular attention to the works of Michel Foucault, himself greatly influenced by German phenomenology, recognizes that Foucault drew his concepts from areas that Lovejoy knew scarcely at all—biology, economics, and linguistics. What *belles-lettres* and the work of classical philosophers was for Lovejoy—the historical intellectual continuum that had existed since the time of the ancient Greeks—had less interest for Foucault; his concern was overwhelmingly with ruptures, with man as "a novelty-making, unpredictable animal." Foucault, the author explains, saw the different layers of civilization as discontinuous, very much in the manner of Freud or Marx. Foucault's interest was in excavation, in the "subterranean, unconscious connections" that must always be looked for. He advised historians to avoid "a slavish reproduction of the official intellectual continuities that the thinkers of an epoch themselves declared important and to concentrate instead on those of which they were unaware." While Foucault "deliberately remained mute on the dynamics of change," he clearly thought Marxist determinism too facile and too superficial. All his work, the author explains, implicitly repudiates the idea of long-term historical inheritances, at least in the manner that Lovejoy wanted to discover. Those

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who accept the idea of "cataclysmic breaks in historical consciousness," as many contemporary historians do, will find it difficult to accept Lovejoy; but that does not imply a total repudiation of his major insights. If "there are important psychic ruptures," Frank Manuel writes, this does not mean that "there can be no filiations." Lovejoy, born in 1873, could easily accept the idea of duration, the idea of the unity of Western culture; for men born in this century, it is much less easy to do so.

Because 1989 is the bicentennial year of the outbreak of the French Revolution, because *Dædalus* is giving consideration to how it might commemorate that event, but mostly because the theme of revolution figures so conspicuously in this volume, it seems appropriate to include at least two essays that look at the phenomenon of revolution in quite new ways. Stanley Hoffmann, in his brief "Note on the French Revolution and the Language of Violence," is concerned with what he calls "the involuntary invention of totalitarianism during the French Revolution."

Exploring the language of the French revolutionaries, Hoffmann sees how much the idea of virtue was attached to the myth of unity and unanimity, how much division and conflict were seen to be unnatural, treasonable, criminal dispositions to be dealt with violently through purges. "A civic Republic of virtuous, frugal happiness" was what the Revolution hoped to achieve. While this was the ideal, the reality was different: the manipulation by the few, who claimed to be speaking for the many, on behalf of a very specific vision of "the good life." The author, curious to know how all this came to happen, dissatisfied with Marxist and neo-Marxist economic explanations, finding no better answer in Alexis de Tocqueville's political explanations, and not wholly persuaded by the preoccupation of contemporary historians, with their emphasis on *mentalités* and culture, sets out on a somewhat unconventional path. Although Professor Hoffmann chooses to compare the American Revolution with the French, in the tradition of Crane Brinton, his interest is less in the so-called stages of the two revolutions as in their very distinctive rhetoric. The American Revolution, grounded in a relatively egalitarian and democratic ethos, more free of the past, used a largely utilitarian language that was intended to preserve community and individual rights but to avoid the establishment of too strong a state. The question for the Americans was whether specified rights

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could be extended to all, including the nonwhite minorities. In the French instance, the Old Regime, in its feudal form, was still present in 1789, though obviously changing. A very loose coalition was fighting a tradition that was essentially undemocratic, centralizing, absolutist. In France the dramatic encounter, in its many guises, was essentially between liberty and the state, with liberty defined differently by the various contending factions. Jacobinism, grounded in Rousseauistic philosophy, was seeking to create a modern concept of the nation and of citizenship more generally; it tried to do so out of disparate elements, attached to quite different traditions in the past. The effort required to integrate these elements to one form of government that would be deemed a legitimate expression of true Rousseauist purpose, led to an involuntary invention of modern totalitarianism. Based on the concept of the need to employ terror in order to impose obedience, if only as a temporary measure on the road to "the republic of virtue," the Revolution led to an end no one had forseen. Why did this happen? Because, according to Stanley Hoffmann, the Revolution "was from the beginning embroiled in the language of contention." As the battle grew more intense, the move from the language of battle to the language of crime and treason was easy. Also, as the illusions fell away, the past proved to be too strong, and the fear too great. The state became the new religion; pluralism was once again denied, and Rousseau's philosophy caught the public fancy. His myth, emphasizing unity and uniformity, assimilating both politics and ethics, could not fail to appeal to a French society fragmented into so many parts. In contrasting the French Revolution with that of the Bolsheviks in 1917, Stanley Hoffmann sees one overwhelming difference: the Jacobins "stumbled into undeliberate, unplanned terror"; it was impossible for participants in a later revolution to claim that a similar accident had befallen them. Lenin, in fact, never made such a claim; he understood the uses of and necessities for terror.

George Kelly, in his essay "Alphonse de Lamartine: The Poet in Politics," describes this major figure in the French revolutionary turmoil of 1848 as more than a literary man caught up in revolutionary politics. Kelly's purpose is to analyze how a man who imagined himself a "militant herald of harmony" could have been so influential. To understand this, according to the author, it is important to see how different 1848 was from 1789. There was "a pow-

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erful religious current" present in 1848, "a kind of 'liberation theology' before its time," writes Professor Kelly. Lamartine was a principal actor in developing this current; his great work, *Les Girondins*, may be seen as an instance where literature provided a model that history was then invited to copy. Lamartine, according to Kelly, was one of the few poets in history who not only engaged in politics, but who actually could claim to have held political power. For this to happen, we are told, poetry, politics, and religion had to overlap. They did in 1848, as Lamartine had long hoped they might.

If Lamartine's poetic gifts were important, they would never have brought him to power had he not also been endowed with a great public presence and with very impressive oratorial talents. He succeeded in the Chamber in parliamentary debate, but his great success was outside, with the crowd. There, he achieved the effects he wanted, creating bitter enmities; his rivals, for the most part, chose to see him as little more than an artful conjurer. Lamartine played on the mob, and his playing was generally successful—more often than his detractors were willing to acknowledge.

This, however, could not make him appealing to those who were proper bourgeois, good liberals who saw politics and poetry as occupying necessarily separate spheres. The new "muscular history" of Lamartine and others of his intellectual position could never appeal to such men, nor, for that matter, to those of more aristocratic bent, like Tocqueville. The politicians had scant respect for Lamartine even as they feared him. In their memoirs, they made his ideas seem puerile and insipid. They felt instinctively that he was not one of them, even as they were compelled to acknowledge his liberalism. His egotism gave offense, but so also did his demagoguery. Tocqueville's verdict was the most damning: ". . .he is the only one who seemed to me always ready to turn the world upside down in order to divert himself. . . .Neither have I known a mind less sincere, nor one that has a more thorough contempt for the truth."

Although Lamartine was judged harshly by his contemporaries and failed to create a true progeny for his ideas, Kelly sees him as a true "liberal," expressing a "liberalism of principle" and indeed a "liberalism of conjuncture." Devoted to liberty, but in a context that few could appreciate or understand, Lamartine defined liberty as a "mysterious phenomenon whose secret belongs to God alone, but

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whose witness is the conscience, and whose evidence is virtue." This was neither a "politics" nor a "liberty" that the ordinary politician could accept or find useful. Kelly calls it "evangelistic and apocalyptic," with very limited appeal for practical men.

However committed Lamartine might have been to revolutionary principles, revolutionary action was abhorrent to him, particularly when it required crime or violence. He wanted change, but refused to accept the price that the Jacobins had countenanced. He saw his own mission as helping to bring revolution about, but controlling and limiting its damage. His dream—what he sought to do in 1848—was to realize once again the pious and simple virtues of family and village life. George Kelly, while unwilling to close the gates of power to the poet, recognizes the hazards even as he sketches the circumstances that could exist to make the poet's services useful. Lamartine's life, as portrayed by Kelly, helps to illuminate an age; it also does much to illustrate a problem, the role of the creative artist in politics. More than that, however, it is a comment on revolution and its rhetoric.

The last essay, which stands by itself in this issue, is by Lincoln Chen; the subject, "The AIDS Pandemic." It would be difficult to imagine an essay more appropriate than this one to a *Dædalus* issue entitled "Past and Present." There can be few developments in the world today more alarming or more disconcerting than the steady and rapid spread of AIDS as a deadly infectious disease. The information conveyed by Dr. Chen in this article would be reason enough to publish it. There are, however, two other reasons for concluding the issue with this article. In it, the author argues that the hazards of this disease are now so great, and will continue to be so even if a vaccine against new infection is rapidly discovered, that only the most innovative kinds of international cooperation can succeed in arresting the spread of the disease. Dr. Chen calls for an internationalist approach to disease control of a kind that has never been attempted before. In our next *Dædalus* issue, to be entitled "Futures," Dr. Chen will spell out in greater detail what such an internationalist approach could be, and why it is mandatory. Also, given what he says about the moral issues raised by the rapid spread of this deadly disease, it is expected that such questions will also figure prominently in future issues of the Journal.

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In "The AIDS Pandemic," the author does more than document the spread of the disease. While concerned with its biology and epidemology, his preoccupation is to understand what happens when a disease of this kind reaches pandemic proportions; what the health consequences are, but also what the political, social, and moral costs may be. Looking at other world epidemics, at the great infectious disease catastrophes of human history, starting with the Black Death in the fourteenth century and continuing in time through the great cholera outbreaks of the last century, Dr. Chen indicates why the AIDS hazard, with its lifelong infection, long latency period, and asymptomatic transmission, spreading today with a speed that has made it a world health problem in less than a decade, will not submit to the kinds of palliative measures that some deem sufficient. A much more fundamental kind of international cooperation, almost without precedent, is required. The AIDS pandemic, touching as it does highly sensitive national and personal feelings, involving the health of even the most advanced countries, is intimately affected by health conditions globally. Because the disease is wholly impervious to social class or other such distinctions, there is an urgent need for a kind of transcultural tolerance that has never been in very abundant supply.

Because Dr. Chen believes that there is probably no more neglected area of research than the field of health-related behavior, and because the customary measures for controlling infectious disease may be woefully inadequate in this instance, he sees the problem as one of exceptional complexity, touching issues of individual human rights, privacy, and liberty in new ways. Certain of the more traditional justifications for specific compulsory public health measures will probably not be sufficient. The situation around the world suggests that feelings on the subject are now so highly charged that none of the conventional devices are likely to prove effective. It is impossible, the author says, for any country to adopt an "isolationist" stance in respect to AIDS; all attempts to control travel and the like are almost certain to fail. Nor is it possible to imagine a "war on AIDS," a global "crash" program to eradicate the disease, comparable to what was once accomplished with smallpox. The two diseases are completely different; the methods appropriate to the containment of one are wholly irrelevant to the containment of the other. This is not to say that much cannot be done, and done immediately. Dr. Chen, in his last pages, outlines a long-term internationalist strategy that could

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make a very substantial difference very quickly. We feel privileged to be able to publish this paper, written to an almost impossible deadline, on a subject of the greatest and most urgent importance.

S.R.G.

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Gail W. Lapidus

Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System

SEVENTY YEARS AFTER THE VICTORY of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Soviet system stands at a crossroads, confronted by a set of choices that will determine, as Mikhail Gorbachev has put it, whether or not the Soviet Union will enter the twenty-first century "in a manner worthy of a great power." Within the Soviet elite a dramatic struggle is under way, a struggle at least as momentous as the one that followed Stalin's death in 1953; a struggle not only over the reform of prevailing institutions and policies but, as the poet Andrei Voznesensky recently put it, one that involves a "revolution in consciousness" within the Soviet elite.

Despite striking parallels to Khrushchev's earlier campaign for de-Stalinization and the reform of the Soviet system, the scope of current efforts is potentially broader and its thrust rather different. At issue are not merely the errors of a single leader, however significant his role, but the very nature of the system he shaped and its capacity to effectively address both the internal and the international demands of the 1980s and beyond. Although Gorbachev has not called into question the fundamental economic and political arrangements or the overarching values of the Soviet system, he is clearly engaged in the delegitimation of the legacy of Stalin as well as that of Brezhnev. His campaign for *perestroika* (restructuring) is a call for far-reaching departures from prevailing practices and norms across virtually every area of Soviet life. Its success would entail radical changes not only in the organization of the Soviet economy, but also in social and cultural policy, in the nature of Soviet political life, and ultimately in the

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allocation of status, power, and rewards throughout the Soviet system.

It is tempting indeed to view current developments in the Soviet Union through the prism of Russian history. Over several centuries, international weakness or military defeat has repeatedly served as a catalyst for internal reform, and Gorbachev can plausibly be portrayed as the latest in a long tradition of reforming tsar-autocrats, from Peter the Great to Stalin, seeking to impose radical and coercive modernization from above on a passive, backward, and recalcitrant society. While this analogy is not altogether wide of the mark, it fails to capture the extent to which current efforts at reform are a belated response to fundamental economic and social changes that have altered the relationship of state and society in Russia. The current attempt at reform is only partially a renewed effort at mobilization from above; it is, at the same time, an effort to adapt an increasingly anachronistic and ossified set of economic, political, and social institutions and norms to a changing society with important elements of dynamism.

Moreover, the striking parallels between Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union and the reforms under way in China, as well as the various attempts at reform in Eastern Europe, suggest that what is involved is not merely a pattern of change unique to Russian political culture but a set of challenges and responses characteristic of post-totalitarian communist systems more generally.

Gorbachev's point of departure is a far-reaching critique of past policies and practices, resting on a diagnosis of Soviet ills that bears a striking resemblance to the assessments of Western Sovietologists. At the January 1987 plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee, Gorbachev's sweeping attack on economic stagnation, social corrosion, political conservatism and inertia, the spread of apathy and cynicism, and the absence of legal and political accountability could have been drawn from the pages of any number of Western studies of the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970s or early 1980s.[1]

Moreover, while Gorbachev has yet to formulate a comprehensive strategy for change, key elements of his emerging program echo themes long present in the writings of prominent Soviet reformers. Some twenty years ago, three distinguished members of the Soviet intelligentsia—Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Valery Turchin—addressed a letter to the Soviet leadership appealing for a

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gradual democratization of the Soviet system and outlining a series of measures for reform. Drawing an analogy between the Soviet economy and an urban traffic intersection, they observed that when only a few cars existed, traffic police could easily cope with their task, but as the stream of traffic steadily increased, fining the drivers and replacing the police would no longer guarantee a smooth flow of traffic. "The only solution," they argued, "is to widen the intersection. The obstacles hindering the development of our economy lie outside it, in the social and political sphere, and all measures that do not remove these obstacles are doomed to ineffectiveness."[2] Gorbachev's policies not only echo many of their recommendations; they stem from a similar recognition that economic development and the growing maturity of Soviet society demand new approaches to its management. In short, Gorbachev is engaged in an effort to address those obstacles through a fundamental redefinition of the relationship of state and society.

If Gorbachev's efforts are daunting in their scope, they are also highly uncertain in their prospects. As recent developments in China—not to mention earlier experiences in Eastern Europe—should serve to remind us, the reform of Leninist systems is both difficult and reversible. The sheer technical complexity of the undertaking, the ideological and political challenge it poses, the bureaucratic resistance it inevitably engenders, and the popular conservatism and inertia it must overcome, test the political skills and the will of even the most determined reformist leaders. Paradoxical as it may seem, despite the enormous concentration of power at the apex of the Soviet system, the very considerable constraints that have developed in the post-Stalin era to limit the power of the Party's General Secretary now serve to inhibit the cause of reform. Moreover, while previous attempts at reform in Eastern Europe were constrained by the threat of Soviet intervention, the Soviet leadership faces a constraint absent in Eastern Europe: the danger that reform will unleash centrifugal forces within the multinational Soviet system as well as threaten to destabilize its East European empire.

If Gorbachev's attempt at reform challenges deeply ingrained features of Soviet behavior, it also invites a reconsideration of some of our own assumptions about the nature of the Soviet system. In challenging the image of unchanging communist systems, it raises fundamental questions about the sources and patterns of change,

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about the potential scope as well as the limits of transformation, and about the linkages between domestic reform and international behavior.

Discussions of change in the Soviet Union all too often reject as without significance alterations that fall short of a fundamental structural transformation. Clearly, current developments do not fundamentally challenge the Party's monopoly of political power, or the key features of a centralized command economy, or the state's monopoly over the critical channels of information and communication. Nor do they even approach the scale of changes under way in China, not to mention those attempted during the Prague Spring of 1968. If the criterion of significant change is the evolution of communist systems toward market economies, liberal–democratic polities, and pluralist societies with independent bases of power, the current changes are unlikely to appear worthy of note.

And yet, just as Khrushchev's reforms succeeded in dismantling several key features of the Stalinist system—the reliance on mass terror, the central role of the secret police, the untrammeled power of a dictatorial leader exalted in the cult of personality—and thereby significantly transformed the nature of Soviet politics, so too might Gorbachev's reforms alter the functioning of the command economy, the role of official ideology, the role of the media, and above all the way in which the party/state deals with its own society, in ways that meaningfully affect the lives of the Soviet people, as well as the Soviet relationship to the international community.

Indeed, in most political systems most of the time, significant economic, political, and social changes occur within the framework of existing institutions. No serious analyst of American history would dismiss Roosevelt's New Deal or the "Reagan Revolution" as without real significance because they represented mere changes of policy without altering the fundamental structure of the American system. In confining our focus to the admittedly remote prospects for systemic change, we may well be using concepts and vocabularies insufficiently rich to capture the more modest but nonetheless significant changes that are in fact occurring within the communist world. The broadening scope of quasi-autonomous economic, social, and cultural activity, and the retreat of the state from efforts to control it, may well herald the emergence of an embryonic civil society in Russia.[3]

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This essay will explore three issues that are central to understanding current developments in the U.S.S.R.: the sources of the impetus for change; Gorbachev's strategy for reform in both domestic and foreign policy; and the obstacles it confronts, with a view to assessing both its long-term prospects and its implications for the West.

THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

Gorbachev's strategy has its roots in a series of broad political and social changes that created both the context and the impetus for reform in the Soviet Union: the gradual erosion (which became increasingly visible by the late 1970s) of confidence in the Soviet regime within the broader society, and in Brezhnev's political leadership within the broader elite. This growing malaise and even alienation was the product of two mutually reinforcing trends: an objective deterioration in the performance of the Soviet economy, which brought in its wake a mounting array of social and political problems, and a growing mood of demoralization within the Soviet elite, reflecting a subtle but profound shift in perceptions of regime performance. Their effects were exacerbated further by the immobilism of an aging political leadership unable to act effectively to reverse the decline.

The deteriorating performance of the Soviet economy was the critical catalyst in the growing perception of failure. For the first time since Stalin's death, slowing rates of economic growth made it impossible to guarantee, by the late 1970s, a simultaneous increase in per capita consumption, investment, and military spending. As the competition over increasingly scarce resources intensified, a growing gap between mass expectations of continued improvement in living standards and the leadership's capacity to satisfy them threatened the implicit "social compact" that had replaced the extensive reliance on mass terror and coercion and served as the cornerstone of stability in the post-Stalin era.

The economic slowdown was compounded by technological backwardness, creating yet a second "gap" of profound political and psychological importance: the gap that increasingly separated the Soviet economy from those of other advanced industrial societies, as well as from the dynamic newly industrializing countries of Asia, from South Korea to Singapore. As a new industrial revolution

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transformed the international economy, placing a high premium on rapid technological innovation, speedy communication, and high-quality products, the Soviet system increasingly appeared to be relegated to marginality, a comparative backwater whose economic performance was increasingly incommensurate with its political ambitions, and threatened to jeopardize its military prowess.

Economic slowdown and diminished international competitiveness might not necessarily have generated a sense of urgency; but they coincided with and contributed to a sea-change in attitudes: an increasingly negative assessment of regime performance, reflecting a change in the criteria used to evaluate it; a growing sense of failure; growing pessimism about the future—in effect, a crisis of confidence within the Soviet elite. By the early 1980s not only Western observers but key Soviet officials were themselves, in a fashion unprecedented since the early 1920s, beginning to use the term "crisis" to convey the urgency of the situation.[4]

This dramatic shift in attitudes was rooted in broader social and demographic changes that had transformed the passive and inarticulate peasant society of the Stalin era into an urban industrial society with an increasingly articulate and assertive middle class. The society over which Khrushchev presided in the 1950s was still predominantly rural. By the mid-1980s, in contrast, two thirds of the Soviet population lived in cities, and a growing share had been born in them. Urbanization was transforming the quality of urban life as well. In 1959 only three Soviet cities numbered over one million in population; by 1985 that figure had reached twenty-two million. Moreover, the spread of television brought urban life-styles and values to the remotest corners of Soviet territory. Even in 1965 fewer than one in three Soviet families owned television sets; by 1986 television was almost universal.

Rapid urbanization was accompanied by a dramatic rise in the educational attainments of the Soviet population. In 1959 two thirds of the Soviet population over the age of ten had no more than a primary education; by 1986 almost two thirds had completed secondary education. In 1959 only 5.5 million Soviet citizens had higher education, compared to 22 million in 1986. The growth in the number of "scientific workers" was especially dramatic: from 1.5 million in 1950 to 15 million in 1986.[5] In short, by the mid-1980s a large urban middle class, including a substantial professional,

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scientific–technical, and cultural intelligentsia, had emerged as a major actor on the Soviet scene.

These changes, moreover, were reflected in the character of the Communist Party itself, as both its membership and its leadership were increasingly drawn from this milieu. Over one third of all urban males with higher education, for example, were Party members, and higher education had become the norm rather than the exception within the Politburo itself.

We can only speculate on the impact of these social and generational changes on the values and expectations of the Soviet population, but the evidence suggests that they profoundly affected patterns of popular support for official norms. In contrast to the attitudes of earlier generations of Soviet citizens (such as the refugees from World War II interviewed in the Harvard Project of the 1950s),[6] regime support appears inversely related to education among younger generations. The more highly educated the respondents interviewed in a recent survey, the weaker their support for state control over the economy, and the greater their commitment to individual as against collective rights. Moreover, younger age cohorts, regardless of their levels of education, tended to be more favorably disposed than their elders to private economic activity and to individual rights.[7]

This transformation of attitudes has its counterpart in Soviet behavior as well: a shift in expectations and energies from the public to the private realm that has paralleled the emergence of an intellectual and moral rationale for the increasing "privatization" of Soviet life. In a striking dramatization of this trend, *Pravda* itself published a letter from a young woman explaining that she had resigned her membership in the Komsomol (Communist youth organization) in order to have more time for her private life![8] Whether in the burgeoning "second economy" or in a blossoming popular culture (and facilitated by newly available technologies, from automobiles to VCRs, whose use is not readily amenable to central control), official norms and institutions have been progressively supplanted by new forms of largely autonomous expression responsive to the preferences of consumers rather than those of officials.

The ability of the Soviet leadership to channel and shape the direction of social change has been strikingly diminished in the post-Stalin era. The image of "revolution from above," with all its connotations of state domination of a passive society, no longer

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corresponds to a reality in which social forces have achieved a degree of autonomy, and indeed actively impinge on the political system in unprecedented ways. The erosion of political control over important sectors of Soviet life is abundantly illustrated by the evolution of the "second economy," which by its very existence subverts centrally established priorities and challenges centralized control over prices, income distribution, and the allocation of capital and manpower. The spread of corruption, particularly within the political elite, threatens the organizational integrity and political legitimacy of the Party, and feeds both the resentment of those excluded from patronage and the hostility of those critical of its existence.

A parallel development is visible in the escape of important dimensions of social behavior from official control. People marry, reproduce, and divorce without reference to official demographic policy; they migrate from north and east to south and west in defiance of planners' preferences; and their devotion to religious beliefs and practices resists all efforts to invigorate atheistic propaganda. A whole spectrum of social pathologies, from alcoholism and drug addiction to crime, dramatize the limits of political control.

This broader shift in values within the educated elite during the 1960s and 1970s, best captured in works of Soviet literature but visible as well in social science scholarship, centers on four broad themes. The first is a shift from the emphasis on party-mindedness *(partiinost')* to preoccupation with universal moral concerns: the meaning of truth, the nature of good and evil, the moral significance of memory. The popularity of contemporary Soviet writers whose works address such themes, such as the Kirgiz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov, and the intense discussions they provoke in Soviet literary and cultural journals, is an important indicator of the values and concerns of the educated public.

A second trend is a shift away from collectivism, with its image of a solidary society, to increased recognition of individual and social diversity and ultimately of the potential for social conflict. In scholarly writings on social stratification or on nationality issues, the scope and durability of class and ethnic differences are not merely acknowledged but legitimized, and—to borrow a metaphor from American social science—the vision of a socialist future has been transformed from a melting pot to a salad bowl.

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The open recognition of conflicting interests is a precondition of serious political discussion in any society, bearing as it does on the crucial problem of the allocation of rewards. It is therefore of no small significance that two of the major intellectual debates of the 1970s and 1980s in the Soviet Union have centered on the nature of contradictions in socialist society and on the meaning of social justice.[9]

Related to this trend but distinct in its implications was a parallel shift from acceptance of the notion of a "single truth" to a recognition of the legitimacy and indeed the necessity of divergent opinions. While the early post-Stalin era was marked by a considerable broadening of the boundaries of permitted discussion on a whole range of issues, the insistence that open discussion was a precondition of scientific progress as well as of cultural vitality, and that it should extend from technical to political issues, directly challenged the traditional claims of Party ideology.

A fourth trend has been the gradual retreat from utopia and a growing realization of the limits of social engineering. Whereas social pathologies—from chauvinism to corruption, from drug addiction to crime—were once treated as "relics of the past," with the implicit assumption that a vast chasm would separate the socialist society of the future from its capitalist counterpart, current discussions of social problems accept their universality in all social systems, focus on how such behaviors are socially reproduced, and direct energies toward incremental improvements rather than eradication.

This impressionistic sketch of emergent attitudes and values by no means exhausts an increasingly rich, diverse, and contradictory spectrum of expression, not all of whose manifestations have tended toward liberalization and increased tolerance. Side by side with this incipient reformism, and equally alienated from the ethos of the Brezhnev era, two other currents commanded some support in this urban milieu. One was a technocratic orientation that sought the solution to current problems in the application of new scientific and technological processes and products, and of managerial techniques, and saw in the military economy a possible model for emulation. The second was, if anything, anti-technological, identifying with a romantic nationalism that found its symbolism in the Russian past and protesting the ravages inflicted on nature and culture by the unbridled pursuit of industrialism and material progress.

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The spiritual alienation of important segments of the intelligentsia would not have had so serious an impact, had it not become entwined with the deteriorating economic situation of the late 1970s. Détente further compounded the problem. By increasing the exposure of Soviet citizens to the outside world, it provided new criteria and reference groups for evaluating Soviet achievements and shortcomings. Judged by these standards, Soviet performance was increasingly found wanting, and previous official explanations of failure no longer seemed convincing. In the face of mounting domestic and international problems, and the virtual paralysis of an aging and infirm leadership, the demoralization of an influential scientific–technical and cultural intelligentsia resentful of—and frustrated by—an authoritarian, patronizing, and exclusionary pattern of political rule constituted an important impetus for reform.

GORBACHEV'S STRATEGY

When he finally succeeded to power in 1985, Gorbachev brought to the Soviet leadership no compelling vision of the future, nor a detailed blueprint for moving toward it. Neither a "true believer" like Khrushchev, disposed toward egalitarian, utopian, and populist programs, nor a conservative bureaucrat like Brezhnev, concerned with protecting the status and privileges of fellow members of the elite, Gorbachev is the first *modern* Soviet leader, vastly more attuned than his predecessors to the imperatives of a scientific–technological age, pragmatic rather than ideological in his approach to problems, and concerned with rationalizing and making more efficient the system he has inherited.[10] He is confident of its basic stability and of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Soviet population, sharply critical of its performance, impatient with the heavy weight of inherited dogma and bureaucratic inertia, but he has no ready answers as to how it should be improved.

Gorbachev came to power, moreover, as the head of a reform-oriented coalition, united in its critical assessment of past policies and performance and agreed on the need to move vigorously and decisively to break with the Brezhnevite past, but lacking a shared consensus on a strategy of reform or on its scope. The common denominator of the coalition was support for energetic leadership,

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greater discipline, a revival of the asceticism and civic virtue associated with the heroic periods of Soviet history, and a reassertion of effective control of the strategic levers of power by the center. Beyond this common core, however, it encompassed divergent views on how to move from discipline to revitalization, and varying degrees of willingness to sacrifice traditional forms of control for the sake of stimulating greater popular initiative.

The evident contradictions in the policies pursued over the past two years are thus in part a product of the very nature of the reform coalition and the different orientations within it. They are also a result of an evident process of learning. From the summer of 1986, Gorbachev's speeches reveal a growing realization that the problems he inherited were more complex, and the obstacles to reform more daunting, than he initially appreciated. They are marked by a perceptible radicalization, a gradual shift from an emphasis on "acceleration" *(uskorenie)*—a speeding up of the tempo within a basically stable framework—to a focus on "restructuring" *(perestroika)*, which contemplates more radical and even fundamental change. Indeed, in July 1986 Gorbachev himself described "restructuring" as nothing short of revolution. It encompassed "not only the economy but all other sides of society's life: social relations, the political system, the spiritual and ideological sphere, the style and work methods of the Party and of all our cadres. Restructuring is a capacious word. I would equate restructuring with revolution. . .a genuine revolution in the minds and hearts of people, in the psychology and understanding of the present period, and, above all, in the tasks engendered by rapid scientific and technical progress."[11]

During this same period, Gorbachev's conception of reform has gradually shifted from a substantive to a processual one. His initial focus on achieving specific and measurable outcomes, particularly in the economic realm, has been progressively supplanted by a concern with process and by a focus on the broader determinants of economic progress. The striking evolution of Gorbachev's thinking during his first two years was manifested in his dramatic speech to the January 1987 plenum of the Central Committee, in which he argued that economic progress and social renewal were ultimately dependent on political democratization.

Gorbachev initially came to power with three rather traditional reformist priorities: to consolidate his political power; to arrest the

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deterioration of civic morale, restore discipline, and launch a process of social renewal; and to undertake economic reforms that would arrest the economic stagnation and technological backwardness of the Soviet economy and inject a dynamism now largely absent.

To these tasks Gorbachev brought considerable personal assets, most notably his comparative youth, formidable energy, and consummate political skill. He also brought to the leadership a strong commitment to reform, shaped by his formative years as a law student at Moscow University during the early part of the Khrushchev era and by his continuing association with reform-minded intellectuals and professionals afterwards. He benefited from a psychological climate favorable to strong and decisive leadership—an understandable reaction to the long period of indecision and drift that characterized the succession of aged and infirm leaders—and from a demographic situation that gave him considerable opportunity to speed the retirement of an entire generation of leaders from the party, state, military, and ministerial apparatuses and to fill an exceptionally large number of vacancies with his own appointees.

But he also came to power with some real liabilities: a limited political base of his own, particularly weak outside the Russian republic, and the presence of numerous well-entrenched regional leaders who had taken advantage of the stability and security afforded by Brezhnev's cadres policy to strengthen their own positions and build protective networks of informal ties based on patronage, nepotism, and corruption. Moreover, the evolution of the Soviet political system itself in the years since Stalin's death had eroded many of the bases of power and authority associated with Stalin's rule. Terror and violence were no longer available as political tools, nor was a reliance on personality cults; even the personnel weapon had been weakened by expectations of security within the elite. Thus, while Gorbachev has succeeded in forcing considerable turnover in key political positions, in using lateral transfers to bring "outsiders" into critical posts, and in forging alliances with powerful political associates, the changes so far are clearly insufficient to provide him with a broad and secure political base for his policy initiatives.

Gorbachev's political difficulties were vividly exemplified in his protracted effort to crack open the Party organization of Kazakhstan, remove its first secretary, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, and replace him

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with a new leader more responsive to the center. The appointment of a Russian to the position, in violation of expectations developed during the Brezhnev era, triggered serious local demonstrations with strong nationalist overtones, a reminder that Gorbachev's effort to reassert central control constitutes an enormous political challenge to local elites.

A second priority in Gorbachev's initial strategy was his campaign for social renewal. In a dramatic effort to arrest and reverse a widespread and snowballing atmosphere of decay, corruption, and cynicism, the new leadership sought to command the attention of the Soviet population, and to vigorously assert its authority, with three highly visible campaigns—one directed against violations of work discipline, the second against alcoholism, and the third against corruption, particularly within the elite. These campaigns, moreover, would boost economic performance in the short term by increasing labor productivity and tapping unused reserves of labor and capital. The highly publicized attack on corrupt officials assured the working class that it was not the only target of renewed social discipline and simultaneously provided the new leadership with a device for replacing political opponents. However unpopular specific measures might be, they succeeded in their larger purpose: to create from the start an image of strong and decisive leadership, and of its determination to confront widely acknowledged social problems, which would help mobilize both elite and popular support.

Gorbachev's third priority was to carry out an economic reform to arrest the stagnation in growth rates and introduce a self-sustaining process of technological innovation that would create the essential foundation for superpower status. The urgent need to shift from an extensive to an intensive pattern of economic growth had long been recognized, but bureaucratic inertia and political resistance thwarted earlier half-hearted attempts at reform under Brezhnev.

Despite his clear commitment to significant economic reform, Gorbachev's dispositions have yet to be translated into a coherent reform program, and his general statements of intent have yet to be translated into critical decisions concerning price reform, the supply system, or the relative roles of plan and market. Once made, decisions can all too readily be unmade in their implementation. Nonetheless, the broad outlines of his approach can by now be discerned.

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First, Gorbachev's strategy would simultaneously strengthen central control over strategic planning decisions and enhance initiative and responsibility at the enterprise level by striking at the middle layers of the stifling economic bureaucracy. It reflects a recognition that excessive insistence on control actually reduces the power of the center, and that relinquishing control over details may be essential to affecting outcomes. Greater latitude granted to enterprise management will also entail increased responsibility as profitability becomes the main criterion of performance. Bankruptcy is becoming a real possibility; the first such instance has been announced with jubilation.

The work force as well as each enterprise will face a more competitive environment if the economic reform proceeds. A major revision of the wage structure, allowing increased wage differentials combined with a reduction of job security, would increase the rewards for initiative and productivity and impose more severe penalties for failure on workers as well as enterprises.

The proposed reforms also seek to encourage private initiative in agriculture and in the services, where centralized planning has proven least effective, where the poor quality and limited availability of desired goods and services has been a perennial source of complaints, where dependence on supplies from other sectors is lower than in much of industry, and where the precedent of Lenin's New Economic Policy of 1921—explicitly invoked by Gorbachev—makes ideological constraints less inhibiting. The expansion of collective farm markets selling agricultural produce in urban areas, the spread of private or cooperative restaurants, encouragement of cooperative housing construction, and the creation of a network of establishments providing needed consumer services are envisioned as a modest contribution to improving the living conditions of the Soviet population, much as such measures have done in Hungary. The success of such initiatives, however, depends on the cooperation of local authorities, and complaints abound of their resistance to new proposals.

Finally, Gorbachev's economic strategy also involves new international economic policies. Not yet clearly defined, they would rely on the limited use of joint ventures with capitalist firms and on greater involvement in international economic institutions to attract Western capital, technology, entrepreneurship, and managerial skills to Soviet enterprises. Moreover, by obliging joint ventures to produce for an

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international market as well as an internal one, economic policymakers are seeking to challenge Soviet enterprises to meet international standards of quality. Whether the terms proposed will elicit the desired Western response remains in question. What all these elements of economic reform have in common is an increased reliance on the discipline of the marketplace to make Soviet products more competitive, and to challenge the sway of a "protectionism" that has long insulated the Soviet economy from outside influences and protected enterprises and workers from the consequences of failure.

The effort to expand the role of market relationships in the framework of what remains a socialist command economy, and to utilize economic levers in place of administrative mechanisms of control, encounters nearly insuperable obstacles on technical grounds alone. Past attempts have foundered on the fundamental incompatibility of the two. Moreover, the challenge such change poses to habitual norms and practices evokes political and ideological resistance. Gorbachev has explicitly tried to defuse this resistance by criticizing the tendency to view changes in the economic mechanism as a retreat from the principles of socialism. Challenging the relevance of the Stalinist economic model to contemporary needs, Gorbachev has insisted that "there will be no progress if we seek answers to new economic and technological questions in the experience of the 1930s, the 1940s, the 1950s, or even of the 1960s and the 1970s. . . ."[12] He has, in effect, called into question the identification of Stalinism with socialism, and the assumption that its features are immutable.[13]

Nonetheless, the subject remains as controversial among economists and planners as it is among consumers. An imaginary dialogue between an old and a new Party secretary published by Fedor Burlatsky, a distinguished political analyst and commentator for the influential political weekly *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* and subsequently performed as a drama on Soviet television, vividly captures the controversy. The debate focuses at one point on how to handle peasants who, taking advantage of the new regulations on private enterprise, bring cucumbers, strawberries, and other scarce produce to the cities and sell them at exorbitant prices on what is now a partially deregulated market. The old Party secretary is indignant at what he considers a revival of petit-bourgeois egoism and selfishness, a denial of everything that socialism represents. His antagonist rejects

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this view. The fundamental problem, he insists, is not the greed of individual peasants, who after all are themselves workers, but scarcity, and the proper solution is not to discipline the peasant but to increase the supply of products. Unleashing private initiative, he insists, is what will ultimately drive down prices by flooding the market with cucumbers and strawberries.

These two very different diagnoses of the sources of Soviet economic problems and two different strategies for addressing them evoke the debates of the 1920s that preceded agricultural collectivization. They also reveal the deeply rooted and continuing ideological opposition to even the expansion of "socialist markets," a far more modest undertaking than the introduction of market socialism.

But the novelty and significance of Gorbachev's strategy go beyond the three initial concerns described so far. They lie in Gorbachev's recognition that Soviet society has reached a level of maturity that requires a new approach to its governance; that the Soviet people, and particularly the educated middle classes, can no longer be treated as the objects of official policy, but have to be treated as genuine subjects. In short, they express his growing realization that successful reform rests, at bottom, on redefining the relationship of state and society.

Khrushchev had launched the process of inclusion—a shift, however erratic, from the centralized, coercive statism of the Stalinist system to a more conciliatory and flexible approach to social forces.[14] Gorbachev sought to extend it further. His advocacy of *glasnost'*, of cultural liberalization, and of "democratization," is not merely a tactical device to secure the support of the intelligentsia for his economic and political program, or a public relations effort aimed at world opinion. It reflects a profound recognition that an embryonic civil society has begun to emerge in the Soviet Union, and an unprecedented willingness to lend the process official encouragement.

The endorsement of *glasnost'*, with its simultaneous connotation of both candor and publicity, stands at the center of this effort. It is, of course, a policy of preemption, intended to reduce the reliance of the Soviet population on foreign and unofficial sources of information—from foreign television and radio broadcasts to gossip—to fill the voids created by Soviet silence. The Chernobyl experience gave enormous impetus to this effort. The fact that the Soviet people first

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learned of a major domestic catastrophe with far-reaching implications for their own welfare from foreign broadcasts, and that the news was initially denied by their own government, was a major political embarrassment. It dramatized as never before the high costs of traditional Soviet secretiveness, both domestically and internationally, and it strengthened Gorbachev's determination to expand the flow of information and communication in order to enhance the leadership's credibility among its citizens.

Glasnost' is also a symbol of trust. It reflects a recognition by the Soviet leadership of the maturity of the Soviet people, and a partial repudiation of the patronizing notion that only a small elite can safely be entrusted with the truth. It marks a real break with the entire Bolshevik conception of a vanguard party, premised as it was on the need for tutelage over backward masses.

It is equally an expression of confidence in the basic legitimacy of the Soviet system and in its leadership, a recognition that the pretense of infallibility is no longer necessary to command popular allegiance and support. Indeed, greater publicity for shortcomings and problems—whether the shoddy construction of nuclear power plants or the spread of drug addiction—is an indispensable precondition for successfully addressing them.

The case for *glasnost'* and its intimate connection to the prospects for reform was put most eloquently by Tatiana Zaslavskaia, the reformist sociologist, who argued in a remarkable article in *Pravda:*

> If we continue to keep from the people information about the conditions under which they live, say, the degree of environmental pollution, the number of industrial accidents, or the extent of crime, we cannot expect them to assume a more active role in economic or in political life. People will trust and support you only if you trust them.[15]

Finally, and of potential significance for the future, *glasnost'* is linked to accountability. An expanded and more independent role for the media—including serious investigative reporting—is an important instrument for exposing abuses of power and position and for holding officials accountable for their actions. Needless to say, it also offers a convenient weapon for use against political opponents. It is nonetheless of great importance that *glasnost'* has extended, in however tentative a manner, to the first gingerly exposés of abuses by

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the police and the KGB. Military and security affairs remain forbidden territory, and their future treatment will be a key barometer of the scope and limits of official candor.

Dramatic new departures in Soviet cultural policy—the most far-reaching and tangible of Gorbachev's reforms thus far—reflect a similar redefinition of the role of the state in the arts and an orientation toward inclusion and trust. The publication of long-suppressed poems and novels and the public screening of controversial films long kept from public view are not only a form of reconciliation with the intelligentsia but an expression of a more tolerant and encompassing approach to Soviet culture. The reappraisal of the contributions of such writers and poets as Mikhail Bulgakov, Boris Pasternak, Marina Tsvetaeva, and Anna Akhmatova, once scorned for their deviation from "socialist realism," extends the boundaries of licit literature to figures previously outside them. Pasternak's great novel of the Revolution, *Doctor Zhivago,* is now to be published in Russia. The process of reintegration also extends to elements of emigré culture, holding out the prospect of ultimately reuniting the "two streams" of Russian culture at home and abroad.

Moreover, by contrast with the cultural thaw of the Khrushchev era, current approaches involve a devolution of cultural decision-making from the center. Whereas key decisions were once on the Politburo's agenda (and it must be remembered that Khrushchev himself authorized the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and argued the merits of abstract art with the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny), or in the hands of the state censorship, Gorbachev now exhorts writers' associations and cinema directors' organizations to assume responsibility for such decisions, and assigns the editors of Moscow journals the responsibility for their contents. Changes in personnel have been accompanied by criticism of appointments dictated from above. In an unprecedented repudiation of earlier practices, the distinguished film director Elem Klimov—his own films once the victims of censorship—was elected to head the Cinematographers' Union, despite the fact that he was not a Party member. Even the Writers' Congress discussed—but failed to act on—the possibility of electing distinguished writers rather than literary bureaucrats to head their union.

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In culture as well as in the historical and social sciences, darker aspects of Soviet life have been brought to the forefront, and the positive hero of "socialist realism" has virtually disappeared from view. As part of the effort to reclaim the national past, the works of two distinguished pre-revolutionary historians (V.O. Klyuchevsky and S.M. Solovyev) are to be republished, and the proposed printings of 150,000 and 100,000, respectively, have been criticized as too modest. But it is above all the Stalin era that is emerging as a central subject. Two important cultural events of recent months—the announced publication of Anatoli Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat* and the screening of Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance*—involve unprecedentedly frank and powerful evocations of the crimes of the Stalin era, with clear lessons for the present. Citing Sergei Eisenstein's bitter remark that "the truth always triumphs in our lives, but often our lives aren't long enough," Abuladze explained to an interviewer that "even today the truth cannot always make its own way"—therefore it was necessary to make this film. "*Repentance,*" he added, is "a film that addresses not only the past and memory but the future as well."[16]

The literary and cultural journals that review these works have become a forum for major public debates with clear political ramifications. A recent review of *Repentance* vividly captured its mood:

> Don't we sometimes hear, even from young people, the proposition, at bottom a monstrous one, that in the past, under Stalin, there was greater order? But what kind of order was it? The people's life took its normal course, to be sure, and many people still retain bright memories of that time of economic development and construction. They are pages of our life, of our history. But as far as the order that supposedly reigned during the repressions is concerned, the film gives an exhaustive answer on this score. The silent line, crushed by grief, that forms in front of the barred window from which an abrupt voice, totally unlike that of a human being, barks out something rather than speaking it. . . . So many mistakes, so many personal tragedies and painful lessons are hidden in the past that this scene cannot slake our thirst for retribution and repentance in one sitting . . . we know too many cases in which an exposed evil was, after a while, declared to be a good again, and the graves of criminals were once more decorated as seemly monuments. That is why you want this frame to be repeated again and again, until there is not one person left among us who dares to say that

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"when you chop wood, the chips will fly" and that the bright edifice of the future can be built on the blood of innocent ruined people. . . .[17]

A generation without complicity in the crimes of the Stalin era can more easily reexamine the alternatives to Stalin as well, and one manifestation of the new policy is the emergence of Lenin's associates and the victims of Stalinism—Bukharin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others—from decades of oblivion. In January of this year a four-part series on Lenin made some twenty years ago appeared on Soviet television for the first time, with Bukharin played by an appealing and well-known Soviet actor. A long-suppressed 1962 play by Mikhail Shatrov, *The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk'*, which portrays Trotsky and Bukharin as devoted associates of Lenin, will open in the fall of 1987 for the seventieth anniversary of the Revolution. A more forthcoming and accurate treatment of early Soviet history than has been possible in decades has received the endorsement of Gorbachev himself, who recently asked that "forgotten names and blank spots" in Soviet history be filled in. Other figures within the leadership have been notably less sympathetic to what they view as an unwarranted tendency to minimize the achievements of the Soviet past.

In the social and policy sciences as in culture, the Gorbachev leadership is extending official sanction to values, orientations, and aspirations that, in the 1960s and 1970s, came to be increasingly widespread within the intelligentsia and specialist communities. It is reflected in the increasingly sober and objective treatment of Soviet policy as well as history, with Stalinism now portrayed as a historically limited solution to a particular set of problems rather than as a universally valid approach to modernization. If the trauma of collectivization is ultimately confronted directly, Stalinism may even be judged to have been calamitous in the 1930s, but in any event it is clearly treated as irrelevant to the 1980s. In trying to create a clean slate for new policy initiatives while still drawing on traditional sources of legitimation, it is the Lenin of the NEP period to whom Gorbachev turns.

The Gorbachev era is also characterized by apparent official acceptance of a more differentiated conception of society. A progressive erosion of earlier emphases on solidarity, homogeneity, and uniformity has been accompanied by the emergence of a new orientation that, at the very highest level, recognizes a diversity of

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groups and interests, and of the possibility of fundamental conflicts between them. It even acknowledges the need for some political expression of them, although not for politically autonomous expression. Indeed, in an unpublished talk with Soviet writers, Gorbachev himself reportedly acknowledged the need for a functional equivalent of a party opposition. This open recognition of conflicting social interests, a view long held by Tatiana Zaslavskaia, among others, and circulated in confidential memoranda and reports in the 1970s, has been effectively legitimized by its publication as a lead article in the Party ideological journal, *Kommunist*.

Indeed, a transformation of Soviet ideology, if not its actual erosion, is under way, most visible in the dramatic change that *Kommunist* itself has undergone under an editor newly appointed by Gorbachev. Lenin's conception of a single truth and an infallible approach to problems no longer holds sway; contributions present diverse and contradictory approaches to current problems and invite readers to join the discussion. The very introduction of formal debate on Soviet television, with its presentation of two diametrically opposed positions on major issues of the day (including the desirability of reform or whether Gorbachev should go to Reykjavik) without any final resolution, is a dramatic departure from long-standing behavior.

Gorbachev clearly aligned himself with the advocates of ideological change at the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum when he criticized what he called a "schematic and dogmatic approach" to Party ideology characteristic in the past. He attacked the persistence of theoretical concepts that remained at the level of the 1930s and the 1940s while the country's needs had fundamentally changed: the disappearance of vigorous debates and creative ideas, the absence of competition and conflict, and the absolutizing of particular authors and particular points of view, which, Gorbachev implied, ought to have been treated as contingent and context-dependent. And he explicitly repudiated portrayals of Soviet social structure that denied the presence of contradictions and therefore of social dynamism, rather than presenting Soviet society as embodying diverse interests.

Gorbachev's speech echoed a striking article that had appeared in late 1986 in *Izvestiia* calling for greater debate and controversy on major issues of the day. "We must get used to the idea that a

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multiplicity of voices is a natural part of openness," its author had argued;

> We must treat diversity normally, as the natural state of the world; not with clenched teeth, as in the past, but normally as an immutable feature of social life. . . . We need in the economy and other areas of Soviet life a situation where multiple variants and alternative solutions are in and of themselves development tools and preconditions for obtaining optimal results, and where the coexistence of two opposing points of view on a single subject is most fruitful.

Reminding his audience of the high price paid in the past for intolerance toward other opinions, he concludes: "We must learn to live under democratic conditions."[18]

All of these themes come together in the issue that has emerged as the most fundamental (and the most explosive) dimension of Gorbachev's strategy: his advocacy of democratization. In recent months Gorbachev appears to have concluded that the success of the entire reform effort ultimately depends on whether the Soviet people can be actively engaged in the process, and whether a greater sense of participation will at least partially compensate for the absence of other immediate payoffs. His campaign for democratization seeks to encourage more extensive involvement in grass-roots economic and political life, more candid discussions of problems in the workplace and in local state and Party organizations, and greater accountability by leaders. In a succession of speeches to workers and Party officials, Gorbachev has repeatedly called for open competition in elections to select factory managers, members of local soviets, and Party leaders, and the media have sought to provide concrete illustrations of how such novel elections might work in practice. Although Gorbachev's proposals for the competitive election of Party officials were not formally approved by the January 1987 plenum—and indeed their controversial nature was underlined by Gorbachev's admission that the plenum itself had to be postponed three times—he has pressed ahead with his campaign, has encouraged local and republic Party organizations to experiment with such elections, and has made it clear that electoral reform is high on his political agenda.

Tentative discussions of legal reform also have important implications for political democratization. Measures that would curb the arbitrary interference of officials in judicial procedures, strengthen

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guarantees of "socialist legality," offer greater protection to defendants, and define anti-Soviet behavior more narrowly, would provide an essential foundation for creating a more genuine sense of citizenship. Gorbachev's decision to permit the return of Andrei Sakharov to Moscow and his outspoken participation in public affairs are important milestones in this process.

Gorbachev's increasing focus on the need for democratization has brought to the forefront a fundamental tension that runs through virtually the entire reform effort: the tension between the urgent need to enhance initiative and the fear of losing control. Gorbachev addressed the deepest anxieties of the Party apparatus when he acknowledged: "Democracy without openness does not exist. But at the same time, democracy without a framework is anarchy. That is why it will be complex."[19] Leninism, from its inception, was fearful of spontaneity and preoccupied with maximizing control. Faced with the urgent need for new approaches to managing a modern economy and society, Gorbachev has inherited an old dilemma and is casting about for a fresh approach to its resolution. In contrast to Khrushchev and Mao, who sought to mobilize popular initiative *against* the Party and bureaucratic apparatus, Gorbachev is trying to ensure greater accountability of leaders *within* existing institutions. Nonetheless, the potential for turbulence and conflict is very real; indeed, a Kunaev might well have been the first beneficiary of genuinely free elections to the Party leadership in Kazakhstan! Responding to widespread fears that democratization would weaken discipline and undermine control, Gorbachev has accused the opponents of democratization of lacking confidence in the Soviet people. "Democracy is not the antithesis of order," he has asserted. "On the contrary, it is order on a higher level, based not on unthinking obedience and the blind execution of directives but on the full-fledged and resourceful participation of members of society in all undertakings." Acknowledging the prospect that the effort will encounter serious difficulties, Gorbachev expressed the ultimate source of his confidence: "There is no need to fear if some things don't run smoothly at first . . . . We have a mature society and a strong Party. The socialist system rests on an extremely strong foundation of the people's support. . . ."[20]

The enormity of the challenge he has launched and the limited support on which it is based have compelled Gorbachev to seek new sources and instruments of leverage. In the effort to overcome the

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resistance and inertia of the Party and state bureaucracies, and to mobilize broader support for his programs, Gorbachev has turned to the media as a major political resource. Indeed, one of the most intriguing features of the recent Soviet scene is the way in which the media have emerged as a novel and influential instrument of political power. Technological changes have created new tools of communication, most notably mass access to television, which has in a very short time rendered obsolete the entire agitprop system that was long the linchpin of Soviet political socialization. Indeed, Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader to appreciate fully and utilize this development. By placing supporters in key positions in ideological and cultural institutions—for example, as head of the ideological and cultural department within the Central Committee, or as the editors of influential journals such as *Kommunist* and *Pravda*—he has sought to shape the terms of the debate over reform to his political advantage and to compensate for his relative weakness in the more traditional organs of power.

NEW DEPARTURES IN FOREIGN POLICY

In foreign as in domestic policy, Gorbachev's succession has prompted a serious reassessment of previous assumptions and policies, and has brought with it a number of new departures in substance as well as in style. Although the changes thus far remain modest by comparison with those in domestic affairs, the new flexibility manifest in Moscow carries the potential for fresh approaches in a number of areas.

Gorbachev's foreign policy, as he himself has argued on several occasions, is a direct outgrowth of his domestic priorities. Indeed, the two are more closely entwined at this juncture than at any previous time in postwar Soviet history. Economic reform is not only the key to domestic revitalization, in Gorbachev's view; it is essential to sustain the Soviet Union's international role. To gain the time necessary to consolidate his power and carry out his domestic programs, Gorbachev urgently needs both a respite from external pressures and evidence of external success. He has therefore centered his efforts on shaping an international environment that will be more hospitable to domestic reform. The key challenge he confronts is to reframe Soviet policies to serve this purpose without jeopardizing the

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major strategic and political gains of the 1970s—and his own position with them.

Gorbachev's approach has two key features. The first is his effort to revive the atrophied instruments of Soviet diplomacy to project a more positive and dynamic Soviet image abroad, to convey an image of moderation and good-neighborliness and willingness to seek political settlements to outstanding issues, while reducing the costs and risks of Soviet involvements in the international arena. The second is to extricate the Soviet Union from dead-end positions where this can be accomplished without threatening Soviet geostrategic interests and alliance systems.

As in domestic affairs, the bases of a more dynamic and flexible Soviet foreign policy were created by a series of organizational and personnel changes that altered the foreign policy-making process itself. The replacement of the veteran foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, by Edvard Shevardnadze, signaled Gorbachev's determination to assert direct control over foreign as well as domestic policy, and to distance the new Soviet leadership from some of the liabilities of its predecessors. Equally significant in laying the foundation for new initiatives was the shift of responsibility for policy planning from the Foreign Ministry to the International Department of the Central Committee, and the replacement of its veteran and ideological head, Boris Ponomarev, by Anatoly Dobrynin, assisted by a knowledgeable staff with substantial experience abroad. The Foreign Ministry was reorganized to make it more responsive to new international trends, and in a personnel shake-up new ambassadors were appointed to the United States, China, and Japan. Changes in the leadership of key foreign policy institutes and publications, and the call for "new political thinking," further signaled Gorbachev's apparent interest in fresh approaches.

Gorbachev's initial strategy has focused on an effort to reduce tensions simultaneously with the United States and China. Without as yet offering far-reaching and fundamental concessions to either, Soviet policy has demonstrated a strikingly greater responsiveness to the long-standing concerns of both.

The United States remains the central, if less exclusive, Soviet preoccupation, and arms control its primary focus. Soviet policy in the past two years has been marked by new initiatives across the

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entire range of arms control negotiations, as well as by an unprecedented willingness to address the thorny problem of verification. When important Soviet concessions on strategic arms limitations failed to alter the Reagan administration's commitment to SDI, Gorbachev swiftly refocused the negotiations on an INF agreement instead. Soviet policy under Gorbachev has also demonstrated a more subtle appreciation of the domestic forces affecting American foreign policy, and particularly Soviet–American relations, in its readiness to modify previous practices concerning human rights and Jewish emigration.

The improvement of Soviet relations with China, which had taken its first halting steps under Brezhnev in 1983, was similarly given new impetus by Gorbachev's accession to power. Indeed, Gorbachev's own commitment to reform contributed to a more positive view of developments in China than had previously prevailed within the Soviet leadership, and an acknowledgement that, like the Soviet Union, China was engaged in an effort to build "a socialist society worthy of a great people."[21] Indeed, greater tolerance for diversity within the socialist community more generally has been a hallmark of the Gorbachev era.

Several concrete overtures to the Chinese leadership offered modest concessions to longstanding Chinese positions, including a reduction of Soviet troop deployments in Mongolia, and the demarcation of the disputed Amur River border, itself an important departure from the traditional Soviet refusal to cede territory. While the Soviet position has not significantly changed on the issue of central concern to the Chinese leadership—the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia—and although important differences divide the two countries on a number of issues, the expansion of Sino–Soviet economic, cultural, and political ties has brought tangible benefits to the U.S.S.R., and has considerably diminished what was once a serious security threat.

Soviet efforts to repair strained relations with Japan are yet another manifestation of Gorbachev's desire to create a more benign environment for domestic reform. A new recognition of Japan's economic and strategic importance, as well as a desire to extricate Soviet diplomacy from the antagonistic and unproductive posture it had assumed under Gromyko, prompted a visit to Tokyo by Shevardnadze and hints of possible Soviet flexibility concerning the Northern Territories.

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These and other Soviet initiatives around the globe constitute a concerted and ambitious effort to overcome the political isolation and economic marginality of Moscow in the early 1980s, particularly in the vital and dynamic Asian region; to regain the diplomatic initiative; and to win breathing space for domestic revitalization. It remains unclear to what extent Gorbachev's strategy envisions only marginal and essentially tactical shifts, leaving core features of traditional arrangements and policies unchanged, or whether a new calculus of Soviet interests will lead to more far-reaching changes in Soviet international behavior.

THE PROSPECTS

Gorbachev's reforms have already brought important changes to the Soviet system, but they are by no means irreversible. Indeed, all the evidence suggests that Gorbachev is pursuing a high-risk strategy that confronts significant obstacles to success.

Although significant policy changes across a wide range of areas are already evident (most notably in Soviet culture), as these changes increasingly impinge on core institutional arrangements, the obstacles and the resistance mount. This is especially true of efforts at economic reform, where key features of the Soviet economy are not only closely intermeshed, but tightly bound to the nature of the Soviet political system and ultimately to the role of the Party itself. To shift from the administrative allocation of resources to an increased reliance on market mechanisms is ultimately to challenge the very *raison d'être* of the Party, in the U.S.S.R. as in China.

Second, reform is not only a technical process but a highly political one, involving fundamental changes in the allocation of resources, status, and power in the Soviet system. It has already brought latent and long-repressed conflicts of interest to the surface, and is likely to trigger further manifestations of working-class and ethnic grievances. The effort to promote competition, to increase the rewards for success and the penalties for failure, and to reduce the scale of state subsidies by, in effect, shrinking the social safety net would deprive important segments of the working class of what are by now perceived as customary entitlements. Similarly, just as the comparative immobilism of the center during the Brezhnev era allowed

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regional elites to enhance their economic and political power, Gorbachev's efforts to regain central control over cadres policy, to redirect resources away from Central Asia, and to challenge the preferential treatment of indigenous nationalities not only reveal a more assertive, if not coercive, nationality policy; they are clearly a serious challenge to local prerogatives. The demonstrations in Kazakhstan and the workers' protests that erupted when the new system of quality control resulted in the rejection of such volumes of shoddy goods that wages were reduced, provide but two examples of the way in which these new policies threaten longstanding expectations. Cultural liberalization, political democratization, and *glasnost'* are a potent recipe for ever greater expression of grievances and for unprecedented manifestations of social and political conflict in a system long unaccustomed to dealing with them openly. Managing these conflicts effectively will pose a major political challenge.

A third source of resistance lies in the bureaucracy itself, a largely passive resistance of established routines, of inertia; but one which has demonstrated a formidable capacity over the years to absorb and domesticate reforms rather than be transformed by them.

Beyond passive resistance, Gorbachev confronts outright political opposition, not yet highly visible, not yet organized, and without as yet an alternative program of its own, but an opposition which draws sustenance from the widespread anxiety that these changes have already provoked by blurring familiar boundaries, eroding stable expectations, and bringing long-repressed conflicts to public attention. Abundant evidence is available, if any is needed, of bitter antagonism to many of Gorbachev's initiatives, from the release of prominent dissidents, to what is perceived as an excessively critical assessment of the Stalin era, to the attack on elite privileges, to the potential challenge democratization poses to the very role of the *nomenklatura*. Opposition to a number of measures in the foreign policy and security domain, while less visible, may be equally real.

Finally, Eastern Europe constitutes a significant constraint on the prospects for reform in the Soviet Union. The irony of Gorbachev's triumphal visit to Prague—where he was accompanied by the Czech Party leader who owed his position to the defeat of Alexander Dubcek—was hardly lost on Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and his colleagues have learned the lessons of 1968, and may well be determined that instability in Eastern Europe will never again be

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permitted to halt the reform of the Soviet system. But the situation is inherently unstable, and a serious eruption in Eastern Europe is bound to reverberate in Moscow.

Gorbachev's reforms seek to tap the sources of vitality and dynamism that have increasingly developed outside the Soviet system, to draw back into the official economy, polity, and culture individuals and activities that had deserted it or been excluded. It is an effort to enlist the talents and energies of the Soviet population—from Andrei Sakharov to avant-garde writers and artists, from second-economy entrepreneurs to alienated workers and youth—in the revitalization of the Soviet system by supporting more genuine participation in managing its affairs.

Whether or not Gorbachev's far-reaching effort to reform the Soviet system will prove successful, and indeed how success can be measured, remains an open question. Gorbachev has posed the issue sharply: "there is nowhere to retreat to."[22] "Either democratization or social inertia and conservatism. There is no third way. . . ."[23] History, however, may afford less stark choices.

ENDNOTES

I should like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for their support, and Alexander Dallin for his many helpful criticisms and suggestions.

[1]*Pravda,* 31 January 1987, p. 1; Gorbachev's remarks virtually echo the diagnoses of Soviet political, economic, and social problems in chapters 1, 2, and 4 of Robert F. Byrnes, ed., *After Brezhnev: The Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980's* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). Western scholars were less successful in anticipating how the new Soviet leadership would respond to these concerns.

[2]Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Valery Turchin, "Appeal for a Gradual Democratization," in *Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition,* George Saunders, ed. (New York: Monad Press, 1974), p. 405.

[3]For a similar argument concerning China, see Richard Baum, "Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China: The Rebirth of Socialist Legality," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 19(2) (Summer 1986).

[4]K.U. Chernenko, *Kommunist* (13) (September 1981), pp. 10–11; Gorbachev in *Pravda,* 31 January 1987.

[5]Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (Moscow: Statistika, 1985), pp. 27–28, 64.

[6]Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).

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[7]Brian Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," Soviet Interview Project, Working Paper #6, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, December 1985. Both the Harvard Project and the recent Soviet Interview Project found support for state control over industry to be significantly greater than support for state control of agriculture. Support for regime norms was higher among those respondents who reported high levels of material satisfaction, but "satisfaction" was highly dependent on subjective perceptions. Recent Soviet research, for example, found that residents of Moscow and Leningrad—cities considered highly desirable places to live—were in fact *less* satisfied with the quality of life they enjoyed than were respondents from twenty-seven other cities because their higher expectations created a wider gap between aspirations and real possibilities. See also Oleg Bozhkov and Valerii B. Golofast, "Otsenka naseleniem uslovii zhizni v krupnykh gorodakh," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (3) (1985).

[8]*Pravda,* 30, March 1987.

[9]The debate on contradictions centered primarily in *Voprosy filosofii* and *Kommunist* between 1980 and 1984. A comprehensive statement of a key reformist sociologist about social justice is Tatiana Zaslavskaia's article on the subject in *Kommunist* (13) (September 1986), pp. 61–73, with responses from readers carried in subsequent issues.

[10]The Party Program adopted in 1961 was the quintessential expression of Khrushchev's unbounded optimism, with its extravagant prediction that in twenty years Soviet economic output would outstrip that of the United States and its promise that the Soviet population would enjoy material abundance. The most striking feature of the new Party programs adopted under Gorbachev is the modesty and lack of concreteness of its goals.

[11]Khabarovsk speech, *Pravda,* 2 August 1986.

[12]Ibid.

[13]*Pravda,* 28 January 1987.

[14]The most original treatment of this theme is Kenneth Jowitt's "Inclusion and Mobilization in Marxist-Leninist Political Systems," World Politics 28(1) (October 1975), pp. 69–97.

[15]*Pravda,* 6 February 1987.

[16]*Literaturnaia gazeta,* 25 February 1987, p. 8.

[17]T. Khlopiankina, in *Moskovskaia pravda,* 4 February 1987, p. 4.

[18]Aleksandr Vasinsky, in *Izvestiia,* 28 October 1986, p. 3.

[19]Speech to the Trade Union Congress, *Pravda,* 26 February 1987.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Vladivostok speech, *Pravda,* 29 July 1986.

[22]*Pravda,* 28 January 1987.

[23]*Pravda,* 26 February 1987.

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Aleksander Smolar

Jews as a Polish Problem

UNTIL QUITE RECENTLY, and for several decades, systematic attempts were made to eliminate the Jews from Polish memory. The Jews tended to disappear from Polish history, from the landscape itself, from guides for tourists, and, as a particular group of victims, from official publications about war. Still, they kept an important place in the national consciousness; they were present in conversations about those in power, about communism itself, about the prewar era and the war; they were present in neurotic phantasms, and also in rational debates.

Voices from abroad, conscious of the past, evoked (even if not always in a just and balanced way) the problem of moral responsibility for the traditions and consequences of Polish antisemitism. The apparent efficiency of official communist antisemitic propaganda posed the same problem. Such questions—and more generally, those concerning the Polish–Jewish past—have been posed by more and more young people who do not know Jews, who know almost nothing about their past in Poland, who do not understand the accusations coming from distant places, but who consider the silence itself a moral and intellectual scandal. Since the beginning of the 1980s, particularly in the sixteen months of relative freedom during the Solidarity period, the Jews—their history, traditions, and culture—and the Polish attitude toward them have become a very important matter of discussion in all four major Polish networks: the official, Catholic, underground, and emigration presses. "The Jewish question" in Poland today exists principally as a Polish problem: that of facing history, the burden of moral responsibility, and the difficult

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questioning of the Polish heroic and tragic self-image, formed in the perpetual fight for freedom, independence, and national survival.

* * *

The argument generally invoked by Poles when they are charged with antisemitism is that their country has an age-old tradition of national and religious tolerance. Indeed, for hundreds of years, even in the age of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, Jews persecuted in other countries of Europe were in the habit of finding sanctuary in Poland—hence, the great concentration of Jews in the lands of the pre-partition Commonwealth. Poles sometimes forget that this is now a rather distant past. The situation of the Jews in Poland began to deteriorate precisely at the time when religious toleration was becoming the rule in Western Europe, when Jews were being given full civic rights. The Polish situation was changing in a very different way, caused by the decline of the nation itself, but also by the growing role of the Catholic Church in maintaining the unity of that nation. The changed position of the Church greatly complicated relations with people of other faiths.

Jews tend to view Polish history as a perpetual process of growing antisemitism. In fact, since the end of the last century, traditional anti-Jewish attitudes among Poles, mainly of a religious kind, have been compounded with new forms of antisemitism whose roots are various: conflicting economic interests; changes in social structure; budding modern nationalism. A marked deterioration in Polish–Jewish relations occurred after the First World War when Poland regained its independence; this became even more conspicuous in the late thirties. This was a time of radical anti-Jewish ideologies, of antisemitic brawls, and of massive discrimination in many spheres: in the economy, in higher education, in the professions. New anti-Jewish legislation came to be prepared. The view that Jews must seek their future outside Poland became more widespread among political elites, and by no means affected only those on the right.

Jews, when pointing to these facts, sometimes neglect to take into account that their misfortunes were part and parcel of a set of dramatic problems facing a country that had recently reestablished its independence and unity after a long period of political subjection. The country was locked in a vicious circle of poverty that affected

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Poles no less than Jews, not to mention other minorities. Also, though antisemitism in Poland tended to assume ever more brutal forms, this must be seen as part of a more general tendency in Europe at the time—a rebellion against both democratic and liberal values. We know that in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the thirties the situation of the Jews was no better, and indeed was sometimes worse, than it was in Poland.

Poland between the wars was not the chosen land for the Jews. But it was, despite growing antipathies, the land of the largest and the most culturally and politically dynamic Jewish community in Europe. Poles and Jews view their coexistence in different ways, and give different explanations for the growing hostility. Jews speak about intolerance, religious hatred, prejudice, violence in the streets, pogroms at the moment that an independent Polish state was being created. They also dwell on the economic boycotts that were organized during that period. Poles evoke dramatic images of overpopulation, of Jewish cultural, linguistic, and social isolation, of the role and number of the so-called "Litvak" Jews, pushed into Polish territory by the Czarist policy. They recall the lack of enthusiasm among Jews for an independent Polish state, and emphasize the influence of procommunist sentiments in the Jewish community. The arguments on both sides, valid in some part, reflect age-old prejudices, and suggest how difficult coexistence has been for two radically different ethnic groups.

Also, it must be remembered that a large part of the Jewish community in the United States, in Western Europe, and in Israel originated in Poland. Mass Jewish emigrations from Poland, which took place in periods of growing economic difficulties and mounting social and racial tensions, have made the image of Poland in Jewish memory a rather negative one. Still, pre–World War II history is not sufficient to explain the generally hostile and very emotional attitude of many Jews toward Poles and Poland; nor does it explain the role Poles play in Jewish memory, giving rise to stereotypes widely accepted throughout the world. The prewar history of the Jews in Poland was not very different from the history of Jews among many other nations. The particularly tragic elements of the relationship have much to do with events that began in September 1939, when World War II erupted.

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THE WAR

It is extremely difficult to give an accurate account of Polish attitudes toward Jews during the Second World War, and it is not my objective here to try to do so. What interests me is how the specific conditions of life under the occupation in Poland affected both Poles and Jews, the relations that existed between them, and why the images of this past, as represented by Poles and Jews, are so dramatically different.

It is best to begin by stating a fundamental fact: there was not the slightest chance of saving all three million Polish Jews or the three million Jews of other countries who were doomed to perish on the territory of occupied Poland. A different behavior on the part of the Poles might possibly have saved some more Jews. Individual Jews might have escaped death; the people itself was doomed. Only the Allies could have changed this had they grasped what was going on, had they shown the will to save Jews regardless of cost, had they been able to act. What sealed the fate of the Jews was not so much a lack of knowledge of their plight as a lack of imagination, determination, and the ability to act.

Thus, what is at stake in the continuing controversy between Poles and Jews, at least in respect to the war, is not the ultimate fate of the Jewish nation. At stake is a moral judgment on Polish attitudes toward the destruction of the Jews. The object of the controversy is immensely important, but it needs to be seen in proper perspective.

It is possible to distinguish between a dominant "Polish" and an equally powerful "Jewish" vision of recent history. Both, perhaps, make excessive use of pure colors: the first uses too much white; the second, too much black. Characteristic of the "Polish" position is the belief in a historic discontinuity, the insistence that the tragic experience of war brought about a radical change in the attitudes of Poles toward Jews. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a historian with a commendable record of saving Jews, writes: "Conditions of the occupation led to a considerable decrease of antisemitic sentiments in Poland as compared to the prewar period. A common fate of the persecuted, the suffering, and the fighters contributed to a new sense of solidarity and a will to help those who were perishing."[1] Andrzej Micewski, a Catholic journalist and close adviser of Cardinal Glemp, says, ". . . when all is said and done, we as a society and as a nation have no reason to suffer from complexes on account of our attitude

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toward the Jews."[2] Jerzy Turowicz, an eminent Catholic intellectual and editor-in-chief of the prestigious *Tygodnik Powszechny*, says, "The commonality of persecuted, suffering, and fighting people changed quite radically the Polish–Jewish relations in our country. In a very large part of Polish society the last vestiges of antisemitism disappeared to give way to a sense of solidarity, and there appeared the will, very often effective, to help the persecuted."[3]

Jewish memory is very different; it tells a story of historic continuity. Antisemitism is seen to be constant, despite its changing guises or varying degrees of intensity. Three Jewish historians, considering the effects of prewar antisemitism on the attitudes of Poles during the war, offer an interpretation very different from that of the Poles. Pawel Korzec, a historian who emigrated from Poland after 1968, writes, "We don't think it is an exaggeration to conclude that the fate that interwar Poland had prepared for the Polish Jews contributed to the feasibility of the immense tragedy that befell them under the Nazi yoke."[4]

Toward the end of his *Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939*, a very balanced work, Joseph Marcus gives an account of the September 1, 1939 session of the Seym. He writes: ". . . the government statement in the Seym that Poland would fight 'to the last dying breath' was given frenetic acclaim . . . and the statement by representatives of the Ukrainian minority, declaring full support and participation in the common defense of the country, was also loudly applauded. But when, in turn, deputy Szymon Seidenman made a similar and much more convincing pledge on behalf of the Jewish people, there was icy silence in the House." Marcus adds: "It was an ominous silence for the Poles' attitude in the coming months of tragedy during which forty generations of continuous Jewish history in Poland virtually ended."[5]

Ezra Mendelsohn, an Israeli historian, writes, ". . . when Hitler's soldiers, aided by Soviet troops, stamped out Polish independence in 1939, Nazi anti-Semitism, though far more extreme and thorough than the Polish variety, struck a highly responsive chord among large sections of the Polish population." The author adds, "In this respect, too, Poland was typical of East Central Europe."[6]

Such contrasting histories—Polish and Jewish—permit one to pass judgment on the behavior of this or that party; they contribute little, however, to an understanding of the tragic entanglement of human

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fates that led to so great a catastrophe in such inhuman conditions. For documentation of this, one must go to other sources; I shall dwell on two examples that are too little known in the West.

In August 1942, Zofia Kossak, a novelist and head of a small but very active Catholic social and educational organization, The Front for the Rebirth of Poland, issued in its behalf a leaflet entitled "Protest." She wrote, "He who remains silent in the face of murder becomes an accomplice of the murderer. He who does not condemn, condones." In the second part of the leaflet, not usually quoted by Polish authors, she adds:

> Our feelings toward Jews have not changed. We still consider them to be political, economic, and ideological enemies of Poland. What is more, we are aware that they hate us more than they hate the Germans, that they consider us to be responsible for their misfortunes. Why, on what grounds—this is a mystery of the Jewish soul, but it is a fact that is being confirmed again and again. The awareness of these feelings, however, does not relieve us of our duty to condemn the crime.[7]

This document, more than any other that measures assistance and betrayal, reveals the tragic complexity of the relations between Poles and Jews. It is significant that Zofia Kossak, having written this appeal, became involved in building the underground organization "Zegota" that saved the lives of many Jews. A Christian, bound by the divine command to love her neighbor, she was prepared to help the persecuted Jews, whom she considered enemies—who, in her opinion, considered the Poles enemies. It is a fact that many antisemites, including some who were notorious as such, did a great deal to help the Jews during the war, for very similar reasons. They included, among others, the well-known fascist Jan Mosdorf, who helped the Jews in Auschwitz, and the equally well-known prewar antisemite Father Marcel Godlewski, who cared for Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. Such a list ought also to include Jan Dobraczynski, a novelist who remains an active antisemite today and who is now chairman of the so-called Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON), created by General Jaruzelski to replace the banned Solidarity movement. Dobraczynski rescued a number of Jewish children during the war. While such individual gestures were not unknown, they ought not to be generalized; helping those whom one does not like is an uncommon virtue, especially if the price to pay may be extremely high.

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Those wishing to argue against the conventional Jewish indictment of Poles have often cited the work of Bartoszewski and Lewinowna, *He is of My Country*.[8] This is an impressive collection of documents and testimonies on the care and compassion demonstrated by many Poles toward Jews during the war. It contains three documents on the importance of respecting minority rights in the future. Interestingly, all three are written by Poles in exile; in their criticism of intolerance and discrimination, they reflect Western influence. There is not a single document of this kind that originates in Poland. Because views on the "Jewish question" expressed in Poland by Poles are of course far more interesting than what is said abroad by Poles who are away from home and no longer in the mainstream of Polish life, who did not experience the occupation, it is important to ask why we know so little about this.

Polish attitudes toward "the Jewish question," as distinct from attitudes toward individual Jews murdered en masse, provide a fascinating theme. The conspiracy of silence on the subject has recently been broken in a book by Jacek Majchrowski, who tells of the wartime program of the home-based Polish Christian Democratic party called the Labor Party (Partia Pracy), which advocated the removal of Jews from Poland, arguing that the Jewish nation was the product of a religion of conscious evil that encouraged Jews to be parasites on the bodies of other nations.[9] The conclusion was obvious: only in forced emigration could the problem be solved. A plan was drawn up. The first group to be forced out would be Jews aged eighteen to forty, thereby reducing at once the Jewish birthrate; the rest would be left in Poland to die off. Isolated from Polish society, Jews would enjoy a limited self-government, controlled by the state. They would be allowed to satisfy their more essential current needs, but they would be banned from public office and military service. They were to be prevented from providing goods and services to the rest of the population. Poles who had married Jews were to be similarly ostracized. Only Jews baptised before 1918, and some few others in quite exceptional circumstances, might apply for Polish citizenship, which would be granted by the Seym. That these were mere words, that the plan was never realized, cannot alter the fact that the idea was more radical than anything contemplated under France's Vichy government or the Horthy regime in Hungary, two governments of the extreme right, allied with Nazi Germany. When

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one considers that the program was formulated by a Christian Democratic party thought to be moderate rather than radical, and represented in the Polish underground state, it becomes easier to understand the views of Jewish historians who see the wartime attitudes of Poles as simply a continuation of prewar antisemitism. However, those who tend to believe this forget or at least minimize the tensions created by the division of Poland, the occupation of the country by both Germans and Russians. For them, there is no break between the rampant antisemitism of the late thirties and the Holocaust of the early forties. Yet for the Poles there was a memory that rankled; it had to do with Jewish attitudes toward the Soviet invader.

JEWS UNDER THE SOVIET OCCUPATION

When war broke out in 1939, Poles faced two enemies at once: Germany and the Soviet Union. That, however, was not the way certain ethnic minorities saw it. For almost all ethnic Germans and Lithuanians who were Polish citizens, as well as for many Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Jews, the dual onslaught was an occasion for celebration. The reaction of ethnic Germans and the Lithuanians who, for a short time, were to be part of an independent Lithuania, was understandable; one may even understand the reaction of the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians. They were expressing a preference more national than ideological. Given the way that successive Polish governments had dealt with them, they were all alienated. Why, however, were the Jews so accepting of the Soviet invasion? They had no territorial claims against Poland; they were not seeking a state of their own in Eastern Europe. Yet the evidence is overwhelming: large numbers of Jews welcomed the Soviet invasion, imprinting in Polish memory the image of Jewish crowds greeting the invading Red Army as their liberators. How is this attitude to be explained?

The Jewish writers who have chosen to treat the matter have generally given a single answer.[10] In divided Poland, German power and Soviet power were equally hostile to Poles, but not to Jews. For Jews, the danger was Nazi Germany, with its openly declared anti-Jewish policies. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was seen as a country that allowed Jews full civic rights, or, more precisely, deprived them of rights in the same measure as it deprived others.

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This is a weighty argument. If it is accepted, the attitude of Jews in September 1939 can be explained by their own interests, which were inevitably distinct and different from those of Poles. Their attitudes cannot be judged in moral terms. Still, this is not the whole story. In 1939 and 1940, no one foresaw where the radically anti-Jewish policies of the Germans would lead; no one prophesied the "final solution." Still, fears existed; the tales of discrimination against Jews in Germany, the humiliations they experienced, Crystal Night itself had made a deep impression. But it was not universally held. Some Jews, disappointed with the Soviet occupation and wholly unaware of what was in store for them, actually decided to make their way *to* German-occupied Poland.

In any case, the perception of a German threat—even if widely accepted—cannot explain the enthusiasm with which many Jews greeted the invaders from the East. The explanation may be found in the words of a Polish respondent to a questionnaire circulated by the Paris-based Polish monthly *Kultura* on the subject of antisemitism. He wrote:

> The welcome extended to the Bolsheviks was above all a demonstration of a separate identity, of being different from those against whom the Soviets were waging war—from the Poles—a refusal to be identified with the Polish state. We must not pretend that we do not realize this, or fail to admit that it was the result of our own policies and of our antisemitism. . . . In the year that war broke out, the alienation of the Jewish community had reached its zenith because of a propaganda campaign that almost amounted to a pogrom, calling for bloodshed. This had alienated even quite assimilated Jews.[11]

A tragic, vicious circle. Many Jews welcomed the invader because they no longer considered Poland to be their country. Shunned and persecuted, the subject of public debates on how they might be evicted, they reacted as a wounded people often will. Still, this is not the whole explanation, and in any case, it only deepened the hostility of the Poles. It confirmed their suspicions about the loyalty of Jews to the Polish state, and indeed to the idea of Polish independence itself.

Straining relations further, many Jews, whether communist or not, educated or not, were given posts in the local administration imposed by the occupiers. They became actively engaged in the consolidation of Soviet power. In some instances, they even helped hunt down Polish officers and members of the deposed Polish administration.

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The fact that thousands of Jews eventually followed hundreds of thousands of Poles to the most inhospitable parts of Siberia, deported not because they were Jews but because they had become disenchanted with Soviet rule, changed nothing. Soviet power proved itself no less hostile to them than to others. Jews were the "wrong" social class: shopkeepers, artisans, and professionals; many were religious. In any case, the Soviet authorities did not tolerate unofficial associations. It is a cruel paradox that even deportation did not necessarily dampen Jewish sympathies for the U.S.S.R. Though exiled Jews suffered no less than others, only in their case did the suffering seem to make sense: it gave them at least some chance of survival, which did not exist for Jews trapped in occupied Poland, soon wholly overrun by the Nazis.

Some Poles, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Home Army, General Grot-Rowecki, greeted the invading Germans in July 1941 as "liberators from the Bolshevik oppression in which Jews had played a great part."[12] Hatred and ethnic tension became manifest in Brest, where a pogrom is said to have taken place, arranged by Poles released from prison.[13] Once the whole of Poland found itself under German occupation, news of the behavior of Jews under the Soviets spread throughout the country, with obvious effects. General Grot-Rowecki's report of September 30, 1941 to the Polish Government in London has been quoted often. He wrote:

> Please take it as an established fact that an overwhelming majority of the population is antisemitic. Even the socialists are no exception. There are only tactical differences about what to do. Hardly anybody advocates imitating the Germans. German methods provoke compassion, but after the merging of the occupation zones, on learning how the Jews behaved in the east, this is now considerably reduced.[14]

In no other country in Europe did the clash of Jewish interests and attitudes with those of the surrounding population reach such dramatic proportions as they did in Poland under the Soviet occupation of 1939–1941. In other occupied countries, the Jews were in conflict with parts of the surrounding population—with local quislings, for example—but they had behind them the rest of society. In Poland, under the Soviet occupation, the Jews were themselves seen as quislings. This should be borne in mind in any discussion of Polish–Jewish relations.

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THE PARADOXES OF NATIONAL UNITY

There are traitors in every country. In Poland, Poles worked for the Germans for money, out of spite, in fear of blackmail or torture. However, there was no collaboration based on the belief that national interests would be served by cooperating with the occupying power. There was no Pétain or Quisling in Poland. In any case, the Germans were not looking for cooperation with anyone in Poland. As far as the Germans were concerned, Poland was a nation without a future; and all Poles would eventually share the fate of all Jews. Destroying the Polish elites was only the first step in the process of destroying Poland. All this is well known, but it is significant in any consideration of Jewish–Polish relations.

Poland was unique in another respect: resistance against the invader served to unite organizations and parties that before the war had nothing at all in common. Democrats and totalitarians, liberals and socialists, nationalists and communists, freemasons and Christians were all engaged in the same struggle. In other German-occupied countries, antisemitism was the monopoly of quisling governments and parties. The resistance, as a rule, was anti-fascist, democratic, and anti-antisemitic. Antisemitism, for them, was part of the syndrome of treason. Only in Poland was antisemitism compatible with patriotism (a correlation considerably strengthened under the Soviet occupation in 1939–1941) and also with democracy. The antisemitic National-Democratic Party was represented both in the Polish government in London and in the structures of the underground within Poland.

Precisely because Polish antisemitism was not tainted by any trace of collaboration with the Germans, it could prosper—not only in the street, but also in the underground press, in political parties, and in the armed forces. Indeed, a thriving political and cultural life existed outside the official underground establishment, especially on the right. The "Szaniec" (Rampart) group and the Confederation of Independent Poland were eagerly developing their totalitarian–nationalist program, envisaging, among other things, a radical solution to the Jewish question. Some Polish poets would have been happy to ostracize poets deemed "alien" to Polish culture precisely because they were Jewish. These "aliens" included men of the distinction of Julian Tuwim, Antoni Slonimski, and Boleslaw

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Lesmian.[15] There were also powerful military organizations on the extreme right: the National Military Organization (NOW), the Lizard Union (Zwiazek Jaszczurczy), and the National Armed Forces (NSZ). Pobog-Malinowski, a historian, describes the men the NSZ attracted: "hot-headed dynamic youths, mostly town bred, among them many supporters of 'national radicalism,' perhaps not quite a kind of nazism, but not unlike it—brutally uncompromising in striving for power and domination, devoted to hard terrorist methods verging on banditry, utterly chauvinistic. . . ."[16]

The patriotic credentials of wartime antisemitism allowed it to penetrate far and wide. Some military units of the radical right, while subject to their own political structures, were also part of the official Home Army linked to the London-based government in exile, and this could only affect the atmosphere in the forces. Marek Edelman, one of the leaders of the 1943 uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, recently said that after the collapse of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, in which he took part, he was warned by his commanding officer not to surrender to the Germans in the company of his unit: "I cannot vouch for my soldiers, one of them may betray you as a Jew."[17]

Jozef Cyrankiewicz, recalling soon after the war the time he spent in Auschwitz, tells how he would try to explain to prisoners from other countries the antisemitic behavior of certain Polish inmates: "Germans, Austrians, and French are all politically well-defined groups, for they are all anti-fascist; there are no fascists in the camps, for fascists work hand-in-hand with their Nazi friends. Only in our camps are we together with our reactionaries. . . ."[18] It is important to realize how this phenomenon, however marginal, helped to shape the reputation that Poles have in the West as incurable antisemites.

THE COST OF BEING A WITNESS

"I have often found," says Herling-Grudzinski, "that man is human in human conditions, and I have always thought cruelly nonsensical the attempts to judge him by the deeds done in inhuman conditions—as if water could be measured by fire, and the earth by hell."[19] A descent into hell can only leave its marks. What indeed are the boundaries of the inhuman world? Extending them too far is dangerous—it dispenses with moral responsibility.

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Zofia Kossak wrote in "Protest," "We know how poisonous the seed of crime is. Compulsory attendance of the Polish people at the gory spectacle performed on the Polish soil may well breed moral indifference, sadism, and above all a dangerous conviction that one can murder with impunity." There follows a warning that is surely not empty of rhetoric: "He who does not understand this and dares to link a proud, free Polish future with despicable glee over the misfortune of his neighbor has no right to call himself a Catholic or a Pole!"

No European people was condemned to witness crime in the same measure as Poles, who, living in hell themselves, were forced to watch day by day the ever lower and more horrific infernal circles. In the West, people saw the trainloads departing eastward; they witnessed individual murders, saw the humiliation in the yellow badges worn by Jews, and were certainly aware of the anti-Jewish laws. As for the Germans, for the most part they saw nothing. They might have known or guessed, but apart from those who served in the occupied East and those, of course, who were in any way involved in any stage of the "final solution," they physically saw nothing.

Polish peasants, however, knew of the extermination camps and smelled the stench of burning human flesh. City and town dwellers alike saw the sickening misery of the ghettos, peopled by walking skeletons whose faces resembled more and more the demonic monsters of German propaganda. They read the warning notices on the ghetto walls: "Jews, lice, typhoid," which induced a conditioned reflex of fear and disgust.

Indifference in the face of horror and crime was steadily growing, as suggested in the writings of Milosz, Andrzejewski, Rudnicki, and, more recently, of Mrozek.

> What was happening to the Jews was not a cause of amusement but of horror, but this horror was just one factor in the general horror of war and occupation. After all, what the Germans did to the Jews was a matter between Germans and Jews. No concern of ours, no need to stick your head out. A very, very unpleasant business, perhaps even more than unpleasant, perhaps even horrible, but not ours.[20]

When the dominant feeling is one of helplessness, indifference comes to be seen as the most decent form of escape from responsibility.

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But indifference was not the only reaction. The image of the Jew underwent a change. Before the war that image had been a combined product of stereotype, prejudice, and ideological commitment; it was also a product of everyday experience. As the popular saying went: "Every antisemite has got his favorite Jew." Now this everyday experience no longer existed. The Jew had ceased to be a person of flesh and blood, liked or disliked, respected or despised, as any man may be. Now he became indistinguishable from the stereotypical portrayal of propaganda, and all past prejudices surfaced and became widespread.[21] While German propaganda had some part in this change, more important was another factor: Poles began to feel that the fate of the victim may not have been wholly undeserved. This is a natural reaction, well known to psychologists. It is possible to disdain the myth of a people guilty of deicide, to treat the delirious "Protocols of the Sages of Zion" with a healthy scepticism, and yet to imagine that the Jews cannot be wholly blameless if they have so often been punished by history.

In the face of Hitler's murderous orgy and indescribable horror as a daily occurrence, there was a natural tendency to seek a rational explanation for it all. The sense of outrage very often turned against the Jews themselves. The well-known writer Zofia Nalkowska described the reaction of a simple woman living close to the ghetto wall. "I can't take it, I can't take it," she would say, adding, "It's better for us if the Germans finish them off. They hate us more than the Germans. . . . Everybody says so. Ask anyone who knows them. Should the Germans ever lose the war, the Jews would murder us all."[22] The poet Mieczyslaw Jastrun noted the remark of a man in the crowd watching the burning ghetto: "The Germans have just forestalled a Jewish action against us"; or consider the tale told by a school girl about Poles murdered by the Jews who had managed to escape.[23] Reactions to all this horror ranged from dislike and fear to indifference. There was also the kind of reasoning described by the critic Kazimierz Wyka, who said: "The Germans have committed a crime murdering the Jews. It is on their conscience—but for us it is a sheer benefit, and in the future we shall reap more benefits, with a clear conscience, without blood on our hands."[24]

After the shock of the Holocaust, there was silence. People were trying to forget. If the matter was raised at all, it was only to defend Polish honor against unjust accusations. In this overwhelming silence,

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it is difficult to know how many shared the feelings of Jerzy Andrzejewski:

> For all honest Poles the fate of the perishing Jews must have been exceedingly painful, for the dying . . . were the people whom our people could not look straight in the face, with a clear conscience. The Polish nation could look straight in the face of Polish men and women who were dying for freedom. Not in the face of the Jews dying in the burning ghetto.[25]

THE POSTWAR YEARS

With the end of the war, normal life resumed, though in the abnormal conditions of war's aftermath, and in the abnormal shell of a new political order established over (but not accepted by) the nation. People restored their homes, cleared the rubble, or trekked to the West—to the new western territories of Poland and to the more distant West—as did the Jews. At first there were very few of them, consisting of the small number who had survived the occupation in the homes of trusted neighbors, in the forests, or, occasionally, in camps. Later, they were joined by Jews who returned from Russia. No more than 10 percent of the prewar Jewish community had survived.

One would have expected the war to have cleared away the causes of hostile attitudes of Poles towards Jews. Indeed, this is the dominant Polish interpretation today. Jerzy Turowicz, noted Catholic editor, has written: "I say that in Poland after the war, antisemitism was virtually nonexistent."[26] Bohdan Cywinski, an eminent Catholic journalist and historian who has been actively engaged in the democratic opposition to the communist regime since the 1970s, writes:

> The Nazi occupation affected Polish–Jewish relations through the fact of the Holocaust. The enormity of this fact proved to be a shock for the whole of Polish society, and has since been recognized as the absolute apex of Nazi criminality. At the same time it exposed the depth of the moral depravity; this has sunk deeply into the national consciousness, creating an effective barrier against any possible revival of antisemitism.[27]

Andrzej Szczypiorski, a well-known opposition writer, has said: "The great theoretician of the national question and incomparable friend of mankind [Stalin] was quite wrong. With the experience of

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war and nazism behind us, antisemitism in Poland did not have a great chance."[28]

While refraining from quoting Jewish assessments of these same postwar years, the contrast is in fact marked. Indeed, Poles, writing immediately after the war, were more divided than these sanguine remarks suggest. For example, Stanislaw Stomma, a historian and politician close to the Polish Episcopate, said, "It seemed that the horror of the occupation and the enormity of the crimes committed against the Jews would bring about a radical change of the views on the Jewish question, deepening them and humanizing. The reality is different."[29] Jerzy Andrzejewski, the author of *Ashes and Diamonds*, writes: "Polish antisemitism has not burnt itself out in the ruins of the ghettos. The death of several million massacred Jews was not enough to wipe out Polish mental and emotional habits."[30] Kazimierz Wyka, a professor of literature and an acute observer, writes, "The only country in Europe where antisemitism is still alive, leading to political and moral crimes, is Poland. The country where Jews have been most thoroughly wiped out and where resistance against the occupation was the strongest. And yet it is there that nazism has planted its bastard seed."[31]

After the 1946 pogrom in Kielce, *Tygodnik Powszechny* published a courageous article by Professor Stefania Skwarczynska. She noted that while the natural reaction was to deny responsibility, to seek culprits as far away from Poland as possible, she knew, with a heavy heart, that one could not shift the blame to others. Even assuming that "alien interests were involved," how could a "healthy society thus be led by the nose?" Calling for an unequivocal condemnation of the crime, she appealed to others to give witness to those Christian attitudes that had been demonstrated during the war. Her appeal was addressed to Jews and others of the German-invented "otherness."[32]

Tygodnik Powszechny published three replies to this appeal. Each is interesting; each, written by a woman, expresses gratitude to those who, despite extreme danger to themselves, have offered their help. Laura Kaufman responded because she was afraid that "hysterical noises and malicious whispers would drown the calm and truthful voices."[33] E. Koenowa, while expressing her gratitude, adds, "Antisemitism has not come to an end in Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz. It is very sad that often the same people who had

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compassion for the Jews during the war and helped them as much as they could are now unfriendly to them."[34] Ewa Szmajdlerowa, telling of help she received from fifteen people, says:

> It is a pleasure to relate all this, but I would not dare to mention the names of these people in public, for fear that it would be anything but a service to them. Similarily, I do not dare to display openly the cross which, as a Catholic, I wear under my dress. It does not go with my racial type. Please consider carefully the last two sentences. I am content to add one brief comment: the Germans have taught me contempt for death. The Poles are now teaching me contempt for man, and to be ashamed, terribly ashamed.[35]

There are other witnesses of this same kind. Michel Borwicz wrote of the curious unwillingness of courageous people who helped Jews during the war to be "exposed" as such after the war.[36] Maria Hochberg-Marianska, in the introduction to her book *Children Accuse*, writes: "I wonder whether outside Poland it is possible to understand the fact that having saved an innocent child from the clutches of a murderer may be a cause of deep embarrassment, even infamy."[37] What is to be learned today from these testimonies and assessments gathered soon after the war?

In the uniformly serene picture of Polish–Jewish relations after the war, sketched by Polish writers today, there is said to be only one exception: the Kielce pogrom of 1946, which saw civilians go after and kill several dozen Jews. Such an event could not be ignored or glossed over; innocent people were murdered; tens of thousands of Jews were forced to emigrate. But the exception is more apparent than real. The responsibility for the pogrom is externalized: it is not the Polish population that is considered responsible, but some alien forces. Various political groups identify these forces differently.

According to the authors of a publication about Polish–Jewish relations distributed by the Polish Accord for Independence (Polskie Porozumienie Niepodlegloscio we, or PPN), an underground association of intellectuals founded in 1976, the Kielce pogrom was actually part of a long-term Soviet policy in Poland. Once diplomatic relations had been broken off with the Polish government in London in 1943, the Soviets began a propaganda campaign to defame the Polish underground. The Soviets accused the Home Army of collaborating with the Germans, but also of being nationalist and antisemitic. "The latter charge was revived in 1946 when, in order to justify the failure

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of the U.S.S.R. to honor the obligations it had entered into with the Western powers, the NKVD (Soviet Security Service) and the UB (Polish Security Service) organized the so-called Kielce pogrom, a mass murder of Jews. Their intention was to represent the Poles as a nation of racists, quite incapable of governing themselves."[38]

The same view is held by Stanislaw Zochowski, ex-chief of staff of the NSZ (military resistance movement of the extreme right), whose political orientation is radically different from that of the PPN. He considers the Kielce pogrom to have been an indubitable provocation of the Polish Security Service; as he puts it, "Ten years later, in October 1956, the Party announced that the pogrom had been a mistake."[39] There is in fact no evidence that the party did anything of the kind. The assertion that the pogrom was the work of the NKVD or the UB appears in many different accounts, but generally without any proof. Among those who have tried to prove it are Krystyna Kersten[40] and Michael Checinski.[41]

A quite different theory comes from the propaganda of the other side; the communists and their friends argue that the pogrom was the work of the Polish Government in London, that General Anders and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk are in some way culpable. In the confidential minutes of a meeting of the secretariat of the Communist Party's Central Committee, the record of a discussion on "the matter of the pogroms" is interesting to study. Politbureau member R. Zambrowski, discussing aborted pogroms in Krakow, Radom, Miechow, Chrzanow, and Rabka, suggests that these were all centrally planned and organized. Zambrowski is interested more in the political than in the criminal aspects of these events. The Jewish question, he argues, "is for the forces of reaction simply an opportunity to foment hatred and public disorder, to present the government as weak, to create an appearance of great numbers of people being involved." He told his colleagues that in the fight against antisemitism ". . . we are assured of the support of the European democracies."[42]

What is the truth? Who in fact were the killers? Was this mob incited by the UB or by the extreme right of the anti-communist underground? Is it possible that both sides had a hand in it? Today, such questions are impossible to answer, and it may not be useful to pursue them. Still, we know that the pogrom in Kielce effectively distracted the attention of the West from the scandal of the falsified government referendum. Also, we must ask how it was possible, in

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the middle of the twentieth century, after a bloody war, for thousands of ordinary people to take to the streets and massacre several dozen other ordinary people, on the charge that the latter were guilty of ritual murder. Those murdered were not, by the way, communists, security men, or hated dignitaries; they were very ordinary men and women.

It is unnecessary to offer all the concrete evidences of continued hatred and aggression now available to us.[43] The facts cannot be denied; they must, however, be explained. How could Poland, which had witnessed the murder of three million Poles and six million Jews, become the scene of compulsive hatred? And why is it that forty years after the war, instead of asking such questions, even the best Polish intellectuals seem content to seek refuge in comforting formulas, or choose to remain silent? To understand anything, the safe ground of standard interpretation must be abandoned. The theory of the purifying effect of war must be rejected, but so also must the theory of endemic Polish antisemitism.

* * *

Let us consider, for a moment, the changes that occurred in Polish social consciousness as a result of the war. The overall effect, as with other European nations, was a radicalization of the country. Fundamental demands included not only the withdrawal of the invader and the guarantee of independence, but some sort of democracy in the political order, together with far-reaching reforms in the social and economic spheres. During the interwar years, democracy was under attack everywhere in Europe. After the war, democratic values were broadly accepted by all elements in the population except for the communists.

In Poland, however, with the crushing of the Warsaw uprising of 1944 and the inevitable approach of the Soviet army from the east, hopes for independence suffered a traumatic setback. Faith in democractic values gave way to a growing chauvinism, antisemitism, and stubborn conservatism.[44] After the collapse of Germany, the Soviet Union and its Polish allies were the chief enemy, the only enemy of the Polish people. Patriotism came to mean everything that was contrary to the new power structure's programs, which sought to

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camouflage its real aims in a democratic–populist phraseology and the semblance of democratic reforms.

In the West, the left, led by intellectuals, was morally victorious. Stalinist tyranny, labor camps, the true meaning of communist rhetoric—all this was conveniently overlooked. The traditional ethos of the right, compromised by spiritual kinship—however distant—with fascism, wartime collaboration, and anti-democratic tendencies, was clearly disintegrating. This was not the case in Poland, where the right was in equal parts patriotic, anti-German, anti-Soviet, and antisemitic. Poland felt no need to rethink its values. There was no crisis of the rightist ethos under new Soviet-imposed power. The result was the consolidation of two traditional stereotypes, the "Polish-Catholic" on the one hand, the "Judeo-Communist" on the other.[45] Both seemed to gain credibility as never before. A Polish-Catholic was now, as always, a defender of the fatherland—with its tradition, culture, and religion—against the communist power imposed by the Soviets and exercised on their behalf by the Jews.

The Jews became very visible indeed, especially in the central nodes of power. Popular imagination multiplied their numbers, sensing the existence of Jews under newly adopted Polish names everywhere. For the man in the street, this "Jewish flood" was a shocking new phenomenon, more shocking than certain other more essential and more durable aspects of the new communist reality. It seemed to be a resumption and indeed a continuation of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in 1939–1941, but also a continuation of the "cold civil war" between the "Polish element" and the "Jewish element," which in the minds of right-wingers had been waged in Poland even before the war. Official posters, appearing in April 1946, read "Honor to the heroic defenders of the ghetto," and "Shame to the fascist knaves of the AK army [Interior Army]."

To many Poles, it seemed as though the Jews had "won." How humiliating after years of wartime deprivation and heroism, sacrifice and hope, to find Jews—with all their stereotypical attributes—intact. The bloodsuckers and demoralizers denounced in the gutter press of the right, the devil incarnate, the ominous sages of the "Protocols of Zion" who had been reaching for power all over the world, had won! Indeed, their very reemergence into society was a shock. People had gotten used to not seeing Jews; their absence

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seemed almost natural. It was a resurrection of sorts—the resurrection of Judas—or so many felt.

* * *

The anti-Jewish incidents ended some time in 1947, caused perhaps by an ebb in anti-Jewish feeling, by the radically diminished number of Jews, by the absence of political motivation on the part of those in power, or simply by the marginalization and eventual liquidation of the extreme right wing underground. It is difficult to know why the incidents stopped. However, just as the absence of open political demonstrations does not necessarily mean the acceptance of a particular system by a society, so the end of anti-Jewish demonstrations does not necessarily mean the end of antisemitism.

After the Kielce pogrom, Stefania Skwarczynska wrote about the horrendous defeat suffered by the "world of ideas," not only the one that happens to be "at the helm today," but also the much older one "which preaches love of man to man, according to Christ." "The latter tells the former: such is the harvest of your rule; while the former tells the latter: this is the achievement of many ages of Christian civilization, the fruit of Catholicism." Neither of the two answers is satisfactory. Nevertheless, the "world of ideas" and its associated institutional structures, both with powerful means at their disposal for shaping collective responses, had a decisive influence on the development of Polish–Jewish relations.

THE CHURCH AND THE JEWS

A pastoral letter by Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland, written in 1936, provides eloquent evidence of the Polish Church's official position on the Jews at that time. The letter says:

> The Jewish problem is there and will be there as long as Jews remain Jews. . . . It is a fact that Jews are in opposition to the Catholic Church, that they are freethinkers, the vanguard of godlessness, bolshevism, and subversion. It is a fact that they exert a pernicious influence on public morality and that their publishing houses are spreading pornography. It is true that Jews are swindlers, usurers, and that they are engaged in fostering immoral earnings. It is true that the effect of the Jewish youth upon the Catholic is—in the religious and ethical sense—negative. But we must not be unjust. This

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does not apply to all Jews. There are very many Jews who are believers, honest, righteous, merciful, doing good works. The family life of many Jews is healthy and edifying. And there are among Jews people morally quite outstanding, noble and honorable people.[46]

This reads like a classic statement of traditional Christian antisemitism of the kind frequently found outside Poland. Typical of the attitude (other parts of the letter could be cited as well) is a rejection of integral antisemitism and racism, together with a condemnation of all anti-Jewish violence. In the context of the Church and its history at that time, the position of the Primate could be described as moderate. More liberal and humanistic attitudes, which were undoubtedly there—Catholic personalism, for example, was important—were limited to a small intellectual elite. Of special importance were the center at Laski, near Warsaw, which fostered Father Kornilowicz and his periodical *Verbum*, and the Association of Catholic University Students, "Odrodzenie," which was the intellectual cradle of many eminent postwar Catholic personalities, including Jerzy Turowicz and Stanislaw Stomma. Apart from such small enclaves, the Church was predominantly peasant and nationalist. The powerful nationalist sentiment, associated with an equally strong antisemitism, was represented by the Catholic periodical *Rycerz Niepokalanej* and the daily newspaper *Maly Dziennik*.

It is virtually impossible to say anything about the attitude of the Church toward the Jews, or toward the Jewish question more generally, during the war. No documents or pastoral letters were published on the subject. The Church, itself severely repressed and decimated, remained silent. As in other countries, however, the Catholic Church had a magnificent record of saving the persecuted from certain death. This was largely the work of individual priests ready to incur great risks, and of certain religious orders, particularly orders of nuns. Still, the question remains: What was the relation of the Church to the small Jewish community that survived the war, and also to the Jews in the power apparatus?

Krystyna Kersten, in her recent book, suggests that "cases of assaults on Jews were resolutely condemned by the head of the Polish Church." Her evidence is words spoken by Cardinal Hlond to the representative of the Jewish Religious Associations, professor Michal Zylberg. The Cardinal said: "[The assaults] are a source of great

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sadness to me. Without reiterating the arguments based on Christian principles, in present-day Poland there are no objective reasons for antisemitism. It is the madness of those who are still conspiring in the forests. They conceive of this as politics; they think that by assaulting the Jews they are fighting the government. As a Pole and a Catholic, I condemn those activities."[47] Kersten's interpretation of these words is, in my view, debatable. The Cardinal, in the difficult postwar years, did not do what he had done ten years previously—condemn hatred and anti-Jewish violence absolutely. Requests to do so were made to him by many parties, including the Jews, both before and after the Kielce pogrom. The Primate's reply was always the same. In a conversation with a group of foreign correspondents, for example, he said that the deterioration in Polish–Jewish relations was the fault of the Jews:[48] Anti-Jewish incidents were provoked by the presence of Jews in the structures of power imposed on Poland against the will of Polish society. Hostility to the Jews, then, was neither antisemitism nor racism, but simply a political attitude. There are victims among the Jews, but there are even a greater number of Polish victims. Therefore, the Church cannot specifically condemn anti-Jewish violence; it can only say that it is against all hatred and all violence.

That was the position of many bishops as well. A short time before the Kielce pogrom, local Jews, sensing the danger, appealed to the local bishop, Czeslaw Kaczmarek, to issue an appropriate pastoral letter. The bishop refused, arguing against it on reasons similar to those given by the Primate. After the pogrom, a statement was issued which said, inter alia, "No Catholic can refrain from expressing sincere outrage at these tragic and deplorable events." It went on to say, ". . . it is all the more unfortunate that all this happened before the eyes of young people and children."[49] A frightening ambiguity is raised: young people and children were also among those killed. Was the attitude of the Primate, the bishop of Kielce, and, as will be seen, the bishop of Lublin and the future Primate, Stefan Wyszynski, typical of the Polish Church as a whole? It is difficult to say. There were certainly eminent churchmen who thought differently.

The aged metropolitan of Cracow, Cardinal Sapieha, for example, agreed to be one of the patrons of the celebrations commemorating the third anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising.[50] In the prevailing atmosphere this was more than magnanimous; it was an act of courage. His was to remain the only significant public gesture

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of a member of the Polish hierarchy honoring the martyrdom of the Jews until the present Primate, Cardinal Glemp, took part in the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the uprising.

The bishop of Czestochowa, Tadeusz Kubina, virtually prevented a pogrom in Czestochowa by cosigning, together with other local dignitaries, a public statement that said, among other things, that "*Everything about the alleged ritual murders is a lie.* No member of the Christian community, whether in Kielce, Czestochowa or anywhere else in Poland, has ever been injured by Jews for religious ritual purposes."[51]

Why, then, did the Primate and some other bishops deem it inadvisable or impossible to speak out in defense of the Jews? What prevented them from making a gesture that, at the time, barely a year after the end of the war, was shocking by its absence? It appears that the justification given by the Primate needs to be taken literally. Bishops chose to see the persecution of the Jews only in political terms. This was a civil war—at times hot, at times cold—against the ruling power; it claimed numerous victims from among the Poles, but also from among the Jews, who were paying a price for other Jews being in power.

Another factor may have been even more important. The communist authorities were using the real and imagined antisemitism of their opponents to compromise them in the eyes of the public, both at home and abroad. It is not only that those in power were perceived by many as "Jewish"; the power structure, for its part, perversely used the charge of antisemitism to compromise both the opposition and those unreconciled elements of Polish society on the international stage. It may even have helped organize the pogroms to that end. In circumstances where the authorities were acting as defenders of the Jews, any gesture along the same lines by the Church might have been interpreted as giving support to the communists. The Church risked placing itself in a highly ambiguous situation in the eyes of many of the faithful, who were suffering ruthless persecution at the hands of a party and government perceived as predominantly Jewish.

The dilemma was terrible: How to follow the clear logic of compassion in the face of so many diverse victims! It is no wonder that respect for the traditional values of Polish Catholicism seemed to require that love of country be given preference to love of neighbor.

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In view of the exceptional position of the Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, in postwar Polish history, it is useful to consider his views on the Jewish question in some detail. In the specific Polish conditions, the voice of Cardinal Wyszynski was the voice of the Church.

After the Kielce pogrom, two members of the Jewish committee in Lublin, M. Szyldkraut and S. Sluszny, were received by the bishop, Stefan Wyszynski. An account of the meeting found its way into the world press. The bishop was said to have repeated the views of the Primate on the causes of anti-Jewish riots. He stressed that "nations were going through a period of postwar depravation," and that this claimed victims among Jews no less than among Poles. His assessment of the contribution the Jews made to Polish life was negative; he suggested that Jews "should strive energetically to acquire a statehood of their own in Palestine and possibly also a colony in South America."[52]

Like the primate, the bishop refused to make a public statement on the Kielce incident. Soon after, however, in September 1946, on the occasion of the "Majdanek Week," he told the faithful: "Fight the Nazi prejudice which, prompted by racial hatred, has tried to obliterate Jewish cemeteries. Let us remember that violence done to the right of the dead to peaceful and decent rest will by its own impact take revenge on us."[53] It was, it seems, easier to condemn violence done to the dead than to those who were still alive.

Let us pass over the 1950s, when the Primate and the whole Church were fighting for mere survival, and also the early 1960s, with its more confined trench warfare, and concentrate on the March 1968 events and the Church's reaction to them. As in many other parts of the world, this was a time of large-scale protest by students and intellectuals in Poland; such demonstrations were followed by severe reprisals. This was a time of serious attack on Polish culture and science, but also of police provocation; there was a power struggle, great disillusion among reformers, together with a vicious antisemitic campaign organized by the communist authorities. This led to a mass exodus of thousands of Jews from Poland.

Two statements regarding these March events were issued by the Polish Episcopate. The first stressed the need for a social order that "would respect the fundamental rights of persons and society." It commended to God ". . . all who have suffered much in the last few days."[54] The other argued that "no one may be branded an enemy on

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the grounds of holding different convictions."[55] Much attention was given to freedom of opinion, its role in culture and science, and to the need for a pluralist press, with dialogue between people holding different views.

In this same document, after a lengthy paragraph on the baselessness of charges that Poles were in some measure responsible for the Holocaust, two enigmatic sentences appear that on close inspection seem to offer an indirect condemnation of the official anti-Jewish campaign, and, more generally, of antisemitism. It reads: "The Second Vatican Council, in the 'Declaration on the attitude to non-Christian religions,' has formulated clear principles which govern the attitude of Christians to, among others, believers in the religion of the Old Testament. The Bishops remind all the faithful of the deeply humanitarian meaning of these principles." Reference to the text of the declaration *Nostra Aetate* reveals the thought of the Council Fathers: "The Church repudiates all persecution against any man. Moreover, mindful of her common patrimony with the Jews, and motivated by the Gospel's spiritual love and by no political considerations, she deplores the hatred, persecutions, and displays of antisemitism directed against Jews at any time and from any source."[56]

Why such circumspection in condemning a campaign that was being unequivocally condemned all over the world? Before this question is answered, it may be useful to quote from the sermon preached by the Primate in the Warsaw Cathedral on Maundy Thursday, April 11, 1968:

> I, Bishop of the Metropolis, suffer greatly because of these 'spectacles of hatred.' Perhaps I am to blame that as bishop of Warsaw I did not say enough on the law, the obligation of love and of loving, regardless of speech, language, and race, that I did not prevent your being overtaken by the monstrous shadow of a new racism, allegedly in order to defend our culture. That is not the way! Not the way of hatred. . . . We can defend our country only by the way of love.[57]

These words are deeply moving. At last, what was happening in Poland was being called by its proper name: racism. What is more, the Primate had raised the question of the moral responsibility of the Church, not so much its historical responsibility for antisemitism as

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the responsibility of the pastor for his flock, for their deeds and omissions, for the good and evil that make up the human condition.

Adam Michnik, quoting the Primate, notes that the authorized text of the sermon, published in 1972, is "somewhat different" from the version originally given. It is useful to compare the two versions. In the published version, the words "speech, language, and race" and "shadow of a new racism" have been replaced by words on the obligation of loving "all, regardless of their views and convictions."[58] The condemnation of antisemitism has disappeared. The statement becomes more careful, less defined. Why? We will probably never know. Some illumination may be gleaned from a conversation held many years later by a *Kultura* correspondent with "several representatives of the Polish Church hierarchy." The journalist repeated the words of one (or more) of his interviewees:

> [March 1968] was above all a "family quarrel," a contest within the power elite, not a racist campaign. It is true that among the victims of the factional struggle in the party were many who were not directly involved, but in fact those who emigrated did so for economic reasons, since the Jewish community had lost its privileged position. The methods applied in the antisemitic witch-hunt, though morally repulsive, are not likely to obliterate the memory of what the priests, Catholic activists, and society in general had suffered in Stalinist times when the apparatus of repression was manned by so many dignitaries and functionaries of Jewish descent, conspicuous for their great zeal. The volte-face effected after 1956 by the Jewish prominents of the Stalinist "ideological front" and of the cultural milieu did not fool anybody. So also the later anti-Zionist purges could not give rise to the conviction that the Jews were being victimized only because they were Jews. The anti-Zionist campaign, undertaken to settle old scores within the party, has done a lot of moral damage and soiled the reputation of Poland as a country with the traditions of national and religious tolerance. . . .[59]

This seems to be the dominant perception in the Polish Church of events that ended the Jewish presence on Polish land. Ten years after March 1968, a certain amount of publicity was given to a letter from the Primate to an Israeli citizen, Israel Zyngman. In the letter, which thanks Zyngman for a book that he had sent to the Primate, there is a passage about the ghetto that the writer had observed "for a number of months over the wall along Elektoralna Street," and also about the state of Israel, which Wyszynski had thought to be necessary even before the war. The letter also contains a concise

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summary of Polish–Jewish relations: "This common experience [the war] has equalled the historic course of several centuries of coexistence of our two nations on Polish soil. I think that since the time of those terrible sufferings and sacrifices a fuller understanding for [the possibilities of] a new history has developed."[60]

This was the first written statement by the head of the Polish Church on Jews and Polish–Jewish relations since the pastoral letter of Cardinal Hlond, already quoted. How very different are the two statements! The second is a private letter to a Jew in Israel. The Primate writes to tell him, for the first time, "I was close, I saw it all." But he also wishes to tell him that the many centuries of coexistence on the same territory have now come to an end.

After the war the Jews ceased to be a socio-economic or cultural problem for the Poles. They were perceived wholly as a political problem, a political group par excellence. They were no longer part of society; they were outside it, either as part of a hostile establishment or living outside Poland altogether.

In recent years a symbolic return of Jews to Polish society and Polish history has begun. In April 1983, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Warsaw's ghetto uprising, the highest representative of the Polish Church, Primate Jozef Glemp, celebrated for the first time in history a solemn mass for the Jews. By now, the Jews had ceased to be even a political problem. Instead, reintegrated into Polish history, they had become a moral problem for the people of Poland, and also for the Polish Church.

THE POWER STRUCTURE AND THE JEWS

The Jews were part of the communist movement from its very beginning. The utopia of the universal brotherhood of nations was for them a way to escape their own particularism, to emerge from the narrow confines of the Jewish community, to avoid the hostility of the outside world. Stepping outside the ghetto, they were more likely than other peoples to abandon their faith, to give up the ties of tradition and national identity. In the communist movement, they were welcomed as uprooted people ready to reject their ethnicity. Just as the Bolshevik revolution draped itself in the clothes of the French Revolution, so the Bolshevik Jewish policy was a caricature of the French program formulated in 1791 by Clermont-Tonnère:

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"Nothing for the Jews as a nation, everything to the Jews as individuals."

The political position of Jews in postwar Poland was shaped by a number of factors: communist tradition, the policies of the Kremlin, the emergence of the state of Israel, the heritage of Polish–Jewish relations. Long before the end of the war, the political elite of the future People's Poland was selected in the Soviet Union, mostly from among the old communists, but not exclusively. Once Poland was occupied, the expanding apparatus of domination absorbed anyone willing to cooperate, calling primarily for educated people, who were then in very short supply. Many educated Poles were ready to help in the rehabilitation of their country, restarting the economy and developing education; they were not, however, ready to participate in ruling the country under communists. The new authorities, for their part, were deeply suspicious of the intelligentsia, a group rich in long and lively patriotic traditions.

The Jewish response was quite different. Grateful to the Soviet Union for saving their lives, emerging from an almost complete isolation, the Jews were culturally uprooted, acutely aware of the distrust felt toward them by the rest of Polish society. Dreaming of brotherhood and equality, and at the same time quite willing to give the "reactionaries" a lesson, they were ideal candidates for the new men in power. Independent of that, many were convinced communists of long standing.

Under these circumstances, the Jews who decided to remain in Poland—a small minority of the survivors of the Holocaust—and those who, at the same time, decided to break out of the Jewish community and culture—a small minority of those who remained—were caught up by the governing power apparatus. They were funneled into those branches of bureaucracy where loyalty and obedience were of crucial importance: security, the army, the Party apparatus, propaganda, international relations. All possible measures were taken to make the presence of Jews in the administration less conspicuous. Gentile features and fluent Polish were important requirements in their recruitment. Candidates were asked to assume Polish names and surnames, and even personal documentation relating to dead family members was altered. These procedures were immensely humiliating. The Polish public, aware of all this, saw it principally as a large-scale deception designed to camouflage the alien

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character of the new power. Most of these Jews were not simply assuming a Polish exterior while continuing to cultivate Jewish particularities in secret. They were not new Marranos; they accepted their new Polish identities wholeheartedly, with enthusiasm. But it was a very peculiar kind of Polish identity, adjusted to the requirements of official doctrine. And it is by no means certain that these people would have accepted the risks of assimilation as readily in less socially privileged circumstances. Czeslaw Milosz, later a Nobel laureate, may have been right when he had one of his characters say: "They can survive only by not being Jews; those who remain Jews will emigrate."[61]

There is no doubt that Jews were favored by the new authorities. This policy, however, was prompted by purely pragmatic considerations. Jews were given responsible posts not because they were Jews, but because they were faithful. This, however, could not last. Very soon the authorities felt the need for a new "cadres policy," which meant replacing the Jews with a rapidly trained Polish personnel, a switch made possible by a gradual consolidation of the new system and a broader social base from which to draw.

The process of eliminating the Jews from positions of power was greatly helped by the anti-Jewish policies of Moscow. The cold war created the Iron Curtain; under the circumstances, Jews, with their traditions, culture, and international connections, tended to become suspect citizens. With the emergence of the state of Israel—which at first enjoyed the support of Moscow as part of an anti-British diversion—the situation deteriorated still further for Jews, as it did in other countries of the Soviet bloc. A new, ominous word appeared: "cosmopolitanism."

Antisemitic trends were clearly visible in the trial of Laszlo Rajk in Hungary in 1949, and were important in the 1952 trial of Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia. Devoted Stalinists were accused of treason; their treason was increasingly attributed to their Jewish background. Prominent *apparatchiks* were not the only ones to fall victim. In 1952, the entire top echelon of Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. was liquidated, which, after the devastation of the war, meant the total destruction of high Jewish (Yiddish) culture. Only the death of Stalin prevented a thorough anti-Jewish purge throughout the Soviet bloc.

The Polish "Spring in October" of 1956 was, apart from everything else, a time of enhanced consolidation of the communist power

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in the country. The old guard was replaced by Wladyslaw Gomulka, only recently released from prison. In an atmosphere of general euphoria and patriotic fervor, those who symbolized (and, at lower levels, implemented) the process of Stalinization were dismissed, among them thousands of Jews. The power structure was being Polonized, not only in ideology, but also in the people who constituted it.

Until then, Poland had been very much like any other country in the Soviet bloc. For example, Poland's power structure included neither more nor fewer Jews than did the power structure in Rumania or in Hungary. Everywhere, Jews played the part of the loyal praetorian guard. Now they were being ousted—they had done their job. But in the early sixties the ruling elite in Poland took a different road from the one taken by other "fraternal parties"—a road that was to lead to March 1968.

According to some observers, the March events in Poland were a natural stage in the evolution of communism. Why, then, was this stage absent in the other countries of the Soviet bloc? Why was there no wave of organized antisemitism in Hungary? Surely, after the suppression of the revolution in 1956, Hungarian Jews could easily have been made responsible for the Stalinist aberrations and all the resulting misfortunes: the party leader, M. Rakosi, was a Jew; his short-lived successor, E. Gero, was a Jew; the cultural dictator, M. Farkas, was a Jew; so also was the head of the police, G. Peter. Nine out of twenty-five members of the Central Committee in 1945 were Jews. Why, then, was there no March 1968 in Hungary?

Soviet policy cannot provide a full explanation. While there had been the six-day war of 1967 and a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Israel by Moscow, together with a virulent anti-Jewish campaign directed from the Kremlin, other countries did not respond as Poland did. Rumania did not break off relations with Israel; there was no antisemitic campaign there. Hungary, while adopting an anti-Israeli stance, did not extend this hostility to its own Jewish population. There was, it seems, some room for maneuver within these states, whatever the overall anti-Israeli policy of the Soviet government.

The March events in Poland were, in fact, largely a consequence of the failure of October 1956. October offered Polish society a certain model of coexistence with communism, which stressed national

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autonomy and the need for internal reforms, together with a widening of the field of civic liberties and a certain democratization of the system. But the movement for renewal—the so-called revisionism—soon collapsed under pressures from Moscow and the local Party apparatus. The system rejected a transplant that was wholly contrary to its nature. The sense of frustration in the Party, of missed opportunities, combined with a new internal and external configuration, led to the emergence of "moczarism" (named after its ambitious leader, General Moczar), a new and very different program for Polonizing the system. The Party, in need of popular support, did not draw from earlier Polish democratic liberal or leftist traditions; it reached instead for a nondemocratic national heritage.

Antisemitism, once used as a weapon against the ruling establishment, now served as evidence that the establishment had at last rid itself of an alien element. The government was no longer Jewish-cosmopolitan; it had become Polish-national. The views and sentiments that found expression in the March events were not all the result of cynical manipulation. They expressed also the authentic needs of frustrated Party members, alienated from the rest of society and deprived of plausible perspectives. These were people who had risen to various heights from villages and small towns; they had nowhere to go home to. Their frustrations were in some measure consonant with the more general frustrations and obsessions of the society. It was along these lines that the Party sought to reestablish its links with the people.

Did the regime succeed? The general verdict is that it did not. I am inclined to subscribe to the opinion of Leszek Moczulski, who in the late seventies founded the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), a right-wing opposition movement. According to him, the events of 1968 showed that "admittedly only a part, but a considerable part, of society believed that the elimination of a foreign body—the so-called Zionist group—would automatically bring about a radical improvement of the situation."[62] The bulk of society could not be misled for very long; it was too sensitive to the subterfuges of official propaganda. To be credible to the people, authentic Polish nationalism had also to be anti-Soviet. Moreover, state antisemitism, like other state enterprises, was doomed to fail. Bernard Singer, a noted prewar journalist, had said this about antisemitism in the late thirties; it was still true in the late sixties.

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During the 1970s, still more Jews emigrated, leaving only a few old men behind, a few "good comrades," together with a number of assimilated young men and women, many of whom were joining the emerging opposition. The rebellion and the ensuing massacre of the shipyard workers in Gdansk and Gdynia in December 1970 brought the March "renewal" to an end. March 1968 and the Jews are no longer mentioned. The rulers of today are men who came to the fore in 1968 and later; they are not inclined to boast about their role in those days. Antisemitic propaganda exists primarily to attack the opposition.

The sixteen months of the legal existence of Solidarity in 1980–1981 saw little change in this respect. It was allowed to condemn publicly the antisemitic campaign of 1968, but also to criticize Jews and freemasons. Real change came only in the wake of the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981. It is now recognized that Jews, having ceased to be an internal problem, have become an international problem for the Polish People's Republic. This does not mean that there is no longer anti-Jewish propaganda for internal consumption, intended to further the interests of the Empire; this still exists. What is new, however, is the abundance of friendly gestures that have been made, not so much to Polish Jews as to foreign Jews, particularly American Jews. It is for them that the anniversaries of the Warsaw ghetto uprising are celebrated, and the expensive albums published, and the Jewish cemeteries restored amid much publicity. Signs of goodwill and friendly intervention are expected in return. The Poles want help in securing new credits; a friendly foreign press is hoped for. The People's Republic wishes to break out of its international isolation; it has already enjoyed some success in this. Jewish leaders, criticized for meeting General Jaruzelski in New York in the autumn of 1985, do not deny that they are not principally concerned with Poland, human rights, or Solidarity. What concerns them, they say, is that the ban on Israel in the countries of Eastern Europe be lifted, and that the rate of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union be increased. In these matters, Jaruzelski is potentially far more useful than Solidarity leaders like Zbigniew Bujak or Lech Walesa. Moreover, as has been reported, the General told these leaders that there was antisemitism in Solidarity.[63]

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A POLISH PROBLEM

The history of Polish–Jewish relations has come to an end. Jews in Poland are no more, and never will be again. "We are too late," Andrzej Kusniewicz writes in his recent novel; "it is impossible to wash this laundry clean. Some individual personal contacts will remain, a method of avoiding rocks and dangerous shoals. Passing by, sliding over, as if nothing had happened."[64] This is not quite so: something else, far more important, does remain—the heritage of the past as an internal Polish problem. The ugly hump is there, whether or not it is recognized. It is all the more unavoidable since antisemitism, notwithstanding optimistic assurances to the contrary, is by no means dead: ". . . antisemitic slogans survive in our Polish community, we keep hearing them to this day. . . . It is no use burying your head in the sand. Antisemitism is a reality which must not be overrated, but neither can it be neglected," states Father Bronislaw Dembowski.[65] He is echoed by Tymoteusz Klempski: "I do not say that there never was antisemitism in Poland. I shall say more, it exists to this day in the form of a paranoiac relapse, because in fact there are no Jews in this country, since they have either merged into the rest of society or become associated with the party. . . . "[66] Finally, "T.S.," an anonymous writer for the Polish underground press, states, "any honest man must admit that in the circle of his acquaintances there is a number of more or less virulent but unmistakable antisemites."[67] Many such statements can be found to this day in the Polish press: Catholic, official, and above all in the underground. At the same time, it is much more difficult to find descriptions of actual events, or attempts at diagnosis.

The sixteen months of the legal existence of Solidarity provided a unique opportunity to observe the kind of views, attitudes, and behavior that found expression in open public life. The Jewish problem soon became one of the many sources of friction between the union and the authorities. The latter—at least in part—tried to compromise Solidarity by pointing out with glee the number of intellectuals with a Jewish background in the union, greatly exaggerating both their number and the range of their allegedly destructive influence. In turn, union activists criticized the Party for promulgating antisemitic propaganda, recalling, among other events, March 1968 and the Kielce pogrom. Wiktor Kulerski, one of the leaders of

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the underground Solidarity movement after December 1981, responding to the onslaughts of the openly fascist pro-government association, "Grunwald," said: "Realizing who is trying to divide us and why, realizing the cruel and perverse methods applied to achieve this end, aware of the cost of tacit permissiveness in the face of incitement to hatred and prejudice, we must counter these attempts by preserving an elementary sense of human solidarity within our union."[68]

There have been other voices as well. Marian Jurczyk, a prominent Solidarity leader, attacked Jews in the Polish government—an incident that caused the union deep embarrassment. A representative of the democratic opposition had drawn a typically paranoid picture of humanity, ascribing all evil in the world to the Jews. Was this an isolated case? It is impossible to say. Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the earliest fighters for a free trade union movement—and, after December 13, 1981, like Wiktor Kulerski, a leader of the underground Solidarity—writes:

> The movement was beginning to be plagued by all the negative features of the system: intolerance . . . suppression of criticism, primitive chauvinism. . . . There emerged in Solidarity a wing of opinion not unlike "Grunwald" or *Rzeczywistosc* [*Reality*: the paper by the most hardline faction within the Party]. There was only one difference: the totalitarian ideology of "true Poles" within Solidarity was of a different color than red. It is quite amazing that it had a considerable following among the workers. At the same time, the so-called liberal elements in Solidarity were being pushed out of the union—first, as a result of the Party propaganda, second, by the "true Poles," third, by the Catholic hierarchy, which was more sympathetic to Solidarity totalitarians.[69]

Another source of interesting insight into the various trends within Solidarity is the collective work of a group of French and Polish sociologists under the direction of Alain Touraine.[70] These authors agree that while the democratic ethos of Solidarity prohibited the public airing of antisemitic sentiments, such sentiments did occasionally surface in private utterances among union activists. It was quite possible for the same individuals to represent one view on a given matter in public and quite another in private. With the increasing tension in and degeneration of the movement, anti-democratic, anti-intellectual, populist, and nationalist elements tended to come to

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the fore. Private antisemitism, at first kept under firm control, began to enter the public arena. It is important not to forget, however, that even in the worst of times, the issue was very marginal in comparison with other far more fundamental problems and conflicts.

* * *

What causes the survival of anti-Jewish sentiments in a world without Jews? In order to define at least the direction in which possible answers may be found, we must outline the consequences of the Holocaust for what may be called the Western mentality and for the Polish mentality.

For the West, the Holocaust came as a tremendous shock, incomparably greater than any produced by other cases of genocide in the distant or even quite recent past. The very word "holocaust," meaning a religious burnt offering, has in some ways sanctified the death of the Jews. The shock may be attributed to many causes. One had to do with the behavior of the West at the time of the Holocaust; another relates to the huge disproportion between the losses suffered by the West and the fate of the Jews. The Holocaust helped create a sense of crisis in Western civilization. The crime, committed in the center of Europe by a nation that had greatly contributed to the development of Christianity, served as a mirror that twisted all the surrounding images into grotesque distortions. The Holocaust quite abruptly revealed the ugly, irrational side of a civilization built on the premise of technical rationality. Man had become not only the tool but also the raw material of a supremely efficient process of destruction. Perhaps worst of all, as Hannah Arendt has aptly remarked, in the course of it all, evil itself was turned into a banality.[71]

Another cause of the shock to the West had to do with the religious nature of the offense. The Jews had been singled out for destruction because they were the Chosen People. In the eyes of many Jews, the Holocaust was the crowning event of centuries of Christian hate and contempt; this was the punishment for the alleged crime of deicide, the final consummation of the Gospel's "His blood be upon us and upon our children." This deterministic vision deprived nazism of its own distinct, murderous dynamics and saw continuity in what was in fact a terrible mutation. More convincing, certainly, was the opposite view: that the murder of the Jews was the symptom of a pagan

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rebellion against Christianity, its characteristic values and ethical principles.

However, this does not explain the choice of the victim; here, surely, the traditions of European antisemitism are very relevant, including the specifically Christian variety, which ascribes to Jews—*perfidis Judaeis*—a definite place in sacred history. That is why so many Christian thinkers and churchmen, while denying responsibility for the Nazi crimes, recognize the special responsibility of Christianity for the fate of the Jews. Pope John XXIII is said to have prayed, "For centuries our brother lay prostrate, weeping and bleeding, through our fault, because we forgot about Thy love."[72] The French cardinals, M. Etchejaray and J.M. Lustiger, wrote after a visit to Auschwitz: "On that spot where so many sons and daughters of the Jewish people, the people that had received and passed on to us the command 'Thou shalt not kill,' were led to extermination, we can only think of our responsibility."[73] Cardinal Etchejaray said: "We have a mission of repentance for our secular attitude as regards the Jewish people. . . . We should know how to ask forgiveness of the Lord and of our brothers so often fed with the 'teaching of disdain' and plunged into the horror of the Holocaust. We should commit ourselves to repair what should be repaired."[74]

In the West, the consequences of Nazi antisemitism have led to an unequivocal condemnation of all forms of antisemitism. Sometimes even quite trivial signs of xenophobia are thought to carry with them the menace of a new Auschwitz. By now antisemitism, whether religious or political (apart from its peculiarly leftist form, anti-Zionism), social or economic, is in the West more severely ostracized and provokes stronger reactions than many other kinds of religious or racial discrimination.

The Polish reaction to the Holocaust has been quite different. It never caused a shock to the collective Polish mentality. The experience at the time of war and in the immediate postwar period served mostly to strengthen old resentments and revive traditional hostility. Circumstances of the day favored the retention of anti-Jewish stereotypes; antisemitic postures were not compromised. According to Polish perceptions, there was no connection between even the radical antisemitism of the nationalist right and Nazi German antisemitism. On the contrary, both the war and the postwar years confirmed for many the patriotic legitimacy of anti-Jewish feelings.

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The enormous loss of life among Poles helped minimize the significance of the extermination of Jews. The Germans killed three million Poles and three million Polish Jews. Why should one group of victims be treated differently than the other? Why should the likelihood of death, the circumstances, methods of selection, and mode of destruction be more important than the fact of death itself?

Great cataclysms provide a sort of protection against smaller cataclysms. In times of war and revolution, for example, suicides are a rarity. The Poles, having suffered much heavier losses than their allies in the West, and entering upon yet another era of foreign domination, have had little time to worry about a crisis of civilization, let alone indulge in Christian-European remorse with regard to the Jews.

With time, however, antisemitism came to be seen as unacceptable also in Poland. Meanwhile, history leaves its traces, and continues to have an impact on current Polish thinking. Antisemitism is considered to be a matter of opinion, and opinions differ. Indeed, the very meaning of the word antisemitism is often circumscribed in Poland to allow a greater freedom of definition than is common in the West. One author, for example, argues that advocating an economic boycott on a group of citizens is not proof of antisemitism[75]; another holds that anti-Jewish prejudices, stereotypes, and propaganda do not constitute proof of antisemitism.[76] These are traces of a long tradition, of a certain innocence, of a Polish antisemitism that even today remains hardly disturbed by the enormity of the German crimes. On the contrary, it sometimes seems that these crimes have simply fostered the conviction that only open racism or readiness to use violence against Jews can qualify as antisemitism. More general anti-Jewish attitudes are often thought, it seems, to be acceptable.

Only quite recently has the problem of antisemitism and Christian responsibility for it been raised in the Polish Church. This, no doubt, owes much to the influence of Pope John Paul II. During a mass on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Warsaw's ghetto uprising, Father Bronislaw Dembowski said, "We must admit that the crime of genocide of the Jewish people had its origin in the sin of antisemitism."[77] For a Westerner this may appear to be a mere tautology; for a Pole, it is not. The preacher was speaking of antisemitism in general; he was placing the problem of responsibility in a far wider context than is normal in Poland; it did not concern

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Nazi Germany alone. Similarly, Jerzy Turowicz, in a recent article, used words that until now have been taboo. He wrote: "Polish Catholics, who witnessed the terrible fate of Jews on the Polish territory and have seen what antisemitism can lead to, are bound to make a thoroughgoing examination of conscience as regards the sin of antisemitism. I must say clearly, though it hurts me, that in my opinion this examination of our conscience has not yet been thorough enough."[78] In an even more open way, and very shocking to many Poles, the problem of Polish responsibility for antisemitism was posed recently by Jan Blonski, literary critic and professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, in an article entitled "The Poor Pole Looks at the Ghetto." [79] The title paraphrased a well-known poem by Czeslaw Milosz, "Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto," written immediately after the Germans crushed the Warsaw ghetto uprising.

In spite of these examples and many others, it is obvious that the examination of Polish consciousness "has not yet been thorough enough." Why was Poland so late in raising the problem of antisemitism, in inquiring into its origins, in dealing with issues of moral responsibility? Why the silence of Polish intellectuals, who have occasionally voiced moral protests and made some public condemnation of anti-Jewish postures and behavior, but who have never attempted an in-depth analysis, if for no other purpose than to try to understand their own society?

The answer, quite simply, is that a painful confrontation with the past requires the freedom to confront opinions and assessments—in other words, it implies a free public life. This has never existed in postwar Poland. Another explanation may have to do with the general position of Polish intellectuals. Many of them, especially those most sensitive to discrimination, fanaticism, and antisemitism, more or less enthusiastically welcomed the all-encompassing political embrace of the new authorities. One of the motives often evoked then and now by the victims of seduction by the communist power was the nondemocratic, xenophobic, antisemitic character of the political right and of the Church. This was, of course, only partly true; in any case, it did not justify the misalliance. When, in the mid-fifties, certain individuals began to free themselves from that deadly embrace, they could not but suffer a feeling of guilt for having betrayed the society

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they were supposed to serve. It was not becoming for them to moralize from the heights of an authority they no longer possessed.

However, the most important cause lay elsewhere. How, indeed, could one fight antisemitism when antisemitism had become, tragically and paradoxically, part of the protective wall raised by the nation against the pressures of the new power trying to impose on it a completely alien vision of the past, the present, and the future? The wall was absolutely necessary to survive the cruel bloodletting of the war, the unceremonious postwar amputation of Poland, and the shifting of its frontiers further west; also, the brutal transplantation of millions of people ordered by the Soviet Union, a virtual civil war in the late forties, the red terror, and the disintegration of many traditional social structures. The wall was built of anything that lay at hand in Polish tradition and culture: good and noble materials were used no less than inferior and vile stuff. The state of siege, permanent since 1944, never allowed for thorough reflection or necessary self-questioning. To take only one (though far from trivial) example: Was it possible to analyze critically the shortcomings of the Polish Church, Catholic antisemitism, and Christian responsibility when the new authorities were gleefully doing everything to compromise and destroy the Church, the last stronghold of the nation's spiritual independence?

In recent years, the issue of Polish–Jewish relations has been raised in official publications, most wisely and most candidly in the Catholic press, most honestly and without inhibitions in the independent underground press. This has become possible with the coming of age of a new generation of Poles, unburdened by memories of the war and of the immediate postwar years, or of Stalinism itself. Even more important, perhaps, is the unfettering of social consciousness brought about by the emergence of Solidarity. Polish society has become acutely conscious of its strength, but also aware of the spiritual poverty of its enemy. It can now afford to discuss calmly and openly its most embarrassing shortcomings and problems.

ENDNOTES

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Tu Wei-ming

Iconoclasm, Holistic Vision, and Patient Watchfulness: A Personal Reflection on the Modern Chinese Intellectual Quest

JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, in his thought-provoking interpretation of Confucian China and its modern fate, lamented that "there has been so much forgetting in modern Chinese history" and that "the current urge to preserve, the historical mood, does not bely it." To underscore "the forgetting," he thought fit to conclude a story of China with a tale of the Hasidim:

> When the Baal Shem had a difficult task before him, he would go to a certain place in the woods, light a fire and meditate in prayer—and what he had set out to perform was done. When a generation later the "Maggid" of Meseritz was faced with the same task he would go to the same place in the woods and say: We can no longer light the fire, but we can still speak the prayers—and what he wanted done became reality. Again a generation later Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sassov had to perform this task. And he, too, went into the woods and said: We can no longer light a fire, nor do we know the secret meditations belonging to the prayer, but we do know the place in the woods to which it all belongs—and that must be sufficient; and sufficient it was. And when another generation had passed and Rabbi Israel of Rishin was called upon to perform the task he sat down on his golden chair in his castle and said: We cannot light the fire, we cannot speak the prayers, we do not know the place, but we can tell the story of how it was done.[1]

Notwithstanding the suggestiveness of the Hasidic parable for our appreciation of the perennial problem of the gradual erosion of a cherished tradition—especially of a prophetic one with its sacred

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place, its religious ritual, and its esoteric meditation signifying an intimate "I–Thou" relationship with the transcendent—its relevance to the Chinese situation is ambiguous. For one thing, as Lin Yü-sheng notes, "one of the most striking and peculiar features of the intellectual history of twentieth-century China has been the emergence and persistence of profoundly iconoclastic attitudes toward the cultural heritage of the Chinese past."[2] If we must employ the theme of "forgetting" to depict the antitraditional mentality of the modern Chinese intellectual, we may have to imagine a sort of voluntary and active forgetting, in fact an outright rejection of and a frontal attack on tradition. As Benjamin Schwartz points out in his foreword to Lin's seminal study on modern Chinese "totalistic iconoclasm," China, "often regarded in the West as the very paradigm of traditionalism" during the nineteenth century, "had become for many the land of revolution—a society which had effected a total, fundamental break with the entire cultural and social order of the past" by the mid-twentieth century.[3]

Paradoxically, even iconoclastic intellectuals inadvertently subscribed to certain of the enduring "Confucian" presuppositions: "the notion of the integrated wholeness of culture, the notion that every aspect of society and culture could somehow be controlled through the political order, and the notion that conscious ideas could play a decisive role in transforming human life."[4] Indeed, these notions that "formed a powerful, widely shared syndrome of ideas within the cultural tradition"[5] contribute to the ambivalences and complexities of modern Chinese intellectual discourse.

When Lin Tse-hsü (Lin Zexu, 1785–1850), judged by the distinguished British diplomat and Sinologist, H. A. Giles, to be "a fine scholar, a just and merciful official, and a true patriot,"[6] sent his celebrated letter to Queen Victoria in 1839, his argument against the opium trade—expressing all the moral indignation characteristic of the Confucian scholar-official—showed that he had good reasons for taking an uncompromising attitude toward "those who smuggle opium to seduce the Chinese people and so cause the spread of the poison to all provinces." He was absolutely certain that "such persons who only care to profit themselves, and disregard their harm to others, are not tolerated by the laws of Heaven and are unanimously hated by human beings."[7]

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While Lin's moral tone may sound naive and unrealistic to us, with our advantage of hindsight and knowledge of China's mighty fall from the Middle Kingdom to a semicolonial state in a few decades, he in fact spoke from the perspective of "a totally integrated social-cultural-political order presided over by a class which managed to embody within itself both the spiritual and political authority of the society."[8] Though such a perception was much more myth than reality, "the endurance of tradition seemed to be a function of its all-encompassing wholeness"[9] in imperial China.

A generation later, when Tseng Kuo-fan (Zeng Guofan, 1811–1872) decided to send young men in their teens abroad to study superior Western technology as an integral part of the "self-strengthening" movement in 1871, he proposed that there be "interpreters and instructors to teach them Chinese literature from time to time, so that they will learn the great principles for the establishment of character, in the hope of becoming men with abilities of use to us."[10] Prepared to take bold measures to learn from the West, to make compromises in Sinic education to achieve practical ends, he was clearly willing to reorder his sense of priority, no longer certain that the world would long be governed by the principles that seemed so reasonable to him.

Yet, in Tseng's mind, the price exacted for some measure of Westernization was not only affordable but painless. While he raised the issue of cultural identity in response to the challenge of the T'aiping Rebellion under the leadership of a Christian convert, the danger of a radical rejection of the Confucian tradition—not only by feeble minds corrupted by Western influences but by some of the most brilliant shapers of the Chinese intellectual landscape—was almost beyond his imagination. Tseng, an exemplar of the scholar-official, a distinguished literatus, an accomplished calligrapher, a sophisticated interpreter of Sung (Song dynasty, 960–1279) learning, an able administrator, and an effective military commander, had no doubt (as is evidenced in his copious writings) that the transformative potential of the Confucian tradition was great.

When K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Yuwei, 1858–1927) used his reinterpreted Confucianism as an ideological basis for reforming imperial institutions in 1898, the Confucian moral order was significantly compromised. To accommodate the Western impact as both a cultural challenge and as a military threat, the grammar of action,

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defined in terms of wealth and power, gained ascendancy on the intellectual scene. A sense of urgency, prompted by the belief that the survival not only of the imperial polity but also of the Chinese form of life depended on the success of basic institutional changes, led him to undertake a comprehensive examination of all the available symbolic and spiritual resources for social reconstruction in the Confucian tradition.[11]

Chang Chih-tung's (Zhang Zhitong, 1837–1909) catchphrase, "Chinese learning as substance (*t'i* or *ti*) and Western learning as function (*yung* or *yong*),"[12] coined in the same period, shows how an eclectic blending of indigenous cultural values and imported Western ideas was deemed necessary to provide an ideological formula for coping with the Western tide.

The "difficult task" of the Chinese intellectual, defined later by the charismatic Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qichao, 1873–1929) was fourfold. Liang wrote:

> I therefore hope that our dear young people will, first of all, have a sincere purpose of respecting and protecting our civilization; secondly, that they will apply Western methods to study our civilization and discover its true character; thirdly, that they will put our civilization in order and supplement it with others' so that it will be transformed and become a new civilization; and fourthly, that they will extend this new civilization to the outside world so that it can benefit the whole human race.[13]

Levenson perceived in Liang's wishful thinking the dilemma common to the mind of modern China: an emotional attachment to China's past and an intellectual commitment to Western values.[14] Yet underlying all such intellectual efforts to come to grips with Confucian China and its modern transformation was the strong faith in the ability of human consciousness to understand and to shape historical reality. While the undifferentiated masses might not have the vision or the persuasive power to effect fundamental changes in society, it was both the duty and the responsibility of the intelligentsia to do so.

The generation of the May Fourth Movement (1919), witnessing the abortive attempt by the Nationalist Revolution to bring about an integrated polity after the collapse of the imperial dynasty, resorted to a wide-ranging iconoclastic attack on the Confucian tradition. This was seen as a strategic move intended to prepare the ground for "wholesale Westernization." For a brief time, China was hospitable

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to virtually all brands of Western thought: liberalism, pragmatism, vitalism, anarchism, socialism, romanticism, idealism, and nihilism each found a sympathetic and indeed enthusiastic audience.

In less than four generations after the Opium War, many of the most articulate members of the Chinese intelligentsia, notably those who had studied abroad, deliberately relegated their cultural identity to the background, taking it for granted that China's survival depended on her ability to adapt to the brave new world now defined in Western terms. It was perhaps no accident that Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the paradigmatic revolutionary, emerged as a political leader and national hero from the periphery of traditional Confucian culture.

Yet, without exception, Chinese intellectuals remained obsessed with Chinese culture, past and present. Nowhere in China is there a counterpart to the radical Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), who, despite his solid Confucian education, openly advocated the policy of "cutting loose from Asia" to allow Japan successfully to play the Social Darwinian game. Ironically, the great scholarly accomplishments of the Chinese westernizers were principally in traditional Chinese studies. The lifelong work of Yen Fu (Yan Fu, 1853–1921), who singlehandedly translated the works of Thomas Huxley, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith, and others into classical Chinese, was an exception.[15] Yet, even in the case of Yen Fu, as the recent publication of his completed works in the People's Republic of China shows, his primary concern was with Chinese studies.

This combination of cultural iconoclasm and cultural obsession made the relationship of the post–May Fourth intellectuals to their Confucian tradition both ambivalent and complex. The deliberate effort to forget was never fully realized; conscious rejection and unconscious identification with traditional symbols and values were pervasive among the most influential figures in Chinese intellectual life. Levenson speculated as to whether the modern fate of Chinese culture, so unlike the museumization of ancient Egyptian culture by foreign curators, was not also a sort of museumization. He wrote:

> By making their own museum-approach to traditional Chinese culture, the Chinese kept their continuity without precluding change. Their modern revolution—against the world to join the world, against their past to keep it theirs, but past—was a long striving to make their museums themselves.

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They had to make their own accounting with history, throwing back a new line, and holding fast to it, while heading in quite the opposite direction.[16]

This reading of the ability of Chinese intellectuals to detach themselves from the past by externalizing and objectifying it so that it may be safely packaged for display is too optimistic, if not simple-minded. The truth of the matter is that the Chinese intelligentsia—including many who were consistently iconoclastic—maintained unacknowledged, often unconscious, continuities with the culture of the past on every level of life: behavior, attitude, belief, and commitment.[17]

The gradual erosion of the Chinese intellectual's faith in the viability of Confucian culture to sustain the fundamental restructuring of the Chinese polity (an inevitable consequence of Westernization) may be witnessed in Lin Tse-hsü's moralism, by way of Tseng Kuo-fan's pragmatism, K'ang Yu-wei's reformism, and Chang Chih-tung's eclecticism, which eventually led to the iconoclasm of the May Fourth generation. Lin believed in the power and authority of the Celestial Court and the place of the Middle Kingdom under Heaven; he thought that he knew the proper ritual for dealing with uncivilized foreigners, and was confident that he possessed the spiritual resources to expiate sins against humanity. Tseng believed also that China was the center of the world, that she had the spiritual resources to strengthen her national defense, but he was willing to learn the formula, the know-how, from the West. Although K'ang continued to believe in the supremacy of the imperial system and Confucian culture, he recommended drastic measures to revitalize both. For him, China's place in the world, her methods of governance, and the spiritual resources she could command in coping with the unprecedented crisis in her history had all become problematic.

Chang Chih-tung's eclecticism, rightfully dismissed by Levenson as a fallacious rationalization, was a desperate attempt "to consolidate Chinese devotion to Chinese culture in the modern world of western techniques":

Chinese learning, which was to be the *t'i* [substance] in the new syncretic culture, was the learning of a society which had always used it for *yung* [function], as the necessary passport to the best of all careers. Western learning, when sought as *yung*, did not supplement Chinese learning—as the neat formula would have it do—but began to supplant it. For in reality, Chinese learning had come to be prized as substance because of its function,

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and when its function was usurped, the learned withered. The more western learning came to be accepted as the practical instrument of life and power, the more Confucianism ceased to be *t'i*, essence, the naturally believed-in value of a civilization without a rival, and became instead an historical inheritance, preserved, if at all, as a romantic token of no-surrender to a foreign rival which had changed the essence of Chinese life.[18]

The sense of crisis experienced by the Chinese intellectual after 1895, when Japan, having successfully transformed herself into a Western-style power, threatened China militarily as a full-fledged imperialist, cannot be adequately appreciated in a traditional–modern/China–West dichotomy.[19] The psychocultural dynamics of the Chinese intellectual community, informed by a profound historical consciousness, added layers of complexity to the public debates, which, on the surface, seemed to follow neatly the two-line struggle between the traditionalists and the westernizers.

Wang Kuo-wei's (Wang Guowei, 1877–1927) agony was symptomatic. Caught between idealism and pragmatism, he, an aspirant philosopher, ruefully remarked that what he really loved (idealistic claims of the life of the Spirit) was no longer believable; what he believed to be true (empirical proofs in natural sciences) was utterly unlovable.[20] The painful recognition that the culture of the past, with its richly textured history, philosophical insight, aesthetic sensibility, and literary taste could not be entrusted with the urgent task of "saving the nation," that Western ideas of science and democracy, functionally necessary for making China wealthy and powerful, did not in fact move the heart or inspire the soul, made many a Chinese intellectual both emotionally frustrated and intellectually unfulfilled.

The story of the life of the mind of the modern Chinese intellectual has yet to be told. The sense of urgency with which he or she has been impelled to deal with personal, familial, communal, or national crisis has not so far been congenial to long-term scholarship or deep thinking. The psychology of uncertainty, caused by continuous wars, hunger, and famine, not to mention political persecution, social unrest, and economic chaos, has constantly haunted the intelligentsia. It is understandable that for the overwhelming majority the political questions have loomed large. For them, the contemplative life was never a real option; at best, it was a dispensable luxury. The demand for relevance, participation, and activism was so overwhelming at times that those who opted for teaching or writing almost always

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developed a profound sense of guilt. The historical allusion to Pan Ch'ao (Pan Chao), who, fired by a strong patriotic impulse, threw his writing brush on the ground and joined the army, became a pervasive theme in the profile of the modern Chinese intellectual.

Ironically, as the intelligentsia accepted the rhetoric of relevance, with participation and activism appearing as the authentic way to engage in the struggle to save the nation, the rationale that the intellectual community was a center of critical reflection and long-term deliberation was relegated to the background. As a consequence, the politicization of culture became inevitable. The unreflective patriotism of the Chinese intellectual undermined the power of the pen as a prime weapon of social and political criticism in modern China. The spirit of self-sacrifice, with its attendant willingness to subordinate all personal concerns to the well-being of the group, motivated by an idealism to involve one's body and soul actively in the revolution to save China, served to weaken the intelligentsia in a way unprecedented in Chinese history.

The triumph of Marxism–Leninism as a political ideology demonstrates this point. When the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921, the philosophies of Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, James, Dewey, and Russell were all more important than that of Marx. Although Li Ta-chao (Li Dazhao, 1888–1927) enthusiastically hailed the victory of Bolshevism in an article published in the influential *New Youth* in 1918, his Marxist study club, with its messianic hope for the future, attracted very few recruits. The intellectual debates that centered around scientism and the philosophy of life in the early 1920s were dominated by pragmatists and idealists.

The upsurge of interest in Marxism–Leninism politically may be attributed to the increasing popularity of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary model. Ideologically, however, the fact that Marxism–Leninism was Western to the core, while thoroughly critical of imperialism, made its persuasive power overwhelming to many totally iconoclastic and fiercely nationalistic intellectuals. Also, the breakdown of the traditional order in the economic, political, and social realms did much to generate a powerful ferment among Chinese intellectuals:

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> Nothing is untouched: the self, the idea of nature, the relation to the other person, to the family, the group, the State. Love, ambition, respect, friendship, all are challenged at such intimate depths that anger becomes a protective reaction, pride a defense, hatred a strategy and contempt a reflex.[21]

The demand for a holistic vision—a worldview that would situate the Chinese problem in a global context, in a broad historical perspective—was urgent. Hu Shih (1891–1962), inspired by Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism and frightened by Marxist–Leninist ideology, urged his followers to avoid "isms" and to concentrate all their efforts on solvable problems. His plea for reason, liberty, and independent-mindedness was widely interpreted as being both unrealistic and irrelevant, if not positively selfish. After all, Dewey's instrumentalism grew out of the safe academic environment of the United States; it was never intended to address the burning issues of the kind that confronted the Chinese intellectual. A totalistic ideological turn was almost inevitable.

While the timeliness of the Marxist–Leninist ideology, as embodied in the Soviet revolutionary model, may have captured the imagination of the Chinese intelligentsia, it was the participation of the peasantry, the perpetual carriers of traditionalism, that fundamentally changed the political dynamics of the country and eventually brought about a revolution. The principal beneficiary of the rise of communism in China was not the intelligentsia, however instrumental it may have been in providing the symbolic resources that helped form a broad consensus, thereby preparing the whole nation for it. Though the Chinese Communist Party explicitly demanded a total iconoclastic break with the feudal past, it was in fact nativist to the core. Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong, 1893–1976) may have been a creative interpreter of Marxism–Leninism, but he was by no means a westernizer. Even discounting what has been revealed of Mao's style of leadership during the Cultural Revolutionary period (1966–1976), Mao Tse-tung's thought was a deliberate attempt to bring Marxist–Leninist modes of analysis to bear upon the concrete situation in China; as such, it functioned primarily in a Chinese linguistic universe.

However, the Chinese linguistic universe that produced the thought of Mao Tse-tung and that was subsequently influenced by it

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cannot be seen as traditional. One does not prove Mao's traditionalism by pointing to his frequent use of historical allusions, conventional expressions, and classic literary styles; the message Mao tried to convey was iconoclastic; the utopia he envisioned was communist. Still, by and large, he was a traditionalist; his aesthetic sensibility, life-style, political skills, self-image, and conceptual apparatus were reflected in his familiarity with Chinese poetry, fiction, history, and thought.

While the Chinese communists may have emerged from peasant movements and guerrilla warfare—and while the Long March and the Yenan Spirit certainly evoke sensations of earthiness, symbolically explaining why the Red Star over China is inherently rural rather than urban, nativistic rather than foreign—and while there is much truth in all such characterization—the other side of the coin must also be considered. Chinese communists, as nationalists, returned students, intellectuals, and ideologists, are also the self-assigned inheritors of May Fourth iconoclasm. The Chinese Communist Party, Leninist in its conception and organization, assumed the role of "saving the nation" as its manifest destiny. The belief that Marxism smashed the two great mountains—feudalism and imperialism—that had blocked China's way toward modernity for decades led to the self-righteous claim that the wave of the future was neither Western nor Chinese but socialist, combining the most "progressive" elements of both.

The intelligentsia's active participation in this, or at least its tacit acceptance of the communist agenda for "saving the nation," was crucial for developing an ideology with broad popular appeal. If Mao's investigation of peasant conditions in the heartland of Chinese agriculture in the 1920s helped him design a strategy for reordering China's power relationships (which involved the development of tactics of class struggle and brainwashing), his constant wrestling with intellectuals also taught him the complex art of symbolic control.

Symbolic control, in this sense, refers to a governing mechanism that gains its coercive, persuasive power through its appeal to cultural values and social norms. While legal sanctions are also applied, these are used only as a last resort. Social order is maintained not by law but by ritual. Members of the community, with varying degrees of sophistication, all have personal knowledge of the boundaries within

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which they interact as centers of specific relationships, not as isolated individuals. Underlying all overt behavior and revealed attitudes, but also in subtle and inarticulate signs of human interaction, is a tacit understanding of what is acceptable, what is expected of each member. A seasoned member knows precisely the operational rules that derive from such understanding. This is not to say that individual members tend to think and act alike according to standards imposed from above; it does suggest, however, that the governing mechanism relies heavily on shared values and norms. Leaders cannot afford to take lightly a society's value orientation as a political force that is capable of enhancing or undermining their authority and power in consensus formation.

Mao and other founding members of the Chinese communist movement in the Party, but also in the government and in the army, were absolutely serious about ideology. The slogan "politics is in command" means more than that the civilian is in control of the military; it implies that every aspect of society, civilian as well as military, has to be guided by principles that emanate from the power center, where a holistic vision of China's destiny resides.

The intellectuals, especially well-known professors and prominent writers, are not in this sense "rootless cosmopolitans"; they are dangerous shapers of public opinion. Having privileged access to the holistic vision because they have helped formulate it as the core of the Sinicized socialist ideology, at least in principle, they have the authority to suggest an alternative vision, formulating such a new vision when occasion demands it. Theoretically, and occasionally in practice, Chinese intellectuals have exercised their right to criticize the state and the symbolic resources used by the state to legitimize both its *modus operandi* and its very existence. The thoroughness and incisiveness with which political, social, and cultural criticism was directed against the Party and its legitimizing ideology during the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1957 clearly demonstrates that when intellectuals are given the opportunity, they are not unwilling to be outspoken critics. However, it is one thing to be thoroughly and incisively critical of a regime, and quite another to become an active dissident as a declaration of conscience.

The authentic possibility of becoming a dissident in Chinese political culture is very limited. Neither the political push nor the

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ideological pull has ever been strong enough. Historically, the Chinese intelligentsia was an integral part of the governing mechanism of the body politic. Although tension existed between the ruling minority and the cultural elite, the examination system (a Confucian contribution to social mobility in traditional China) enabled the literati to staff the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. As a result, politics was seen not only as a power game but also as an exercise of symbolic control. The intellectuals' role, as the most articulate members of society, was crucial to the success of any such governing mechanism. It is difficult to imagine that the imperial court in traditional China actually imposed Confucian ideology on the literati; rather, the literati, as carriers of the Confucian Way, initiated, implemented, and judged the whole process of symbolic control from the political and bureaucratic center. Marxism–Leninism, as an implanted young ideology in the historical landscape of China, was imposed on the intelligentsia by the central government. However, given the fact that the rise of Marxism–Leninism in China was neither the result of an international conspiracy nor a domestic misunderstanding, but was a deliberate ideological choice made by the intellectuals (instrumental in creating the agenda intended to save the nation), it is entirely conceivable that they see themselves as the carriers of the socialist message. If they remain the government's collaborators, despite wave after wave of anti-intellectual campaigns, it is in large measure due to their perception that they have actually participated in the formation of the holistic vision of nation building. Chinese intellectuals may well be economically disadvantaged and politically oppressed; they are not ideologically alienated.

The collective memory of China's modern fate is so vividly implanted in the mind of every educated Chinese that—despite significant differences among historians' interpretations and evaluations of each major event—the chronology illustrated by Lin's abortive attempt to stop the British, Tseng's self-strengthening effort to catch up with the West, K'ang's reform inspired by the Meiji Restoration, and Sun Yat-sen's revolution, later guided or misguided by the Russians, shows that saving the nation is of great historical significance; that nothing else deserves more focused attention. By comparison, the fate of any single individual, however painfully unfair, can never match the cumulative injustice and humiliation that China, as a civilization-state, has endured in modern times.

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The personification of China's woes in literature, history and philosophy—in text books and the mass media—has done much to heighten the awareness of the young. Each generation relives and reexperiences the century-long tragedy of China, sharing a poignant sense that new painful realities will have to be endured as well. No one in the Chinese cultural universe is spared this historical and existential weight. While the Chinese have never known the Holocaust, they have suffered collectively a series of holocausts, a few self-inflicted by the people of the "land of ritual and rites," as the traditional Confucian scholar would choose to characterize the Middle Kingdom.

The Chinese intellectuals' desire for a strong center, dictated by the modern conception of wealth and power as the essential imperatives for national survival, has been so pervasive that weakness, backwardness, and poverty have seemed even more heinous than dictatorship. Ting Wen-chiang (Ting Wenjiang, 1888–1936), the champion of scientism, is alleged to have told his liberal friends that if Chiang Kai-shek could defeat the Japanese by becoming a dictator, there was nothing wrong with dictatorship. It is well to recall that the communists, as well as anarchists and liberals, joined the Nationalist government in its fight against Japanese aggression. If Chiang had faded from the scene in the early 1940s, he would be honored today as a national hero in China. The prestige that Sun Yat-sen now enjoys on both sides of the Taiwan Strait seems to have come from the perception that he was single-mindedly committed to the Nationalist cause. The deification of Mao in the Cultural Revolutionary period (1966–1976) may have been an aberration in this long and strenuous effort to find an incorruptible center from which a holistic vision of national reconstruction could be persuasively articulated and effectively implemented. Mao's strength in mobilizing a nationwide revolution came not from the power centers of the bureaucracy but from the authority of ideology. His ability to shape profoundly the direction of national sentiment may be attributed to his strategic choice not to exercise power directly through the Party apparatus. Had he, for example, been closely associated with implementing the Party's educational policies, he would have lacked the leverage to deal with the student demonstrations in the summer of 1968.

The reasons why ideology is still vitally important in China are many. To begin with, the mass mobilization of energy from various

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echelons of the society to achieve national goals depends on the ability of the leadership to set the course of collective action in terms understandable and persuasive to the country as a whole. Because the agenda for saving the nation since the late nineteenth century has demanded a concerted effort to involve every Chinese (including those overseas), the art of persuasion, with emphasis on credibility, public-spiritedness, and goodwill, is not so much moralizing propaganda as an essential ingredient that defines Chinese society.

Lurking behind the scene, however, is the dilemma of the May Fourth Chinese intellectual—caught between the necessity to learn from abroad and the urgency of consensus formation based on a shared cultural identity at home—which continues to haunt the communists. The vicious circle of wholesale Westernization, together with the Boxer mentality, which generates both strong admiration for and rejection of foreignism, continues to aggravate all the highly charged ideological debates. Moreover, the imposition of a superficially domesticated ideology on a bureaucracy that is deeply rooted in peasant traditionalism has made the political culture in the People's Republic a pattern of domination that combines feudalist traditionalism with Leninist collectivism.

Unfortunately, the intellectuals who wholeheartedly support the communist agenda have found themselves targets of attack in wave after wave of political campaigns since 1958. The Chinese Communist Party, thought to embody the messianic hope for "saving the nation," consists mainly of peasants, workers, and soldiers; the majority have little more than a primary education. Vigorous recruitment of college graduates in recent years notwithstanding, illiterates still greatly outnumber those with any experience of higher education. The confrontation between the brightest but marginalized intelligentsia and the least educated but most powerful cadres seems almost unavoidable.

Still, the intelligentsia's willing participation in this most recent joint effort to make China both strong and wealthy remains the norm. Despite the activity of highly publicized dissidents, the Chinese intellectual community as a whole has never challenged the leadership of the Party. The phenomenon of *refusenik*, a familiar and common one in the political and social landscape of the Soviet Union, is not likely to have its counterpart in China in the near future. The

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idea that a member of the intelligentsia, influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of the West, would deliberately alienate himself from the ideological claims of the state to live a meaningful life guided by an alternative sense of truth and reality, has never been even a rejected possibility—though, given the intellectual effervescence of recent years, it may become an authentic existential option for an increasing number of writers-as-prophets in Chinese life.

I would suggest that two new mountains have emerged after the Cultural Revolutionary earthquake: Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism. It is too early to tell whether they will block China's predetermined course toward socialism. However, the articulated goal of China's reform effort, "to build China into a great socialist modern civilization-state with a Chinese character," suggests that the iconoclastic attack on Chinese culture as poisonous feudalism, together with the total rejection of Western civilization as bourgeois imperialism, is no longer tenable. The antispiritual pollution campaign of 1983 and the more recent criticism of bourgeois liberalism do not appear to have the support of the intelligentsia. The upsurge in comparative cultural studies, evident in the systematic annotation of major traditional Chinese works in literature, history, and philosophy but also in the comprehensive translation and interpretation of Western classics, past and present, has fundamentally restructured the ideological landscape. The relevance of Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism to the viability of Marxism, if not of Leninism, as a continuous socialist ideology in China has been imaginatively and creatively explored by some of the most seminal minds in China today. Even if we choose to believe that the power struggle in China is more a political game than an ideological debate, it is worth noting that the widely accepted way to exercise power in this political game is through ideological debate.

It appears that the ideological debate, centered on the proper way of realizing the Chinese dream of building a "socialist modern civilization-state with a Chinese character," has taken a pluralistic turn. With the influx of Western ideas and practices and the exodus of Chinese officials, scholars, and students, the intellectual discourse has become more subtle and nuanced. It must sound positively cacophonous to those who assume that the intelligentsia automatically subscribe to the Party line. The days when the Party elders could actually "set the tone" for any ideological debate are gone. In their

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attempt to redefine socialism, they must now confront the challenge of both Western and Chinese humanism espoused by some of the most sophisticated journalists, columnists, and Marxist theoreticians. Deng Xiaoping's reformers may want to confine the current ideological discussion to the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, military, and technology with only limited attention to institutional adjustment, but university students have called for participatory democracy, constitutionally guaranteed liberties, and legally protected human rights as essential features of modernity. The question of how a socialist modern society with a Chinese character should evolve is particularly intriguing: Who should have the authority to interpret and judge the rightness of such a concept for the nation as a whole—intellectuals or cadres? A communal critical self-awareness of the Chinese intellectuals is taking shape. Whether or not a civic society will emerge that significantly changes the conventional pattern of symbolic control in which the state is not only omnipresent but also virtually omnipotent, the conscience of the intelligentsia has already been voiced and heard.

In the spring of 1985, I had the good fortune to offer a lecture course on Confucian philosophy in Chinese at Peking University. About 150 people attended the class, mainly graduate and undergraduate students at Peking, Beijing Normal, and People's Universities, but also members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, visiting college teachers from other provinces, and foreign students. I was struck first by the iconoclasm on the campus. There was nothing there to evoke a feeling of a traditional Chinese academy. The campus itself, the original site of the now discontinued missionary Yenching University, is charming. Though the University is blessed with more than eighty years of history, the collective memory is remarkably short. As a response to strong student campaigns, new bronze statues of Li Ta-chao and Ts'ao Yuan-p'ei (Cai Yuanpei, 1867–1940), the famous president of the University in the May Fourth era, added a little variety to the otherwise monotonous domination of the two gigantic stone figures of Mao.

Indeed, since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Peking University has undergone such dramatic change that many find it traumatic to recollect what it was like even a decade ago. The idea that an academic institution such as Harvard University, founded in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), could survive the

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Manchu conquest, the T'aiping Rebellion, the collapse of the Ch'ing (Qing) dynasty, the Warlords, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Cultural Revolution (as I tried to suggest in conveying a sense of continuity in the history of Harvard, which was celebrating its 350th anniversary) produced only incredulous looks among my Chinese students. They found it revealing that the United States, supposedly youthful, has enjoyed an uninterrupted history with impressive traditions for more than three centuries, while the ruptures in Chinese society in modern times have been so profound that many of the most salient features of the Chinese tradition, including the kind of Confucian humanism we were disposed to study, seem little more than distant echoes.

Despite my fears that a sympathetic reading of the *Confucian Analects, Mencius, Hsün Tzu (Xun Zi), Reflections on Things at Hand*, and *Instructions for Practical Living* might seem like outmoded feudal ideology, the response to the material and the communication among us in lectures, seminars, small group discussions, and informal conversations was extraordinary. No one seemed in the least offended when I remarked, jokingly, that I was introducing a "foreign culture" subject. They even tolerated my paraphrasing of Clifford Geertz's idea, the liberating experience of confronting radical otherness, and my suggestion that the reintroduction of Confucianism—a form of inclusive humanism, as I interpreted it[22]—could serve for comparative purposes as a "radical otherness" to the Marxist mode of analysis with which they were so familiar. In being confronted with this "foreign culture" subject, they were, in theory, being offered the possibility of a liberating experience.

Before long, however, I came to realize that Confucianism, far from being foreign, is an integral part of what a leading contemporary thinker in China, Li Zehou, persuasively argues is the "psychocultural construct" of the contemporary Chinese intellectual, no less than of the Chinese peasant. The problem, indeed, is that they have been for so long, so thoroughly, and often so unreflectively immersed in this tradition that its very familiarity has bred contempt for it. Few could see much potential for creative transformation in a feudal ideology that has so repeatedly frustrated China's quest for modernity. Indeed, their lived experience in a society shaped by traditional habits of the heart has definitively, if not conclusively, persuaded

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them that the Confucian heritage—the embodiment of authoritarianism, bureaucratism, nepotism, conservatism, and male chauvinism—must be thoroughly critiqued again. As iconoclasts, they are indeed children of the May Fourth movement.

My attempts to show that the Confucian tradition, as an inclusive humanism, needs to be studied for its own sake as a necessary precondition to any critical reappraisal of its modern significance struck a number of sympathetic chords in my audience, which grew substantially when I gave later presentations at other universities and at scholarly conferences in other cities. Still, on several occasions, while I was speaking, the image of Rabbi Israel of Rishin—seated in his golden chair and telling the story of how it was done—did come to mind.

Certain colleagues and students who became my friends (and, on occasion, my fellow travelers) helped, by their persistent questioning, to make me acutely aware of my own boundaries: Would I have discovered the symbolic and spiritual resources overflowing from the Confucian tradition had I myself been raised in China? Educated in Taiwan from fifth grade through college, how could I possibly appreciate the dynamic iconoclastic spirit of the May Fourth movement? My experience as both a graduate student and a college teacher in the United States since 1962 must in important ways have conditioned my sense of the Chinese reality, both past and present. How can I be thoroughly critical of China's past, when I present it to American students as a subject worth studying?

Since 1966, when I first taught a course on cultural values and social change in contemporary China at my alma mater, Tunghai University (Taiwan), I have been greatly interested in the revival of Confucian studies in industrial East Asia. The interest was enhanced in 1982 when I accepted the challenging task of trying to introduce Confucian ethics to interested secondary school students in Singapore. To be sure, the narrowly defined Weberian question of identifying the functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic in the so-called post-Confucian states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) did not greatly excite my intellectual passion, though I became fascinated by the profound implications that the Weberian mode of analysis has for both comparative cultural and religious studies. Today, examining the contribution that the Confucian tradition can make to human self-understanding in an increasingly

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secularized and pluralistic world, together with exploring the authentic possibility of thinking both philosophically and religiously about perennial human concerns from Confucian roots, are projects that delight me. While motivated by a strong desire to give a sympathetic and fair reading of the Confucian message to students at Peking University when the opportunity presented itself, might I have given more emphasis to the tragic fact that the great Confucian ideas, as they became crystallized in the power relationships of an oppressive polity, must inevitably enslave the mind, had I been exposed firsthand to its contemporary manifestation?

China is today at an ideological crossroads. The inner strength of the Chinese intelligentsia has been sapped by the collusion of feudal Chinese traditionalism (the remnants of a politicized Confucian moralism) and modern Western collectivism (the outmoded practices of Leninist dictatorship). To release and cultivate the vital energy for self-transformation, the Chinese intellectuals need to tap the resources of both their own tradition and that of the West. That is possible if they are able to identify the two narrow ridges between traditional feudalism and Confucian humanism, between bourgeois capitalism and democratic liberalism. If they are willing to attain the new by reanimating the old, to revitalize the self by embodying the other, a fruitful path could be the creative interaction between Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism in a socialist context. That, in Edward Shils's wise counsel, is "a task for patient watchfulness and tact of the utmost delicacy."[23]

ENDNOTES

[1]Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 124–125.
[2]Lin Yü-sheng, *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 3.
[3]Ibid., p. ix.
[4]Ibid., pp. x–xi.
[5]Ibid., p. xi.
[6]William Theodore de Bary, et al., comp., *Sources of Chinese Tradition,* 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), vol. 2, p. 6.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Benjamin Schwartz attributed this perception to China as the symbol of unchanging tradition; see Lin Yü-sheng, *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness*, p. ix.
[9]Ibid.

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[10]De Bary, *Sources*, vol. 2, p. 51.

[11]Hao Chang, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 21–65. Professor Chang's focused investigation of the ethicoreligious world views of four of the major intellectual figures of this transitional era is most illuminating for understanding the breakdown of the Confucian moral-spiritual order and Chinese intellectuals' struggle to recreate a new holistic vision to fill the vacuum.

[12]De Bary, *Sources*, vol. 2, p. 82.

[13]Ibid., p. 187.

[14]Levenson first formulated this interpretive thesis in his *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). For a summary of his argument, see his *Confucian China*, pp. ix–x.

[15]For a thought-provoking study of Yen Fu, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[16]Levenson, *Confucian China*, vol. 3, p. 124.

[17]Schwartz notes in his aforementioned "Foreword": "The unconscious and unacknowledged continuities with the culture of the past on every level of life in contemporary China are being thoroughly examined." See Lin Yü-sheng, *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness*, p. x.

[18]Levenson, *Confucian China*, vol. 1, p. 61.

[19]For an informed critique of this sort of dichotomous methodology, see Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

[20]Wang's autobiographic account of how he gradually lost interest in philosophy is worth noting:

> In general those philosophical theories that can be loved cannot be believed, and those that can be believed cannot be loved. I seek truth and yet I love mistaken forms of it. Great metaphysics, rigorist ethics, and pure aesthetics—of these we are inordinately fond. However, in searching for what is believable, we turn instead to the positivistic theory of truth, the hedonistic theory of ethics, and the empiricist theory of aesthetics. I know the latter are believable but I cannot love them, and I know the former are lovable but I cannot believe. This has caused me great distress during the last two or three years.

See Joey Bonner, *Wang Kuo-wei: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 95.

[21]François Geoffroy-Dechaume, *China Looks at the World* (New York: Pantheon, 1967), p. 131.

[22]Tu Wei-ming, "Toward a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism: A Background Understanding," in *Confucianism: The Dynamics of Tradition*, Irene Eber, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3–21.

[23]Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 330.

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Gregory F. Treverton

Covert Action: From "Covert" to Overt

FROM THE START, nothing much was secret about the covert American intervention in Nicaragua. Neither the options the Reagan Administration discussed in November 1981 nor the resulting decision were very secret. Reporters were passed copies of both documents. After one major story in the *Washington Post* in March 1982, Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, confirmed that "everything in the *Post* story was true," and in July the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Casey, told the *New York Times* that the President had approved covert operations toward Nicaragua the previous November.

This "overt" covert action was a new type, even if not one without precedent in postwar history. It was overt not just because it, along with broader American policy toward Central America, was controversial, or because Congress resorted to open votes about funding for it. It was overt because for its part, too, the Reagan administration was not much interested in secrecy. It regarded aid to the *contras* as good policy and good domestic politics, an element of its global program to put pressure on Marxist governments in the Third World, especially those aligned with the Soviet Union.

In November 1986, however, it became apparent that the Reagan administration had been conducting a covert operation that *was* secret—selling arms to Iran. In a strange twist, it also turned out that

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the Iranian operation had crossed, in a way secret even from the President, with aid to the *contras*. "Overt" covert action of a new type in Nicaragua intersected with a covert operation in Iran that repeated previous patterns: it became public sooner rather than later; the result was very different from what Washington had in mind.

FROM GEOSTRATEGIC OPENING TO HOSTAGES

In November, a pro-Syrian Beirut newspaper, *Al Shiraa,* published a bizarre account of a secret mission to Iran the previous May by former National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane.[1] The account would have been dismissed as another piece of partisan Middle East nonsense, except that it turned out to be true. The visit was first confirmed by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, then by McFarlane.

The story became stranger and stranger. McFarlane, it transpired, had arrived in Teheran with little advance planning on a plane carrying U.S. spare parts for HAWK anti-aircraft batteries. His party was said to be bearing a key-shaped cake to symbolize an American opening to Iran. McFarlane and his small party were spirited to the top floor of the former Teheran Hilton for several days of on-again, off-again negotiations. McFarlane had expected to get all the hostages released in exchange for more deliveries of weapons. When his Iranian interlocutors would have none of it, negotiations broke off. One American hostage was, however, released in July, and the President subsequently approved shipping the remainder of the May weaponry.

The McFarlane delivery of U.S. weapons to Iran was the fourth or fifth in a sequence running back to August 1985. The first two shipments, consisting of TOW anti-tank weapons, had been made in August and September 1985 by Israel, through middlemen, with U.S. approval and assurance that depleted Israeli stocks would be replenished. One American hostage was released in September. The operation, very closely held in Washington, was managed day to day by Lt. Col. Oliver North of the NSC staff; his primary contact was Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian businessman then living in France. Washington's obsession with secrecy meant that normal procedures for approving covert actions were circumvented; critical

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meetings happened with no analytic papers prepared beforehand and no record of decisions kept afterward.

The United States became directly involved in the third shipment, HAWKs again, in November 1985. In a comedy of errors, a contact of North's, retired U.S. Air Force General Richard Secord, first could not get landing rights in Portugal for the shipment coming from Israel, then could find no aircraft to trans-ship them to Iran. North got in touch with Duane Clarridge, the CIA Division Chief for Europe, who put Secord in touch with an air charter company previously owned and used by the CIA.

Of the events that followed, in all their tragicomic detail, the Report of the Tower Commission, like the reports of the world press, provide accounts that are memorable principally because they proved so embarrassing—to the administration, its senior officials, the President himself, and, ultimately, the United States. There was much to conceal; the revelations added not a bit to the reputation of any responsible official in Washington.

WHY SECRET?

Not every covert action exposé, however, has made for controversy. Some, indeed, stayed in the tabloids or were relegated to the back pages of major dailies. They did not produce political controversies to which the American government felt any need to respond. In the instance of Guatemala, for example, in 1953, leaks about the American paramilitary efforts were discredited, not the operation itself. The vivid prose of *Time* magazine reflected the temper of the times perfectly; according to *Time,* the revelations were ". . . masterminded in Moscow and designed to divert the attention from Guatemala as the Western Hemisphere's Red problem child."[2] Curiously, despite all the public information about it, even the Bay of Pigs—uncontroversial among those insiders who knew of it, save for a few Presidential advisers and a senator or two—did not become a major public issue before the fact.

Now, however, more covert operations are controversial inside the governing establishment—and outside when leaks occur. The series of events captured by the label "Vietnam," with "covert intervention" perhaps a subtitle, has made Americans more skeptical that every upheaval in the poor countries of the world threatens U.S.

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interests enough to warrant intervention, covert or open. The recent public ambivalence in the United States about Nicaragua reflected that skepticism: on the one hand, the drift of the Sandinista government was worrisome, still more so if it took Managua closer to Havana or Moscow; yet, on the other hand, there was no conviction that the threat justified shedding American blood. CIA intervention was preferable to a military commitment, but even it was controversial.

Certainly, there will be cycles in American attitudes, as there have always been. Concerns over Soviet power coexist with worries about nuclear war and peace; one predominates, then the other. In the early 1980s, most Americans seemed to share their President's concern with the Soviet threat, and their Congressional representatives went along with huge increases in defense spending—and in covert action. Ronald Reagan was able to rebuild considerable authority and discretion in the American presidency, thereby ending a cycle begun by Vietnam and Watergate. Indeed, the saddest consequence of the Iran–*contra* debacle may well be that it undermines that rebuilding.

Even now, however, not every covert action is controversial. Of the forty or so covert actions underway in the mid-1980s, at least half have been the subject of some press account. Yet only a few were controversial enough so that the first leaks became continuing stories. Most of the others were open secrets, more unacknowledged than unknown; they were that because most members of Congress thought they made sense, as did most Americans who knew or thought about them—and, no doubt, most of the journalists who reported them. Former DCI William Colby characterized the reaction to revelations of American assistance to the resistance in Afghanistan: "Afghanistan was a two-column headline in the *Washington Post* for one day, then almost nothing."[3]

The point is not that the 1990s will bear no resemblance to the 1950s, that every covert action will immediately leak and become controversial when it does. The line separating those that are controversial from those that are not will move back and forth, just as it has in the last decade. Still, almost every covert action will become known eventually. If *Time,* like the rest of the American media, continues to dismiss most of what the Soviet Union says as propaganda, it is hard to imagine that it will similarly dismiss every revelation about an American covert operation. And when the

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operation finds its way into public print, by whatever device, more often than in the 1950s it will be controversial.

INTERVENING AND SUCCEEDING

Major changes, primarily in American domestic politics, make it more difficult for the United States to achieve its purposes *secretly*. Other changes, primarily in the Third World nations that have been the targets of American action, make it harder now than in the 1950s for the United States to intervene successfully at all, covertly or openly. Despite the controversy and mystique that surround covert action, history suggests that there is no magic to it. It means secretly providing foreigners with money, weapons, or training as indications of American support.

Most early covert actions were conceived in secrecy and began small; the assumption of covertness was reasonable. Yet, the operational requirements of success required these to grow. This meant more of everything: more CIA officers, more visible in the foreign land, more need for airfields or training bases, more meetings in Washington, more channels for passing money in foreign capitals, more propaganda assets. And that, in turn, diminished the chances that the operation would remain secret.

Even the early successes were close-run enterprises, whose chances were reckoned by their sponsors as less than fifty–fifty. The fact of success overshadowed the risk. Moreover, as time went on, a little money here, a few weapons there were less likely to achieve grand foreign policy purposes. Cuba's Castro was a target of a different order from Guatemala's Arbenz—the man who seemed to Washington if not a communist then a communist tool, a perception fueled when Arbenz expropriated the United Fruit Company and confirmed when he turned to the Soviet Union for weapons. In the Congo in the early 1960s, the CIA spent a million dollars a day to achieve an ambiguous "success" through a series of events so tangled that today even foreign policy experts cannot recall them in broad outline. To think in 1975 that a few million dollars might alter the fate of Angola was a faint hope at best, an illusion at worst, all the more so since the CIA recognized that the Soviets and other external actors might counter American support with assistance of their own.

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Or notice the contrast between two Central American cases three decades apart—Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Guatemala in 1954, Castillo Armas's liberators, armed and trained by the CIA, numbered no more than several hundred. Their "invasion" was more conjured than real. Yet they had control of the air, in large part because Arbenz, unsure of the loyalty of his air force, was unwilling to risk putting his own pilots in the air. "Sulfatos"—Spanish for "laxative," the name Guatemalans gave to the invaders' crude bombs—plus rumors of invasion were enough to induce Arbenz to capitulate. In the case of Nicaragua, the *contras* numbered as many as 10,000 by the mid-1980s, yet not even the most ardent advocates of American assistance to them argued that they might soon induce the Sandinistas to "say uncle," much less that they posed a threat to the regime by the force of their arms.

The makers of revolution learned their own lessons from history, including the history of American covert action. Like Che Guevara, who was with Arbenz before joining Castro, they determined not to repeat the mistakes of Arbenz and Mossadeq. They sought to assure themselves of the loyalty of the army, or built revolutionary armed forces of their own, loyal to themselves. They also learned a related lesson: if the United States threatened to impose an arms embargo on the revolutionaries, there were other sources of supply, including the Soviet Union if need be, to which they might turn. And, unlike Arbenz or Mossadeq, they learned to turn to those sources sooner rather than later. Even the CIA officials who planned the Bay of Pigs knew that to delay the invasion until after Cuba had received deliveries of advanced Soviet fighter planes would be to condemn the plan to failure. In the event, when Brigade 2506 hit the beaches of Cuba, they found disciplined Cuban revolutionary armed forces, not a thin military line that would crumble or defect to the invaders at the first sign of combat.

Some of the targets of American concern in the 1970s and 1980s were true revolutionaries, who knew how to distinguish between friends and enemies. Guevara learned that the United States would not tolerate fundamental reform; history told many Third World leaders that radical change was more likely to succeed than moderate measures. For many of these leaders, Chile under Allende seemed to confirm the proposition that real reform within a democratic framework was doomed to fail.

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Moreover, to some of these leaders, the United States was more useful as an enemy than as a friend. Arbenz, Mossadeq, and even Allende sought Washington's approval, or at least its acquiescence—but, in contrast, if the United States was of any use at all for Castro, the Sandinistas, and the Ayatollah Khomeini, it was primarily as a foreign demon against which the revolution could rally. This did not mean that the Sandinistas were unwilling to accept American aid so long as it was forthcoming or that the revolutionary Iranians were above seeking American spare parts for their military. In 1979, Iranians took Americans hostage, releasing them only when they ceased to be useful counters in the bargaining within the revolution.

Today, few Third World countries may be caricatured as "banana republics." Many, though not all, are more secure politically than those the United States confronted in earlier decades; most are not thin ruling establishments sitting atop indifferent or even hostile populations. Instead, they seek to mobilize their publics to protect themselves; in the mid-1980s, the Sandinistas would probably have won even a perfectly fair election in Nicaragua. In 1953, it was in fact almost impossible for Iran to operate its oilfields without foreign technicians. In any case, that expectation, inside and outside Iran, seemed to define the natural order of things. By 1980, both the fact and the expectation had changed.

When the Carter administration debated how to deal with revolutionary Iran in late 1978 and early 1979, its attention was focused almost wholly on the role of the military. There was no doubt that the military in Iran had enough force to contain the revolution. The issue was whether it would hold together in attempting that task. What Washington did mattered greatly. But the issue never turned on a few brave operatives with some training, a handful of weapons, or some whispered indications of American support. Covert action was not an option, though it became one later, as Washington tried to find a way to replace Khomeini in order to get the American hostages released.[4]

A number of Third World regimes that are the objects of American concern today do seem vulnerable—the list includes Angola, Mozambique, Kampuchea, and even Libya or Afghanistan, countries whose economies are in shambles and whose control of their populations is questionable. Yet, even if several of these may be vulnerable to armed

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insurgencies, it is very unlikely that relatively small American interventions could oust any of these regimes. Armed conflict is precisely the terrain on which their Soviet and Cuban (or Vietnamese) allies are most helpful, providing the arms and training for their loyal military and security services. As paramilitary targets, they are all much more formidable than earlier American opponents in the Third World.

While substantial economic vulnerabilities offer certain opportunities for more patient American approaches, it is not so much to supplant specific regimes as to nudge them in directions more acceptable to the United States. With national borders more permeable to information flows, it is harder for Third World nations to hide their economic shortcomings from their own people, though many try. Angola and Mozambique may welcome Cuban and Soviet help in the military defense of their regimes, but they know that Soviet rubles will not rescue their economies, nor will the Soviet computer-chip industry show them the path to development. For those purposes they are obliged to turn to the West.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

If all intervention and particularly secret intervention are more difficult than before, why have successive American administrations resorted to covert action, at least as often in the mid-1980s as in earlier periods? Part of the answer seems to lie in organizational behavior—of the Central Intelligence Agency, principally—and the processes of review and decision that are common under the presumption of secrecy. More of it rests in how presidents and senior officials have perceived their own stakes.

Many aspects of organization and process that operate in covert action are common to all major endeavors by large organizations, public or private, open or secret: officials managing particular programs develop stakes in their continuance; projects often grow but seldom shrink under the pressure of changing operational realities; officials develop personal stakes in the people they are working with. What makes covert action different, in degree if not in kind, is the element of secrecy that attaches to it, together with the special nature of the CIA as an organization.

President after president has turned to the CIA precisely because of its reputation for being able to get a job done. I recall a meeting in

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1975 with Theodore Shackley, then Chief of the Far East Division of the CIA and later the head of the Clandestine Service; the meeting had to do with covert action in his region. Our conversation soon digressed to his career, then to the CIA: "I'm in the business of producing spies," he said with emphasis; "if I'd wanted to produce widgets, I'd be in private industry."

The "can do" spirit of the CIA, plus its emphasis on secrecy, has been reflected in a tolerance for special arrangements within the organization. The CIA has prized innovation: how many other government organizations can boast a "contingency fund" for use as circumstances change—thus serving as a goad to creative thinking? Successful officers in the field are regularly promoted without having to "punch their tickets" by serving in managerial posts in Washington. For every major covert action, the CIA assembles a special task force, which operates alongside the Clandestine Service division that is ordinarily responsible for the country in question. Sometimes, for reasons of secrecy, even officers who normally handle that country are excluded.

The original justification for such task forces was secrecy, but they also made for a special intensity of effort and for short lines of communication. The task force was able to pull officers back from overseas assignments to undertake particular assignments. Key decisions were made by a small circle of officials: the task force head, the division chief, the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO, the head of the Clandestine Service) and the DCI. The DCIs were directly involved, sometimes on a day-to-day basis—a reflection of the preeminence of operations over analysis. Such special operations usually were (at least for short periods) the Agency's most important business. They could make or break DCIs' reputations with political leaders.

The changes in the United States in the postwar period have not left the CIA untouched. With time, and under the pressure of Congressional investigations into controversial operations, it has become an organization more like other organizations of government. If, in Colby's words, the "raw material is better now than earlier," the CIA is also less freewheeling and more bureaucratic, a tendency encouraged by its physical remoteness from the rest of the Washington governmental machine. By the mid-1980s, its top management was all careerist; unlike the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) generation

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that stopped at Wall Street en route to or from the CIA, these were individuals who had spent their entire careers in the CIA.

Inevitably, the CIA has come to behave more like other bureaucracies. Projects conceived in one year do not get approved until the next. Even minor operations require major paperwork. And, despite renewed fondness for covert action on the part of successive American administrations, CIA officers keep an anxious eye on their political masters outside the Executive; none wants to be the subject of the next Congressional investigation. The CIA is becoming more cautious; witness the Iran–*contra* affair: when Lieutenant Colonel North ran into trouble shipping arms to Iran, he turned to the CIA for help. When Duane Clarridge helped him, John McMahon, the Deputy DCI, found out and said "not again," not without explicit presidential authorization. Contrast this behavior on the part of the institutional CIA with that of North or even DCI Casey. Like McMahon, CIA officers seek authorization in writing, and understandably enough.

Still, CIA officers do regard themselves as producing *something*. By contrast, the State Department's preoccupation with the process of foreign relations, which is its appropriate function, may seem to political leaders to be little more than the pursuit of "good relations" with every nation for its own sake. So it has appeared to a number of presidents: Secretary of State Dean Rusk refrained from criticizing the Bay of Pigs plan lest he be regarded as soft and inactive. Twenty-five years later, his successor, George Shultz, absented himself from the Iranian operations as much as he was cut out, moved perhaps by a calculation not too different from that of Rusk.

SECRECY AND THE PRIMACY OF OPERATIONS

The particular organizational cast of the CIA, played out in secret, is rooted in the history of the intelligence craft in the United States. Since the beginning, the CIA has given pride of place to operations over intelligence. When a careerist was made DCI, it was Helms or Colby—operators, not analysts. Given the special character of their craft, the operational side of the Agency has always remained a closed shop. When operations wind down, as they did after Vietnam, DDO operators are transferred to the analytic side. Movements in the opposite direction occur very much less frequently.

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Within operations, covert action, not espionage, has been the way to make a career. That was especially true in the early years of the CIA. To one observer, the "three CIAs"—espionage, covert action, and assessment—were integrated at Langley about as much as the Army, Navy, and Air Force were at the Pentagon.[5] Even now, espionage remains a slow, undramatic process. The "assets" an officer develops will, most of the time, become valuable only much later on (if they become valuable at all). By that time, the officer will be elsewhere, and the success will register not for him but for his successors.

By contrast, covert actions are large, quick, dramatic. Being involved puts young officers in touch with senior management. If they succeed, they make reputations. David Phillips, a very junior officer, describes the rehearsal for briefing the President on the Guatemalan operation codenamed PBSUCCESS—a rehearsal conducted in the garden of Allen Dulles's Georgetown home:

> Two limousines were waiting for us at Washington's National Airport. We were driven directly to the home of Allen Dulles on Wisconsin Avenue. . . . Dulles was casually dressed, fiddled with his pipe and occasionally touched his ample moustache. He was the actor central casting would have selected to play the role of spy master. . . . We drank iced tea as we sat around a garden table in Dulles's back yard. The lighted shaft of the Washington Monument could be seen through the trees.[6]

Early planning for the Bay of Pigs was confined to the operational side of the CIA, the place that had the largest organizational stake in seeing the project go forward. Each of the changes made as the plan developed made sense to Allen Dulles, then DCI, and to his colleagues. For them, the changes were operational, and hence their affair, not that of the government's senior political leaders. Yet, the cumulative effect of these changes was dramatic. The result was very different from the "Guatemala scenario" that had been the plan's original model. What emerged was a full-scale amphibious invasion with no fallback, whose success or failure would be quickly apparent. And the role of the United States would be equally evident.

In assessing these changes, the government's senior political officials were interlopers on an arcane terrain. Who were they to challenge the trade of professionals who had spent a lifetime in intelligence? When they registered qualms, they seemed hollow and

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naive against the assembled experience of the intelligence profession. In that sense, the problem for political leaders or top managers is very much like what they face when confronted with the experience of the uniformed military, or doctors, or people in other of the professions who lay claim to a capital "P."

Yet the secrecy of covert action makes political leaders unwilling to expand the circle of decision-making to include other sources for guidance. In the early stages of the Iranian affair, the circle was narrow, though this time, apparently, it was the CIA professionals themselves who were cut out of an operation being entirely run from the White House. In more open governmental processes—about medical issues, for instance—it is possible, though not always easy, to enlist professionals from the sciences or research laboratories who will raise questions, challenging the judgment of their colleagues. Even with military issues, the rivalry among the uniformed services will often give rise to competing points of view. Occasionally, political leaders will get wind of those disputes.

For covert action, however, the range of competing advice is very restricted, not least by the compartmentalization of the Central Intelligence Agency. In earlier cases certainly, and to some extent even now, intelligence analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence may not even have known what their nominal colleagues in the Directorate of Operations (previously, Plans) had in mind. Whatever else may be said of the Bay of Pigs operation, one of its key premises—that discontent in Cuba would quickly translate into open assistance for the invaders—was never believed by the CIA's intelligence analysts. Yet they never had a chance to register their dissent directly, for they never even knew of the plan. Their opinion was surely known to Dulles and Richard Bissell, the DDO; for them, however, it was simply an abstract view, not a considered comment on the plan; it was brushed aside. Even if given the chance to make their criticism directly, their opinions probably would not have mattered; they were analysts, not specialists in operations.

Similarly, the judgments of threat that formed the basis for covert action in Chile just before and during the Allende presidency were not the assessments of the government's analytic fraternity as reflected in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Those NIEs, for instance, while initially concerned with the implications of an Allende presidency, never saw this as a serious threat to U.S. national security.

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Indeed, their general tone became even more sanguine during the course of Allende's rule. In the case of Angola, we do not know precisely what the intelligence estimates said, but the NSC interagency group doubted the premises of covert action, and even DDO officers were skeptical that a program big enough to make a difference could in fact be kept secret.[7]

More serious by far are the mistakes made more recently. When the White House ran covert arms sales to Iran on its own, beginning in 1985, it denied itself CIA and other assessments that undercut the premises of the operation—that there were Iranian "moderates" who might be separated from the "radicals," that Ghorbanifar was an intermediary with leverage among the ayatollahs. How could this have happened?

PRESSURE FROM THE TOP

In deciding on covert intervention, in most cases, presidents have not been captive of organizations they did not understand or processes they could not control. Far from it. They more often put pressure on the CIA than felt pressured by it. Thomas Karamessines, DDO at the time, left no doubt of the pressure he was subjected to during Track II, so-called, a super-secret effort set in motion by President Nixon to provoke a coup in Chile that would prevent Allende from being seated in 1970. Nixon's chances of success seemed very remote to those CIA officers involved in Track II. In the instance of Angola in 1975, President Ford and Henry Kissinger themselves elected covert action as the "middle" option; they did so against the opposition of the State Department's African Bureau, and, once more, the dubiety of the CIA's own operators. The White House not only set in motion the covert sales of arms to Iran, but ran the operation directly from the National Security Council, at least for a time. When John McMahon, the CIA Deputy Director, resigned in 1986, his own doubts about growing American interventions in Nicaragua and Afghanistan were known to be part of the reason for his going.[8]

In the context of this pressure from the top—plus secrecy, the CIA's emphasis on operations, compartmentalization, and escalating stakes in particular operations—what appear in retrospect to have been obvious mistakes are easier to understand. Producing spies, not to mention overthrowing governments, is a very risky business, much

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riskier than producing widgets. The CIA sees itself as being in the business of taking risks. Kim Roosevelt turned what might have been a disaster in Iran in 1953 into a stunning success. Castillo Armas's invasion of Guatemala was going nowhere until Agency officers decided on one final throw of the dice—a bombing raid accompanied by a new propaganda blitz. What look like silly mistakes from the outside—the decision to bomb a British freighter, the *Springfjord,* off the coast of Guatemala in 1953, or to move the Cuba landing site away from the mountains, or to mine the Nicaraguan harbors in 1984—appear from the perspective of the CIA as risks that simply went awry, taken by an organization under severe pressure.

In some cases, especially earlier ones, organizational momentum played a major role in carrying planning to a "go" decision. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, for example, were both careful to stress that, even after initially approving PBSUCCESS and the Bay of Pigs, they reserved the decision whether to go ahead. Yet, in both cases, their discretion was more apparent than real. In both cases, the plans were well down the track when the time came for final approval. Armies had been recruited; foreign governments had been asked for training sites. The project had ceased to be merely a plan; it was flesh and blood in which the United States—and the President—had a stake. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, there was even some doubt in the President's mind as to whether Brigade 2506 actually could have been disarmed had he chosen this option at the end.

At that point it became particularly hard not to choose the "middle" option. At least until the Bay of Pigs, the reputation of the CIA made it harder still: why turn down an easy success? In Chile, the fact of past covert interventions changed the burden of proof. Not only was the operational machinery for covert involvement in the 1970 Chilean elections at hand, but the practice of intervention was established. It was up to those who opposed the covert action to make the case against it.

Yet, presidents and their senior advisers have themselves set in motion the "middle option." The presumption of secrecy seems a crucial part of the reason. At the point of decision, covert action does not differ from other foreign policy issues because decisions are taken in secret. Most foreign policy decisions are taken in this manner. What is different about covert action is that policy-makers often presume that the action, not just the decision, will remain secret, or

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at least that the hand of the United States will be hidden. The decisions to prepare and then authorize a raid to free the American hostages in Iran, in 1980, were taken in the strictest secrecy. The secrecy held; word of the preparations did not leak. Yet those decision-makers all knew that the action itself would be made public. They presumed they would be held publicly accountable for the operation's success or failure, and thus for the decision's wisdom or folly.

Not so for covert action; there, the governing presumption is that the American role will remain secret. That presumption makes it highly tempting to choose covert action. It is *something:* less than war but more than nothing. In that sense it resembles other "middle" choices, such as economic sanctions. Yet sanctions, unlike covert action, offer no promise of remaining secret; they commit the government to a public course of action.

Under the presumption of secrecy, the first commitments, small and secret, are very tempting to make. Once committed, however, even secretly, leaders are more likely to take the next step than to pull back—a feature of human behavior familiar in many situations, some less unusual than covert action. The Iranian operation in 1985 slid, little by little, from a geostrategic feeler toward Iran, to the notion of moderates, to arms sales for hostages. It was not exactly a case of throwing good money after bad, for at each step it could be argued that the operation was succeeding; the next step could be justified. Warning signals were clearer in retrospect to outsiders than they were at the time to those who were committed to the operation.

In the process, amidst secrecy at the point of decision, and succumbing to the pressure to do something, decision-makers neglect the long-term costs of covert action. Again, that feature of decision-making is scarcely unique to covert action: short-term imperatives often overwhelm longer-term considerations of any sort, perhaps all the more so in administrations whose time horizons seldom extend beyond four years and never beyond eight. Yet, the presumption that covert action will remain secret makes it all the more tempting to ignore longer-term costs. The costs, even if recognized, may never have to be borne. Yet, history teaches that they probably will be borne. In all likelihood, the operation *will* become known; America *will* be judged for having undertaken it. So, the record shows.

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REALISTS AND IDEALISTS

The practical lessons lead into moral issues. How Americans act in the world will, inevitably, be judged both by the world and by citizens at home. Americans are deeply ambivalent about intervening in the affairs of other nations, especially secretly. The debate between "realists" and "idealists," between those who would take the world as they see it and those who would have the United States strive to reshape it, is a debate as old as the Republic.

The issues in that debate, while hardly unique to *covert* intervention, are powerfully present there, though they are often obscured in policy-making by the presumption that covert actions will remain secret. Overt interventions, like the American invasion of Grenada in 1983, or military attacks, like the bombing of Libya in 1986, raise similar moral and instrumental concerns. Those concerns, however, are not absolute ones; they must be considered against the gravity of the threat and the adequacy of other available responses.

In such cases, the calculus may be very similar to what it is with covert action. In the instance of Grenada, the question was raised whether the image of intervention would wipe out any possible short-term advantage. Would young Latin Americans or Europeans cite American "aggression" to support their policies of keeping an "equidistance" between the United States and the Soviet Union—two superpowers that were, if not identical, at least difficult to choose between on the basis of their international behavior? Or would the image of intervention be muted by the evident cooperation of Grenada's neighbors, by the welcome afforded the American "invaders"? And were there good reasons to believe that the intervention might be brief, that the support for democracy in Grenada was indeed substantial?

In the case of Libya, similar questions were raised. Would the raid deter Libyan support for terrorism even if it did not much diminish Libya's capabilities? Would it demonstrate American strength and its determination to keep its word? Would citizens of Third World nations, even Arabs, secretly relish the raid on an eccentric leader, even if they could not say so openly? Domestically, would it reassure Americans, whatever its effects were on Libya? These results had to be judged against the costs to the American image—and the pain inflicted on America's allies—of acting alone, of appearing to use

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excessive aggression against a smaller country. The risk that the raid would make Colonel Qadafy look good was not the result that the Washington planners had in mind.

In December 1976, when I was in Washington working with several old friends who were making arrangements for the transition between the Ford National Security Council and the Carter NSC, we decided to retain the basic structure of the Ford operation, with its network of sub-Cabinet committees for particular purposes. Yet, as a new administration, we thought it necessary to change the names of those committees; we joked about possible new names. The Forty Committee, the Ford administration's group for discussing covert action, would become the "If-They-Can-Do-It-So-Can-We" Committee.

If-they-can-do-it-so-can-we seems unacceptable both on moral and on instrumental grounds. What the Soviet Union or other nations do cannot settle the moral issue. We consider ourselves different from the Soviets, and imagine that the difference is not only basic to what we are as a people, but is also a source of American influence in the world. Though our actions may often belie our words, we do appear to believe that nations ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbors. Non-intervention is said to be a governing principle of international affairs. That belief, as old as the American distaste for the power politics associated with the Old World, the European state system, is supposed to be part of this country's moral armor.

In this perspective, non-intervention is not just a moral principle. It also has instrumental value. It differentiates the United States from the Soviet Union; it is thought to be a source of American influence in the world. We believe that the example of democracy is a powerful one toward which peoples all over the world will gravitate if only they are given the chance. Believing that, we must also believe that the example is powerful in our external behavior and not only in our internal arrangements. If people will choose democracy when given the chance, democracy is demeaned—perhaps doomed to fail—if it is imposed from the outside. There *is* something incongruous about overthrowing governments—even, on occasion, ones that come to power, as in Chile in 1970, in elections that we know to be tolerably fair—and doing so in the name of democracy.

By such actions we not only fail to live up to our own ideals; we also diminish the power of our example. There are important

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differences between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American support for the *contras,* but those are differences mostly of degree, not of kind. It is disconcerting to discover that Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and some young Europeans view Soviet and American behavior as broadly similar. In their opinion, the Soviet Union and the United States have more in common because of their status as superpowers than differentiates them by reason of their international behavior. To the extent that American actions appear to validate such views, there is a foreign policy loss for the United States. In this perspective, even the "successes" of covert action seem ambiguous or transitory at best, accomplished at some cost to what we hold dear as a people, to America's image in the world.

HELPING AMERICA'S FRIENDS

The opposite case, that of the "realists," begins with the observation that the world *is* a nasty, complicated place. Given that fact, America's historic ambivalence between the high moral view and the feeling that international politics is a dirty business is wholly understandable. As Congressman Stephen Solarz put it, "given Soviet violation of . . . accepted international norms," for the United States, "perpetual indifference is neither politically practical nor strategically prudent."[9]

Because nations affect each other's politics in many ways, any too-tidy definition of "intervention" is always suspect. Covert action has only been a part of American foreign policy. The United States' decisions on whether or not to grant economic aid to Cuba, Chile, or Angola, whether to release Iranian assets held in the United States, were based to some extent on explicitly political criteria. Even when similar decisions affecting other countries were not so obviously political, the decisions had political consequences for these countries; foreign political leaders never doubted that.

The same was true of actions by so-called "private" American actors. U.S.-based businesses either invest or do not invest in a foreign country; such decisions have economic effects, obviously, but also political effects. That is true even when the original decision was not "political" in the narrow sense of the term. Most American businesses or banks that chose not to invest in Chile under Allende probably did not pursue this policy for political reasons alone, despite Washington's pressure. For many, the decision was a business one,

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based on their estimate of the commercial and political climate in Chile. They saw their judgment as essentially economic, though the reports of political instability surely affected them.

A BIAS TOWARD OPENNESS

Decisions about whether or not to intervene are ones over which responsible people may differ. Moreover, no matter how much Americans may wish it to be otherwise, the messiness of the world frustrates clear, broad guidelines. Decisions, inevitably, will be matters of judgment. Yet, in deciding whether to intervene covertly, the judgment is often obscured by the presumption that secrecy can be maintained. If "covert" action will not remain secret anyway, why not act openly? Yet there are arguments against doing so. John Bross, one of the CIA's founding fathers, put it succinctly when he said:

> Identification with foreign support can turn what looks like patriotic opposition into what looks like treason. Secrecy also helps to avoid confrontations with other powers who have a stake in the target country and might feel threatened by a change of regime (or no change of regime).[10]

If open identification with the United States is the kiss of death, then supporting America's friends will only crush them in our embrace. (Indeed, by this logic, we ought to try to support our enemies, something that has occurred to the CIA from time to time, at least as a propaganda ploy.) And, in Angola, for example, *if* American support had been kept secret *and* the Soviets and Cubans had not intervened, the operation might just possibly have succeeded.

Neither of these arguments can be summarily dismissed. Yet, both turn on the presumption that covert aid can be kept tolerably secret—a presumption that becomes more and more unreasonable in the contemporary world. *Maybe* Eduardo Frei was better off because U.S. money for his campaign was "covert" (and perhaps even unknown to him). Yet, no one in Chile doubted that the United States favored him and opposed Salvador Allende. Whether his identification with the United States helped or hurt, it was a political fact in Chile, quite apart from what the United States did covertly.

In other cases, especially recently, the presumption that secrecy could be maintained is plainly false. The FNLA (National Front for

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the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola, the *contras* in Nicaragua are good cases in point: covert, rather than overt, aid spared the first two identification with the United States for only the first few months of 1975; for the last, the "covert" aid made not one whit of difference. Nor is it at all obvious that in any of these cases the recipients of American largesse much cared whether the source of the money was revealed. Covertness risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the United States only aids its friends secretly, then any link to the United States must seem sinister, portending far more than is generally the case.

The arguments for openness are strong, but such policies are not easy to implement. They require an explicitness about influencing the politics of a foreign country that Americans are uncomfortable with, that will generally be controversial. Moreover, governments that feel threatened by open assistance will be able to act more easily to prevent it than they will to counter covert action. For this reason, a move toward openness does not settle immediate, hard cases: What if the Sandinista regime prevents open assistance to opposition political forces or the media in Nicaragua? What if the regime in Pretoria does the same in South Africa?

Yet, doing openly what might at one time have been done covertly is not out of the question. The American radio stations broadcasting into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from Munich, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, were in form private organizations; advertisements exhorted Americans to contribute to them. In fact, they were created and financed, covertly, by the CIA, as propaganda agencies. When that support was disclosed in 1967, the stations continued to operate, supervised by a board supported openly by appropriations from the American Congress.

A still more hopeful model may be the West German political party foundations. These are instruments of the major parties; they are supported openly by the government, and have assisted various parties and labor movements around the world. Sometimes, in Central America, Washington has resented the German involvement, seeing it as meddlesome; at other times and places, as in the chaotic days after the Portuguese revolution of 1974, it has appreciated the effort. The United States lacks similar institutions, perhaps for good reason.

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Still, in 1983 the Reagan administration was moved to create the National Endowment for Democracy, an American parallel to the German foundations. The Endowment, with a 1985 budget of $18 million, channels money to the two American political parties, the AFL-CIO, and a business group, which then make grants to support democratic institutions, mostly in the Third World. So far, the record of the Endowment is mixed. Its grants, and those of its four constituent institutes, have been cautious and have adhered closely to government policy: for instance, more than $400,000, over a two-year period, went to the American Friends of Afghanistan, to develop educational and cultural facilities inside those portions of the country controlled by resistance groups; this, in other days, might have been called the "civic action" component of a paramilitary operation.[11]

Through much of the postwar period, the AFL-CIO has supported non-communist labor movements, especially in Latin America—activities that might also have been assisted covertly by the CIA and, indeed, sometimes were. Much of this AFL-CIO effort was discredited when its image as being ideologically heavy-handed was further compromised by its close association with the CIA—an instance, perhaps, of covert actions actually tainting overt ones. Open funding under the Endowment may, however, serve to diminish that taint over time.

Inevitably, perhaps, the Endowment has been drawn into the tempest. In making several grants to support the Nicaragua newspaper, *La Prensa,* under pressure from the Sandinista government, it provided exactly the kind of assistance that the CIA had given covertly in Chile, probably in Nicaragua as well. Given the virtual state of war between the United States and Nicaragua, support from any American institution could not have been long regarded by the Sandinistas as tolerable.

Also, given American politics, it remains an open question whether public funding is even compatible with creative and controversial acts by "private" groups. The Endowment budget, only an eighth as large as that of the German party foundations, in a country a quarter the size of the United States, was further reduced by Congress in 1985, when funding to the Republican and Democratic institutes was denied. This prohibition, incidentally, was relaxed the following year.

It is a sad fact about American politics, even today, that it is easier for the CIA to secure money from Congress secretly than it is for any

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other institution to get it openly—even if the purposes are roughly similar. If the CIA chooses to secretly finance Latin American social democrats so that they can attend a women's conference in Africa, it is able to do so. If the Endowment wishes to do the same thing openly, it risks winning Senator Proxmire's "Golden Fleece" award for wasting the people's money. Part of the difference has to do with the image of CIA competence, in comparison with what is seen as a new and inexperienced institution. Yet funding for the CIA is always wrapped in the cloak of national security. It may be that members of Congress are willing to fund certain activities but are genuinely reluctant to be seen to vote for them, lest their constituents begin to ask, "Why that and not me?"

Still, the model of the Endowment suggests some of the possibilities attached to "overt" activities. A bias toward openness is a long-term direction that ought to be considered seriously. It would reflect the realization that national boundaries are today more and more permeable; in these circumstances, many whom the United States might wish to support may not be so wary of accepting such support if it is open. The United States might more regularly say: "We are prepared to support you, but only openly. We think that open support is better for you. In any case, we know that it is better for us."

COVERT CIRCUMSTANCES

There are obviously some circumstances in which major "covert" actions make sense, but these are probably more and more unusual. American support for those in Afghanistan resisting Soviet occupation of their country is a recent case in point. That American assistance, reportedly begun in a small way in the last year of the Carter administration, escalated sharply in the mid-1980s to an estimated $280 million in 1985, mostly for small arms, clothing, and supplies.[12] Americans, in and out of Congress, broadly supported the cause of the Afghan rebels, freedom-fighters to some.

The secret was open; the American role was not so much covert as, by tacit agreement, unacknowledged. Indeed, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat said on NBC News, two weeks before he was killed: "Let me reveal a secret: the first moment that the Afghan incident [the 1979 Soviet invasion] took place, the U.S. contacted me here and the

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transport of armaments to the Afghans started from Cairo on U.S. planes."[13] The major reason for circumspection was the delicate position of the Pakistani government, the only available conduit for American supplies to the rebels. The Pakistanis were prepared to support the effort, but unwilling to be too visible in doing so lest they antagonize their powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union. In those circumstances, there was recourse to the CIA rather than to the American military; it was more a matter of being discreet than of keeping the whole affair secret.

This was more a choice of institutions than of instruments. Such concerns were also striking in the instance of Nicaragua, where there was never anything very "covert" about the covert action. If, in 1984–85, Congressional opponents of aid could not stop it, they wanted at least to limit it to "nonlethal" items, to have the program administered by the State Department and not by the CIA. For them, the purpose was mostly political; they wanted something to vote *for*, thereby avoiding the label of being "soft" on the Sandinistas.

The compromise that emerged in August 1985 was strange. "Nonlethal" was always something of a fiction, since not only was the boundary hard to define—is a truck that can carry soldiers "lethal"?—but if the *contras* were able to raise money from sources other than the U.S. government, then any "nonlethal" American assistance simply freed resources to buy guns and bullets. Moreover, administering the program was almost more than the State Department could manage. Chartering airplanes, arranging drops, fixing cover: these are hardly mainline diplomatic activities, still less so because all this nonlethal assistance had to be provided quietly, if not covertly. The State Department soon found itself embroiled in charges that its deliveries had commingled "nonlethal" public assistance to the *contras* with "privately" financed weaponry, and that as much as half the money had simply disappeared en route to the *contras*.

The choice of institutions raises issues of effectiveness and accountability. If the United States is to provide enough help to warring factions in the Third World so as to make it impossible for the assistance to be secret, it seems reasonable to have the American military do so, not the CIA. It is indeed strange that helping El Salvador fend off an armed insurgency in the 1980s was thought to be a military responsibility, while helping the *contras* mount a campaign in neighboring Nicaragua was considered to be a task for

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the CIA—though the votes on how much assistance to give were public in both instances. It seemed similarly strange in Vietnam: Why build a CIA air force for Laos when the United States already had one Air Force?

Reflecting on the Vietnam experience, former DCI Colby argued that the reason for not using the military, even for "overt" covert paramilitary operations, is that "they would approach it as a military enemy, to attack the enemy." In his view, "Paramilitary operations are different—they call for constructing a political base first—and our military are nonpolitical."[14] Indeed, large paramilitary operations have never been central to any service's mission, not even to the Marines. All the services moved only haltingly toward a capacity for unconventional war. Their special units are oriented toward commando operations in support of main force movements, not toward providing secret assistance for local armed insurgents.

It may also be that quieter, though not necessarily secret, CIA paramilitary operations, by the U.S. military, carry a lower risk of provoking a Soviet–American confrontation. The extent of the American commitment is less with the CIA; so, also, are the risks of inadvertent escalation. If an American CIA officer in Pakistan is killed in a Soviet strike on an Afghan resistance base, the body is less likely to return to the United States in a flag-draped coffin than if the American is known to be an Army colonel; pressure on American leaders to avenge the killing will be less.

Yet the issue of accountability remains, for flexibility and accountability are opposite sides of the same coin. Part of the reason the CIA can operate quietly is that detailed overseeing of its operations is mostly done in secret, not in the glare of public attention. Its flexibility, certainly less today than in the freewheeling days of the 1950s, is still considerably more than that of the military. If its flexibility is greater, however, so is its freedom from being called to account. This is the concern of many.

In rare cases, circumstances may indeed justify providing money to friendly political parties or unions when it is impossible to do so openly. Portugal, after the revolution of 1974, was an example. Contending political forces were in close balance; a sharp turn to the left was a real possibility. American strategic stakes were major: Portugal, a NATO ally and home to major American bases in the

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Azores, was fundamentally different from Chile, though the differences were of course matters of degree, hence demanding judgment.

Some of what the United States wanted to do it could do openly; conceding $20 million in loan guarantees to Portugal in late 1974, a measure intended in part to add to the prestige of Foreign Minister and Socialist party leader Mario Soares, the United States sought also to build up the Socialist Party as it contended with the Portuguese communists, a purpose Washington shared with its allies in Western Europe. In the spring of 1975, the CIA began passing money, several million dollars a month, to the Party through its fellow socialist parties in Western Europe, at a time when the Portuguese were not yet receiving support directly from their fellow parties.[15]

When the story of CIA support leaked to the press, the State Department refused to comment; Soares, for his part, would only say that the United States had given him "diplomatic support."[16] There the story ended; the operation was brief; it would have been supported by most Americans had they known about it; it was supported by those in Congress who were kept informed; it was consistent with overt American policy.

In a very few cases, the politics of a foreign country may, like Iran's in 1953, be so finely balanced that even a small amount of American assistance to one side can be decisive. It is possible to imagine other targets that may be as vulnerable in the 1990s as Guatemala was in the 1950s. But cases of this kind will be rarer and rarer, for all the reasons given—would-be revolutionaries have learned their lessons; they are able to counter U.S. involvement with other support.

CHOOSING THE COVERT OPTION

In choosing to intervene covertly, prudent policy-makers should always ask themselves a careful series of "What next?" questions. That injunction, in some sense, applies to all policies, foreign and domestic. But it applies with special force to covert action precisely because of the presumption of secrecy.[17]

The most obvious "What next?" is "What next if—or more likely, when—the action becomes public? What happens if it becomes public in midstream?" Covert actions, if large, will not long remain secret, a reminder that is easy to reiterate but hard to embody in making policy when all pressures work in the direction of wishful

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thinking; witness Bissell's lament about the Bay of Pigs: "The argument was [not] made that this is now a very public business, and we'd better treat it as such, and either cancel it if we can't stand the publicity, or else do some of the things that will increase the chances of success if we are going to go forward with it."[18] Perhaps, if that consideration had been more powerful, the outcome would still have been the same. However, it might have induced Kennedy to think through more thoroughly the chain of publicity, reflecting more carefully on the implications of American responsibility for success or failure. That might have led the President to cancel the operation, whatever the pain he experienced in doing so. Or it might have led in another direction, toward the determination that if the United States was to be discovered to have been involved, it should do whatever was necessary to maximize the chances of success. In either case, it should have made it less likely that the United States would bear a double onus: public responsibility *and* failure.

If the Iranian operation of 1985–86 had remained secret for some years after all the hostages had been released, that success might have outweighed any costs incurred by the public learning that arms had been traded for hostages. It is impossible to know that for certain. In any case, it did not require sophisticated analysis to suggest that a covert policy targetted at certain Iranians was very vulnerable, that it might be exposed publicly by opposing Iranian factions if and when this suited their political purposes. When the cover was blown, the trading of arms for hostages, with a nation that the United States had denounced as terrorist, could not be deemed acceptable by America's allies, much of the rest of the world, and, perhaps most important, by the American people.

Whether a particular covert operation will bear the test of disclosure is immediately apparent in retrospect; it is not always obvious before the fact. For presidents, prudence dictates giving very careful attention to warning signals thrown up by the review process—the views of Cabinet officers, White House staff who attend to the president's interests, and Congressional overseers ought to be seen as surrogates for public reaction.

One warning signal, in any case, *is* evident in advance: Does the intervention contradict overt American policy? If it does, as with arms sales to Iran, it is especially improbable that the operation will withstand the test of disclosure. The arms sales went exactly counter

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to the administration's declared public policies: it had twisted the arms of allies not to sell arms to Iran, looking to an end to the war between Iran and Iraq where there would be neither victor nor vanquished; it had pledged not to deal with terrorists over hostages, much less to sell arms to them.

A second "What next?" involves asking, "What if the first intervention does not succeed? What then?" If covert action is to remain secret, most of the time it will have to be small. Its purposes will have to match its scale. No grand purposes ought to be contemplated; there is no magic to covert action. To take only a single example, terrorists have frequently been targets of American covert action in the last decade. If open votes could be taken on such secret operations, the American body politic would certainly have supported them. Many were undertaken covertly only to satisfy the sensitivities of American allies and others whom the United States wished to enlist in the effort. For these reasons, covert actions against Libya, for example, much discussed in the mid-1980s, probably would have withstood the test of disclosure. The rub, however, was that no small operation seemed practicable.[19]

It is obvious that covert action is only one instrument among many in combatting terrorism. While it may have registered success on occasion, we cannot know this for certain from the public record. We can, however, be relatively certain that it has registered no major victories; such successes have a way of becoming public. The architects of Iran's and Guatemala's interventions three decades ago made their achievements known. It is unlikely that stunning successes in the 1980s would long remain secret. In all probability, covert action against terrorism is today secondary to the use of grubbier instruments—effective police work, the tedious poring over intelligence reports.

All too often, small operations begin with grand purposes, objectives wholly incommensurate with the instrument. When that purpose cannot be achieved, leaders are tempted to take the next step and the next. So it was with the Bay of Pigs and Angola, with Iran in the mid-1980s. Sometimes a limited objective can be achieved, but its very achievement makes it appealing to look for more—again, Angola and Nicaragua are cases in point. This "What next?" suggests, at a minimum, careful attention to the covert operators themselves, to detect early signs of skepticism about whether the

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operations as initially conceived can indeed achieve their purposes. Such signs are conspicuous with Track II, Angola, and Nicaragua. Certain risks are worth taking; few are worth taking in ignorance.

A third category of "What next?" questions involves asking, "What signal will be received, by whom and with what result?"—judgments that are again easier to arrive at with the benefit of hindsight. They invariably involve calculations of threat and estimates of American interests. Intelligence assessments by the CIA or the State Department provide one set of useful indicators. In 1985–86, for example, American intelligence on Iran was meager; what existed offered precious little ground for believing that there were indeed "moderates" who might be detached from their revolutionary colleagues. It cast doubt also on the imminence of a Soviet threat to Iran, one of the premises of an early CIA paper. These were cautions that ought to have been heeded.

It is important to consider always the regional context, the attitude American allies in the area are likely to show. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, American assistance to the resistance was supported, though with varying degrees of publicity, by nations as different as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China. In Central America, this support was more ambiguous; most of the nations in the region publicly expressed qualms about aid to the *contras,* while some privately hoped that the Sandinistas could be made to go away.

These rules of thumb amount to setting a higher threshold for the use of covert action. The guidance is mostly negative, essentially, a series of cautions. It may be unwelcome to men and women who are looking for something to do, and not something to avoid—a trait that runs deep in the American character, reinforced as it is by circumstances in which covert action seems an option. Yet, given how both the United States and the world have changed during the postwar period, the circumstances in which major covert action makes sense as policy are in fact sharply limited.

Guidelines akin to these, articulated a decade ago by Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of State, and embodied in Executive Order 12036 of 1978, make sense. For Vance, the language of the National Security Act of 1947—"affecting the national security"—was too loose a standard to justify covert action. Instead, he recommended covert intervention only when doing so was "absolutely essential to the national security" of the United States, when no other means would

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do.[20] Decisions would still be matters of judgment, but no one has improved on this definition since. It needs to be thought of in a time when so much damage has been done through the use of less stringent standards.

ENDNOTES

[1]This account draws most heavily on the *Report of the President's Special Review Board,* known as the Tower Commission after its chairman, former Sen. John Tower, reprinted by Bantam and Times Books in 1987.
[2]*Time,* 8 February 1954.
[3]Interview, 9 January 1986.
[4]The best account of Washington's encounter with revolutionary Iran is Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Random House, 1986). For mention of anti-Khomeini covert action, see the interview with Stansfield Turner, reported in the *Baltimore Sun,* 12 May 1983.
[5]This observation is that of my colleague and astute Pentagon-watcher, Ernest May. See Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 218.
[6]David A. Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), p. 49.
[7]See, for instance, John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978).
[8]As reported in numerous press accounts, for instance the *New York Times,* 7 July 1986.
[9]"When to Intervene," *Foreign Policy 63* (Summer 1986) pp. 20–29.
[10]Letter, 8 January 1986.
[11]See the Endowment report for 1985 and its listing of grants for 1986.
[12]As reported by the *New York Times,* 29 July 1986.
[13]As quoted in Jay Peterzell, *Reagan's Secret Wars* (Washington: Center for National Security Studies, 1984), p. 9.
[14]Interview, 9 January 1987.
[15]See the *New York Times,* 25 September 1975.
[16]As quoted in the *New York Times,* 26 September 1975.
[17]My checklist parallels that suggested by Solarz, cited above, though mine is more specific to covert action.
[18]Interview with Richard M. Bissell, The Columbia Oral History Research Office, 1967, p. 25.
[19]See, for instance, accounts of differing CIA and State Department assessments of Qadafy's vulnerability. *Washington Post,* 3 November 1985. The intelligence committees also reportedly were worried that any plot would involve assassination.
[20]Testimony before the Senate Select Committee . . . on Intelligence Activities, 5 December 1975.

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Frank E. Manuel

Lovejoy Revisited

IN A PERIOD when the methodology of a discipline is highly prized, the history of ideas roams through academic life like a stray cat. The lack of a widely accepted theory may account in part for the field's low esteem in the university, which rejoices more and more in searching for the underlying premises of its major types of research. The mathematician Jules-Henri Poincaré once remarked that he was suspicious of forms of knowledge that were high on methodology and low on results. Whatever its failings, the history of ideas has not suffered from methodological hypertrophy. It has been productive of a great variety of works, without benefit of a paradigmatic theory or the deliberate training of generations of historians who could trace their inspiration back to an ancestral figure. Though in their day Wilhelm Dilthey, Arthur Lovejoy, and Karl Mannheim provoked polemics by formulating the principles that lay behind their practice, the controversies they engendered never had a resolution that won general assent; they were simply left hanging.

Today there are no significant schools or disciples in the history of ideas militantly espousing the views of earlier twentieth-century practitioners. The late Michel Foucault's ambitious undertaking—and he would not even allow it to be placed under the rubric of history of ideas—attracted a limited number of zealous converts, but he did not found a school. By contrast, Pierre Goubert, an entrepreneur of scholarship and exemplar of the prolific *Annales* orientation in social history, has been able to parcel out some forty projects among his students in various provinces of France.[1]

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As a craftsman in the field, I am not as disturbed as some historians of ideas by the absence of a general theory. In *Utopian Thought in the Western World*[2] I set forth under the title "The Utopian Propensity" a series of ordering principles that guided that particular study, but I did not conceive of them as rules with universal applicability. I was merely proposing the existence of a family of ideas around a single concept whose boundaries were deliberately left vague. Critical reflections on a number of predecessors and colleagues in the history of ideas whose works represent alternative ways may help to situate the preconceptions of my own.

One of the first modern writers to compile what even today would be identified as a history of doctrines was the poet and classicist Thomas Stanley, who published a *History of Philosophy* (1655–1662) that did not extend far beyond the Greek schools. His preface preserved the ancient distinction between the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa*. "Now the life of Man being either practick, busied in civill affairs of Peace and War, or Contemplative, retir'd from publick business to speculation and the study of wisdome, Divine or Humane, it followes that this personall history bee twofold likewise."[3] Though he surmised that those who wrote on philosophers in antiquity far exceeded in number the historians of men of action, virtually all the works on philosophers had disappeared. "To give a particular account of them will be unnecessary," he added superfluously, "because their Works are not extant." The only survivors Stanley could think of were Diogenes Laërtius and Eunapius.

But the history of doctrines has in fact been better preserved than Stanley imagined. Beginning with the Greeks, the discussion of views of predecessors was long an integral part of philosophical treatises and dialogues. It served either to dethrone one set of thoughts and impose a new intellectual dynasty, or to draw support from forerunners who were recognized authorities. Aristotle often prefixed his own theories with a summary of his antecedents' opinions, as in the *Politics*, where he treats of an ideal commonwealth. His purpose was polemical, to refute and reject Plato, Phaleas of Chalcedon, and Hippodamus of Miletus. The practice was common among other Greek philosophers and was adopted by Jewish, Arabic, and medieval Christian thinkers. Obeisance to precursors who were used as sustaining fathers was equally traditional in Western thought. The rabbis of the Talmudic period had been meticulous in elaborating a

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chain of opinion on every subject of discourse, each succeeding generation being obliged to show that its conclusions were consonant with those of predecessors. As late as the middle of the seventeenth century a polymath like Amos Comenius profusely interlarded his mammoth treatise, *The Improvement of Human Affairs,* with citations from philosophical and scientific thinkers who had contributed to his idea of Pansophia, which was to be the salvation of mankind. Marginal notes and footnotes became standard repositories of the history of ideas.

Since the seventeenth century, ecclesiastical historians had been composing numerous works on the history of Christian doctrines and of heresies, the measure of vitriol in those writings depending upon the fanatical devotion of the author. Histories of law and legal thought were also mounting. Compendia specifically entitled histories of philosophy were not supposed to add anything to the subject; they were merely to paraphrase the thoughts as they had been written in the first instance and to abbreviate them for those who could not read the texts in their entirety. Judgment of the worth of these compendia depended upon whether or not they were faithful and accurate reflections of the originals. The *Historia critica philosophiae* (1742–1767), in six closely printed quarto volumes by Jacob Brucker, the Augsburg theologian and schoolmaster, was a grand compilation of baroque scholarship that was excerpted and pirated for a few hundred years.[4] The articles in Diderot's *Encyclopédie* that covered ancient and medieval philosophical schools were often mere adaptations of Brucker. In 1791 William Enfield published an English abridgement that became a standard text on both sides of the Atlantic.[5]

Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary,* in its expanded version, was not unlike a present-day dictionary of the history of ideas: individual ideas were arranged in alphabetical order and their origins, changes, and various meanings were commented upon with anticlerical malice.[6] Memoirs presented before the French Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres in the eighteenth century often traced the spread of individual myths and discrete religious and philosophical ideas in the ancient lands of the Mediterranean. The practice was followed in learned academies throughout the Continent, and the history of ideas became associated with erudition on display, a parallel to the virtuosity of scientific academies.

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With the proliferation of doctoral dissertations in Dutch and German universities that had begun in the seventeenth century, a variant to the chronology of schools and doctrines was introduced: the history of a single topic like the golden age began to be followed over extended periods of time. Volumes appeared on the history of abstractions such as luxury, happiness, virtue. Almost any concept, it was discovered, was an opportunity to parade historical and what was more commonly known as philological erudition. The ideas or themes or topics were loosely defined, and the marshaling of examples from many fields of knowledge earned doctoral candidates their degrees. This was learning for learning's sake, and most of the works were simply academic exercises. Some of the dissertations were later printed or reprinted when their authors became world famous; for example, Marx's dissertation on the theories of Democritus. The theses had been written in Latin as long as the language maintained its hegemony; as nineteenth-century dissertations in the vernacular became common, single concepts within a broad historical frame were expanded into weighty tomes.

Traditional use of the history of systems of thought continues after a fashion today and new generations quote revered ancients as confirmation of their own views or as a foil for their dissent. But since the nineteenth century, writers have proposed novel ambitious goals for the history of thought. The Romantic historians who tried to evoke the *Zeitgeist* of past ages found their thought systems—of metaphysics, political theory, aesthetics—to be expressive documents. The recreation of the past was its own justification, and embodiments of the Spirit of the Times in "ideas" provided some of the richest source materials. Certain ideas were identified as dominant in an age and were seen reflected in arts and sciences, in politics, in the style of life. Ideas were appreciated as potent drives to action, and upheavals like the French Revolution were interpreted as the direct consequence of a cabal of philosophers inflicting their views on society. When the *Zeitgeist* was conceived holistically, the historian of thought had to demonstrate the pervasiveness of "leading ideas" in all aspects of life.

This type of conception can be found in embryo in such phrases as the "climate of opinion," which Joseph Glanvill had employed in the seventeenth century. During the Enlightenment, men of the European Republic of Letters had come to believe that they were propagating a

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reasonably organized body of contemporary thought on all important subjects, and books appeared that exemplified this view in their very titles. There was a high consciousness of belonging to the "century of lights." When Vico wrote of *tre spezie di nature,* three kinds of natures appearing in each successive stage of a *ricorso,* the category of major ideas in an age was stretched to include its psychological characteristics. Montesquieu, Winckelmann, and Herder, each in his own way, contributed to the battening of the general notion of a *Zeitgeist,* which was finally enshrined in Hegel's philosophy.

By the nineteenth century, movements of thought were commonly labeled with words ending in "ism." A set of beliefs or reasoned opinions could be identified by a name like rationalism, romanticism, Saint-Simonism, positivism, Owenism, liberalism, socialism, communism. In the fine arts and politics the "isms" multiplied so fast and furiously that the history of thought turned into a cascade of "isms." Since the Middle Ages men had written of "Christianism" and "Judaism," followed by Catholicism and Protestantism, but the multiplication of the "isms" reified intellectual abstractions and made them a major substance of discourse. There were differences about the content of these "isms," how they came into being and died, but well into our own time "isms" have been the warp and woof of some types of history of ideas. Not mine. That an "ism" had its origin in a *Zeitgeist* was taken for granted, and everybody was more or less a Hegelian, whether he had read Hegel or not; one did not have to accept his particular history of absolute spirit to be at least touched, if not contaminated, by his philosophy. Then, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Spirit of the Times incarnate in an "ism" struck against a wall of academic skepticism, and some members of the university retreated into a world of particulars. Grandiose general ideas were eschewed, and in a narrow positivistic mood the university cultivated small segments of ideas limited in period and place.

When comparative literature was established as a legitimate subject in twentieth-century French universities, the diffusion of a set of ideas over a specific geographic area became a favorite topic, as in Henri Tronchon's work on the influence of Herder in France.[7] Often remote resemblances between ideas were seen as evidence of influence, and the setting up of a network of influences was for some time the stuff of the history of ideas. The French *doctorat d'état* awarded

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in the Ecole Normale or at the Sorbonne required the production of heavy theses that pretended to cover a subject completely. If totality was achieved, the minute permutations of an idea tended to be repetitive, and the reader as well as the subject was exhausted. There was no profound theory behind this practice, merely a commitment to thoroughness; a simple chronological frame was considered sufficient to uphold the edifice. A passion for periodization mechanically distinguished stages in the development of the central theme.

In a similar academic tradition, intellectual biographies of writers found a respectable place and a pattern that was God-given: the chosen thinker was born, educated; he submitted to influences and wrote books; his ideas were diffused; and he died. As an exercise in the history of thought, writing an individual intellectual biography was akin to tracing the *fortuna* of a work. Of late years, studies of figures of great stature have had a way of turning into international scholarly industries, like the now almost defunct Newton industry and the burgeoning Darwin industry. In special cases journals and annuals were founded that devoted themselves solely to the achievements of a particular man, like the *Kant-Studien* or the somewhat less restrictive *Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*. Such narrowing of effort in the history of ideas has sometimes resulted in slim pickings after the passing of a few decades. When whole societies depend for inspiration upon a single personage who is revered as a religious or political lawgiver, men like St. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Marx, the tendency to freeze the hero into a mold is a natural consequence. Some major intellectual figures have had a spotlight thrown upon them only on the centennials of their birth and death. Eclectic Western culture is then reminded of their existence at international colloquia.

Particularistic academic scientificism never drove out the *Zeigeist;* it coexisted with the intellectual biography, the history of literary themes and genres, multivolumed textbook histories of art, science, and philosophy. New terminologies had been invented to describe what scholars were doing but there was no generally accepted methodology. Then, some fifty years ago, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University, arose to introduce order into the prevailing chaos by proposing the establishment of a discipline that would be called the History of Ideas and endowing it with at least the semblance of a theory.

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But since Lovejoy drew up his methodological definitions in the opening chapter of *The Great Chain of Being,* the history of ideas has become a coverall for reflecting on dead men's thoughts in general, without restriction to the usage of any particular school or to Lovejoy's own formulations at various moments in his long career. Rival names today crowd the academic marketplace. Only a Lovejoy *redivivus,* with his razor-edged analytical capacity, could have succeeded in discriminating among the several types of the history of ideas, history of thought, and intellectual history now current in American and English universities; among the changing *Methoden* of German *Ideengeschichte, Geistesgeschichte, Zeitgeistesgeschichte, Kulturgeschichte,* and a new conceptualization dubbed *geschichtliche Grundbegriffe;* or among the French fashions in *histoire des idées, histoire de la pensée, mouvement des idées, histoire des mentalités,* and the one-time *dernier cri de Paris,* the *archéologie du savoir* developed by Michel Foucault, who held a chair at the Collège de France in the *histoire des systèmes de la pensée,* which has no recognizable affinity with the history of systematic philosophical thought as Stanley or Brucker or Høffding or Bréhier understood it.[7] Lovejoy alone could have captured the fugitive nuances of meaning in this fast-expanding nomenclature, which seems to have returned the history of ideas to an original tohu-bohu before the Creation.

Lovejoy had access to an awe-inspiring corpus of the thoughts of Greek and Roman, early Christian, and modern European writers, and he published a number of programmatic statements about how these thoughts might be arranged for their study in a modern university. His recommendations were undogmatic in character, loosely phrased, intended to be illustrative rather than systematic and exhaustive. They were pluralist in spirit, hardly constituting an official party platform that would exclude anybody unwilling to subscribe to its tenets. If my own position is construed as a critique of his program, or as giving aid and comfort to those who have taken issue with him, it is a critique in the Lovejoy, not the Marxist, temper. Born almost four decades after Lovejoy, I think it is fair to conjecture that he would have welcomed a review of where the enterprise he fostered has moved and an assessment of its prospects from one who was a student at Harvard when he lectured there in 1933. Despite the very different intellectual worlds in which we were nurtured, there is a commitment I still share with him, and it is fundamental: a

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conviction that the continuation of discourse with the higher mental systems and literatures of the past is a debt of our reason we owe as civilized human beings, and a belief that merely identifying and storing these creations is not enough. The thoughts of the dead men with whom there is a fragile bond must be constantly cultivated or they molder in repositories. In a professionalized industrial-scientific society, the abandonment of the verbal creations of past thinking is a constant threat, and there is nothing that preachers, ordained or secular, can do about it except actively engage in a dialogue with the dead.

Lovejoy in his day set the ideas and thoughts of our spiritual ancestors into new relationships and thereby gave them new life. He called these novel juxtapositions *interesting*, an end sufficient unto itself—he was not afraid of being academic. The cultivation of these ideas was a form of self-knowledge. Lovejoy wrote of it as mind-enlarging, liberalizing, sympathy-widening, an enrichment of present experience, a self-transcendence. Nietzsche once characterized intellectual innovations as *interessant*, in the sense of pregnant with the future, even as a woman's pregnancy used to be described as "an interesting condition."

Often Lovejoy's theoretical posture is clarified by his negations: there were some intellectual activities that he sharply rejected; toward others he assumed a skeptical attitude. There were fields in which he encouraged research and others he dismissed because the possibilities of fruitful yield were dubious. In his prime he probed the body of European thought with a scalpel. Since he issued his original manifestos, an intellectual jungle so thick has overgrown this terrain that one has to wield a machete rather than a delicate surgical instrument to let in a glimmer of light.

In 1931–1933, in the depth of the Great Depression, professors were delivering lectures in the northeastern part of the United States that came to play pivotal roles in American academic life; viewed in retrospect, it was a creative moment. At Yale, Carl Becker, a historian from Cornell, born in Iowa, undertook to communicate in the Storrs Foundation lectures what he called the *climate of opinion* of the eighteenth-century *philosophes*.[9] Lovejoy followed at Harvard with an account of the fortune through time of three intellectual concepts in a Platonic text.[10] As a model for the history of ideas, Lovejoy's structure in *The Great Chain of Being* had far more substance and his

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work has endured critical examination rather better than Becker's, though I refuse to join the pretentious, humorless pedants who in the fifties tried to demolish Becker's sprightly essay, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers,* with bibliographical bulldozers. Almost simultaneously, Alfred North Whitehead, in his second university career as a philosopher at Harvard, embarked upon a study he called *Adventures of Ideas,* which swept grandly through the ages setting forth the major philosophical-scientific preconceptions of the Western world.[11] And I must include the humanist scholar Irving Babbitt, whose work has perhaps worn least well, but who on the eve of his death in 1933 was still exciting audiences of undergraduates with impassioned denunciations of the devil in the guise of the moral ideas of a literary movement called Romanticism. Reading *Rousseau and Romanticism* now is like looking at a film of the 1920s; we have discovered more spectacular ways of exorcizing evil spirits.[12]

Despite the fact that Lovejoy had been born in Berlin (his mother was the daughter of a German clergyman), there was a nativist American flavor to his performance. It was parochial in a number of senses. Only reluctantly did he recognize the existence of the long German tradition of *Geistesgeschichte* in its multifarious forms. Dilthey, for example, was virtually ignored. Though there were some visible ties with Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique,* the Gustave Lanson tradition of literary history, and the French *histoire des idées morales et politiques,* the whole was nevertheless a characteristically American phenomenon, not outstanding in methodological rigor, pragmatic in that it would rather try out a way of dealing with the history of thought than reason through the abstract principles of a discipline. It was essentially pre-Marxist and pre-Freudian, if compared with the present-day saturation of our intellectual atmosphere with Freudo-Marxism, for good and for evil.

World politics had already begun to cut off American life from the Germanic world not only of nazism but of the earlier Wilhelmine and Weimar periods—the influence of the refugees was necessarily slow in asserting itself. Mannheim's *Wissenssoziologie* had its young American proponents and admirers, and Talcott Parsons was wrestling with Max Weber; but until the close of World War II there was a hiatus in the penetration of twentieth-century trends of German thought. The Marx known in the thirties would not survive the serious scrutiny of today's Marxologists. As for the Freudian system

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and its significance for historians of ideas, it was scarcely noticed until many years later. Professor George Boas—a colleague and collaborator of Lovejoy—was, I believe, maintaining the characteristic stance of his generation when, in a 1969 reexamination of the conceptual framework for the history of ideas, he charily admitted sociological interpretations, but cast grave doubts on any penchant for psychologizing.[13]

The burgeoning of American academic interest in the history of ideas in the 1930s, the years of the Great Depression and the triumphant rise of fascism, appears out of harmony with the material suffering of our society during that period. Perhaps the paradox of Americans taking an interest in "ideas" at the very time that the ambience was markedly hostile to them was a competitive response to organized fascist and communist ideological propaganda. "Ideas are weapons," the young Max Lerner told his readers in a lively book with that title.[14] During World War II a writer in the *Journal of the History of Ideas,* the periodical Lovejoy founded, expressed his satisfaction at the growing appreciation of the worth of ideas with touching naiveté: "After a period in which it was fashionable to regard ideas as epiphenomena . . . ideas have come back with a bang in our own time through their recognized influence in the mass of ideologies and propaganda flooding the modern world."[15]

Except for one significant lapse, when he attempted to relate German Romantic conceptions to Hitler, Lovejoy was relatively free from such *ad hoc* political uses of the history of ideas. His preferred method, isolating a unit-idea in Western philosophical and literary culture and tracing its reappearances through the centuries, was communicated to readers and audiences not only through type-studies that showed his virtuosity but with analogies that were not always felicitous. The most frequent was a chemical metaphor: over the centuries the same ideas were usually found in complex compounds, he argued, and it was the business of the historian of ideas to break down the compounds into their elements. Under ordinary circumstances, the elements were enduring but the compounds were unstable, which complicated the task. In lectures delivered in the thirties (though not published until 1961)[16] Lovejoy playfully suggested another analogy, to what he said Freudian psychopathology called "complexes": through historical analysis it would be possible to pick out the threads, to unravel the complex by returning to its

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origins, tracing in detail how ideas happened to become associated or how they adhered to one another in particular combinations. But the psychoanalysis with which Lovejoy was acquainted was rather embryonic, even as the Marxist thought he encountered in the journal *Science and Society* was somewhat primitive.

One cannot help feeling that much of Lovejoy's work was sparked by a plain revulsion against two forms of discourse that were prevalent during his middle years: these were his negative identities, psychologizers would say. One was epitomized in Harvard professor Irving Babbitt's *Rousseau and Romanticism,* which Lovejoy reviewed in 1920, and which initiated a long polemic that outlasted Babbitt and continued until the eve of Lovejoy's death. Babbitt is now virtually forgotten, but in his day he was a great pundit. Lovejoy was allergic to Babbitt's moralizing on the evils of Romanticism and to packaging thought in boxes tagged as "isms," unless the fortunes of the "ism" had been meticulously accounted for, as in the exemplary documentary history of "primitivism" initiated, but never completed, by a brilliant Johns Hopkins group. Lovejoy did not succeed in killing the fashion for labels like "Romanticism," but to this day many of us cannot face them without wincing. And though we ourselves may not be free from occasional lapses, we nevertheless stand ready to heave stones at others. At the same time, Lovejoy had an incapacity to stomach the *Schwärmerei* of much German *Geistesgeschichte,* which reduced whole epochs to adjectives piled high. His antagonism to "isms" and his suspicion of categorical epithets that purported to encapsulate the essence of vast ages, blurring their complexities and varieties of intellectual experience, were really two aspects of the same thing. He could not tolerate humbug. He analyzed, dissected, and debunked in a polite but deadly manner.

The *Geistesgeschichte* that was so repugnant to Lovejoy can boast Herder and Hegel as its spiritual progenitors and Dilthey as the official father of the school. Bernhard Groethuysen was a trustworthy follower, and both he and Dilthey preserved the spirit of Hegel without the absolutism of his system. After World War II, a principal exponent of *Geistesgeschichte* in Germany, the founder of a "Gesellschaft für Geistesgeschichte" in 1958, was Hans-Joachim Schoeps, a prolific, if watery, epigonus. He inherited a journal called *Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* and there and in such works as *Was ist und was will die Geistesgeschichte?* he promulgated the

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program of a school. Its proper method, he assures us, involves taking *Querschnitte* (transverse sections) through the overabundant materials of all aspects of culture to arrive at a *Lebensgefühl,* to establish a *Lebenshorizont* and a *Weltanschauung* of the *Zeitgeist in Wandel* (changing Spirit of the Times).[17] In the hands of Dilthey and Groethuysen the methods of old-fashioned *Geistesgeschichte* gave rise to psychological portraits of individuals and collectives that are rich in provocative historical insights; abandoned to latter-day disciples, *Geistesgeschichte* has become rather barren.

In April 1944, while D-Day was being prepared by General Eisenhower, two professors at The Johns Hopkins University, Lovejoy and Leo Spitzer, an eminent comparatist, were engaged in a controversy about the relative merits of the history of unit-ideas as chemical elements with a linear, chronological history and what Lovejoy ridiculed as that untranslatable word-concept *Geistesgeschichte,* which insisted on establishing relationships within the whole body of thought being formulated at a given time.[18] In their work, neither posed in stark, exclusive terms the alternatives of synchronic *Geistesgeschichte* or linear, diachronic history of ideas. This American version of a *Methodenstreit* seemed to revolve around which was the superior approach to the materials. Unfortunately, the contestants, caught up in the passions of the moment, focused on which procedure was most useful in "explaining" the phenomenon of Hitler. When reread, their exchange sounds quaint and distant—no costumes look so outlandish as the fashions of a few decades ago.

Despite his differences with Spitzer, Lovejoy never argued that the form of knowledge he espoused should limit itself strictly to the chronological and geographical tracing of rational propositional unit-ideas. The description of an idea in a series of new historical environments was clearly as important as the original work of isolating it and separating it from its matrix. When Lovejoy practiced his art he both analyzed and synthesized. Sometimes one even prefers his syntheses, the setting of his gemstones—the chain of being, the ideas of time, human nature, evolution—in a new environment, over his analytic virtuosity. But his prejudices were strong: the dithyrambic *Geistesgeschichte* that pounced upon a whole epoch or movement and epitomized it in a few sibylline, emotion-laden phrases offended his sensibilities. He scoffed at its exuberance, its deficiency in analytic sharpness. Of his legacy, the unit-idea appears to be the mainstay of

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his whole theoretical structure. He constantly emphasized the recurrent unit factors, the components that were essentially identical through time, however distinctive and original the literary and philosophical thought-forms of which they were a part.[19]

Of course, the bulk of present-day history of ideas, history of thought, *histoire des idées, histoire de la pensée, Ideengeschichte,* goes blithely on its way, drawing eclectic patterns unaffected by the theoretical considerations of either the Lovejoy or the Spitzer school. Often the universe of discourse is an individual author or book. Selected expressions in a text are treated genetically. And when contradictions are discovered they are conciliated through any one of a number of recognized techniques for ironing out differences. The wholeness of the thinker or writer is preserved wherever possible. He may be presented against a background of the dominant intellectual conceptions and viewed either as a repeater or an innovator. If he does the task well—in the Dilthey manner—he can become a vehicle for the thought of his age. But the fact is that a good deal of the current production in the history of ideas is trivial; it abounds in summaries or précis of a writer's ideas. Much of it recalls the activity of seventeenth-century *virtuosi* and *otiosi.* Think of a random question and give it an answer; edit a text and overinterpret the meaning of the variants; touch upon an intellectual juxtaposition, analogy, resemblance, and call it an "influence."

A large proportion of the articles in journals that deal with philosophical, scientific, political, or literary ideas are merely expositions of minor relationships or parallel developments, publications of manuscript smidgens as if they were Holy Writ. The quantity of material is staggering, and surely much of the stuff is being left to gather cobwebs unread. Many of these exercises have only one follow-up; they enter the bibliographical mill and have to be quoted in a footnote to show that one is not ignorant of what is going on, even if one invokes the right to freedom from reading and avoids more than a cursory perusal. There are annual bibliographical volumes on individual subjects—like French literature, or philosophy, or the history of science—which run to 400 or 500 pages. An American-sponsored *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* has been published that summarizes some of this material, and the Germans have prepared a similar compendium of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* devoted solely to social and political concepts. While no one

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has made a formal analysis of the hundreds of journals that include articles somehow related to the history of ideas, I am willing to stand by my impressionistic conclusions after rummaging through large open-shelf libraries. A treadmill is in operation.

The printing explosion has not concealed the signal lack of invention in the practice of the history of ideas over the past decades. Vocabulary may have been modified. Perhaps our descriptions are more phenomenological and less propositional, our analyses of texts more precise than they used to be. But the principal concerns are the same. Though there is some interpenetration between two or more academic fields—philosophy and political thought, psychology and literature—the subjects still tend to remain fixed within the bounds of the Library of Congress cataloging system. Controversies—especially in the history of science—are likely to be as internalist as they were forty years ago. If the *Journal of the History of Ideas* is examined, neither in spirit nor content nor form is it very different today from its first years. Rhythms of thought have remained the same, as has the cast of characters. The idea of *X* in the thought of *Y* is still a favorite topic. Romanticism, which perhaps started the fearful rumpus, has not yet bit the dust, a tenacity that Lovejoy in his deserved paradise doubtless contemplates with dismay.

There are, to be sure, segments of the world—many countries of Eastern Europe—where the history of ideas is not practiced at all or where the subject is virtually taboo. While some discussion of dead men's thoughts goes on, it is to a large extent an inquiry into the precursors or forerunners of Marxism-Leninism. The Russians and East Germans have become specialists on figures like Müntzer or Babeuf or eighteenth- and nineteenth-century utopians or materialist philosophers, but they have left untouched vast areas of European thought. The intellectual world of non-Russian Eastern Europe offers only occasional surprises. When Leszek Kolakowski was a professor of philosophy in Warsaw, he wrote a superb history of seventeenth-century religious dissidents;[20] but his work was exceptional.

Toward the Marxist interpretation of ideas, which won some hearing in America at about the same time that Lovejoy issued his programmatic statements, he assumed a position that he called agnostic. But he was really none too sympathetic. "How was the changing class structure of the ancient world mirrored in the idea of the great chain of being?" became a satirical question in his reply to

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Marxist critics of his work in their journal *Science and Society*. Rummaging among his papers at Johns Hopkins, I found a stray note: "Aristotle was, I cannot but suspect, unaffected by the circumstances that he was a member of a leisure class in an economic society resting largely upon slave labor." But the historical questions raised by Marxism are today far from dead in Western society. Since World War II, the commitment to Marxism of large numbers of intellectuals, especially among the younger generation in the countries of Western—not Eastern—Europe, has produced thought that is more sophisticated than the stereotyped formulas of American Marxism in the thirties.

Concomitantly, a distaste has been manifested for the abstractness of the history of ideas and for its apparent tendency to concentrate on the thought systems of social elites, to the almost total neglect of the movement of ideas among the great masses of the people. Since the post–World War II rebirth of Marx, Western European historiographical emphasis has shifted markedly to economic and social studies. Entire schools like that of the Germans and the Italians and most of the French are in deliberate revolt against what they believe to have been an overdevelopment of the history of thought to the detriment of inquiries into other aspects of existence. Young Italian historians became impatient to throw off their shoulders the heavy mantle of Croce, and young Germans had the same disregard for the heritage of Meinecke's *Ideengeschichte*. Conversely, there were isolated students in Eastern Europe who looked upon the history of thought as liberation from what they considered the dead hand of their official philosophy. In Germany and perhaps Italy the academic preponderance of historians of ideas before World War II may have betokened a tendency among university mandarins to avert their eyes from the ugly facts of political and social life, and the reaction to this betrayal is understandable.

A generation of historians both in Western Europe and in the United States, discontented with maintaining a pathos of distance between ideas and values and political and social life, have tried to bridge the gap by exploring the ideas of ordinary people in the past through an analysis of popular literature. They feel, for example, that the impact of minor story-writers on the eve of the French Revolution was greater than that of the *philosophes*, who after all were not read by the masses. This would make of Restif de la Bretonne, the

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"Rousseau des ruisseaux," as he was called, a more dynamic figure than Rousseau himself. While the ideas of "le bas peuple" have become a fertile field of inquiry, estimating the overall influence of writers addressing different social classes remains highly subjective despite the introduction of quantification techniques. (There was a seepage of Rousseau's ideas downward, though perhaps not in their original version, as there was a flow upward to Kant.) I believe that the treatment of the higher mental systems in isolation may come to an end; but I hope that the study of popular culture will not turn into an intellectual ghetto, one of the dangers besetting present-day American historiography.

Lovejoy would not have been taken aback by the current interest in the ideas of workers and peasants in the past; on occasion he too wrote of the need to pursue unit-ideas in popular beliefs and climates of opinion. But the ideas in his historiography were, in his judgment, best expressed in more or less systematic philosophies, and then perhaps in formal literature. What the masses thought was not the focus of his investigations—nor is it of mine—though he mentioned folklore as an area into which new ideas spread and he included its study in a general program for the history of ideas presented before the American Philosophical Society. He opened wide the doors to minor thinkers and poets, holding that they often gave more vibrant expression to dominant ideas than the giants who traditionally occupied the center of the intellectual stage; but he did not seek for seminal thinking in popular literature.

France holds a unique position in the contemporary historiography of ideas. The French have been practicing in this field for a long time. Many of the items in Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* have survived long enough to reappear in the American five-volume *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*. Lucien Febvre laid down a program for an *histoire des mentalités* and an *histoire psychologique*. Robert Mandrou considers himself Febvre's true disciple, but the notion of a history of mentalities has been accepted as well in many contemporary historiographical schools in other parts of Europe and in the United States. For myself, a mentality is only a somewhat more rationalistic and less amorphous version of a *Zeitgeist*. And I have long since given up the idea that all aspects of a culture goosestep in unison through time.

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A group of French sociologists of literature, among whom Lucien Goldmann was preeminent, made attempts to penetrate the highest levels of literary culture with an analysis rooted in Marxism. In *Le Dieu caché* Goldmann tried to show that the very subject matter and construction of Pascal's *Pensées* and the plays of Racine, which were permeated by the tragic vision of Jansenism—an ideology that asserted the impossibility of living a valid life in this world—were evidence of a mental structure uniquely applicable to a specific class in a state of crisis, the *noblesse de robe* in the seventeenth century.[21] Goldmann's famous thesis has been followed by far less ingenious imitations both in France and in the United States. But as a method in the history of thought it should not be dismissed.

In our day the most original mind in the history of thought in the Western world was by all odds Michel Foucault, who in his *archéologie du savoir* insisted that he was not writing an *histoire des idées* at all, but a history of epistemes.[22] Though his examples are usually drawn from French and English thinkers, he belongs to the generation that has been influenced by German phenomenology. In an act of mutual cultural transvestism, as the Germans have turned matter-of-fact and empirical, French intellectuals seem to have become intoxicated with the Germanic way of constructing grand philosophical systems. Their language has suffered from it, but their thought has achieved a certain density that had often been lacking before. Throughout the writings of Foucault, one feels the spirit of Heidegger and his historicization of epistemology.

Foucault identified and described distinct layers of perception in modern knowledge since the Renaissance, stressing discontinuities and disjunctures—this was his underlying break with the older tradition. His method was analytic, both in a Marxist and a Freudian sense. The ideas he singled out penetrate the whole of large, clearly defined, chronological segments of European thought and are hidden, unlike the manifest ratiocinations Lovejoy appreciated most. It required extraordinary intellectual acumen to tease out of an epoch the ideas that make it analogous to an archeological stratum. Foucault derived his concepts from areas of knowledge to which Lovejoy did not in fact have easy access—the histories of biological science and economics and linguistics. Lovejoy, though he took the position that the documentation of a unit-idea could be drawn from all realms of knowledge without restriction, normally enclosed

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himself within the boundaries of belles lettres and the classical philosophers. Foucault dazzles us with the variety of his sources.

For Foucault the human capacity to perceive in the "classical age," by which he meant roughly the period from the early seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, is altogether different from that of the "modern age." Lovejoy was committed to the continuum, the unbroken chain of Western culture since the Greeks whose links he could establish with such remarkable facility. Foucault ruptured the traditional continuities of the history of thought in order to discover there large structured segments with marked thresholds that represent revolutionary fractures. Lovejoy was profoundly convinced of the enduring nature of the major problems of Western philosophy, even when successive generations embroidered upon them or turned them topsy-turvy. Foucault was Nietzschean in his stress upon *ein Bruch, ein Zwang;* Foucault's man is a novelty-making, unpredictable animal.

Foucault thought of himself as taking his point of departure from Marx in isolating as "systems" epochs that have a unique consciousness. He tries mightily to distinguish himself from German ideas of the *Zeitgeist* in Hegel's sense and from Dilthey's search for the psychological *Zusammenhang* (interrelatedness) of an epoch. Since Foucault's units of the history of thought cannot avoid being chronological, one is sometimes hard put to differentiate him from the "spirit of the age" philosophers of history; his method, however, is radically different from theirs, as it is from Lovejoy's. Foucault makes his analogy to archeology rather than analytic chemistry, as he discriminates layers of civilization in which he recognizes distinctive modes that are fundamentally epistemological. Because perceptual modes of the different historical layers of civilization are not derivative from one another but discontinuous, the intricate problems of intellectual inheritance or transmission are dissolved. Foucault assimilated his method to that of Freud as well as Marx. He too is analytical; he too refuses to accept at face value the thought categories in which an epoch overtly expressed itself. There are subterranean, unconscious connections that must be excavated—Freud was also fond of the archeological analogy—but first the traditional system of thought and the orderly historical queue of individual disciplines must be disrupted. Only then can the significant ideas—ways of perceiving things—of a given age be exposed and their

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relationships woven together in an act of historical re-creation. Foucault admonishes the historian to refrain from a slavish reproduction of the official intellectual continuities that the thinkers of an epoch themselves declared important and to concentrate instead on those of which they were unaware.

When Lovejoy proposed the study of "unconscious mental habits" he really meant the predilections of thought that were not explicit—the word "habits" is revealing. His example was the tendency of certain generations of intellectuals to reduce things to "simplicity." He was not referring to the unconscious preconditions of thought that determined perception and manifest thought-processes themselves. Discontinuity becomes particularly sharp if one presupposes—as Foucault does—that there are spatiotemporal segments in which different unconscious preconditions and modes of perception prevail. If such a thesis is accepted, a unit-idea can have only a semblance of long duration. It is in fact a different idea that is entering into combination with others in successive time periods. In Lovejoy's theory, a well-defined unit-idea in the course of time only swaps the idea-mate to whom it has been temporarily joined.

Foucault's radical departure from a sense of the continuity of Western thought is not unique, however. In his emphasis on the horizontal ideational system and its unconscious as well as its manifest content, he has American counterparts who have been functioning in total independence of his work. His approach is paralleled by Thomas Kuhn's conceptualization of changing paradigms in the history of science, and rests upon a similar theory of psychological perception.[23] In Foucault's spirit, Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions rejects the purported evolutionary and teleological development of scientific discovery as it is usually presented. Carl Schorske, in an admirable series of essays, has devoted himself to the study of late nineteenth-century Vienna as an exemplar hinge period during which an inherited body of ideas in a particular configuration no longer satisfies needs and desires as both Marx and Freud defined them. One psychic pattern was being abandoned and a new one invented that took into account the novelties in sociopolitical realities that had evolved. Schorske has a special interest in such hinge periods and their character. He describes these moments of crisis in all their ideational complexity, when the old has not yet died and the new is still aborning. And he is quite aware of the affinity of his conception

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to the Saint-Simonian definition of the confused interval between organic and critical epochs. *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*[24] is an excellent example of the fruit this conception can yield. What Kuhn finds in a scientific revolution, the invention of a new scientific *Gestalt* that can better assimilate empirical data that have accumulated, Schorske sees in the revolution of political and moral values. In my own writings, composed in the minor key of a housebroken academic, I have been concerned with similar upheavals: the changing of the gods in the age of the Enlightenment, transformations in religious ideas and sensibility in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, radical alterations through the ages in the vision of a utopian world, in the interpretation of myths of the pagan gods, in the shapes of philosophical history, and of late in perceptions of Judaism in Western Christendom.

Foucault deliberately remained mute on the dynamics of change. He leaves us with a mystery. He admits that he has not penetrated the secret of the metamorphoses of perceptual systems. At best he can describe the character of successive thought systems in the most vital areas of the knowledge of man, in man's thought about speech, labor, and biological existence (which in his usage includes psychological processes). Though an admirer of Marx as a conceptualizer of epochal structures, he considered deterministic generalizations about the materialist origins of thought systems facile and superficial. And I find myself in agreement. Though Foucault shifted his position in wrestling with the boundaries of historical periodization and was not always meticulous in his references to sources, in the course of his career he raised problems of consciousness in a temporal mode that had only been skirted by less adventurous craftsmen. His books on the concepts of madness, medicine, punishment, sexuality, opened doors to arcana of Western civilization; what does it matter if some of his footnotes can be torpedoed?

Among recent theorists in the history of ideas, Foucault was perhaps the most negative about the relevance of long-term historical inheritances. In this respect he is an embodiment of an anti-Lovejoy manifesto (albeit his history of sexuality gives an unexpected weight to the endurance of Greek and Roman models into modern times). His triumph lies in establishing the density and depth of contemporaneous relationships in any epoch that he analyzes. American scholars are ambivalent about historical continuity. Schorske believes

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that at the moment of the regrouping of ideas the old repository of the culture still contains active agents; and Kuhn insists that his belief in the distinctive paradigms that follow one another does not exclude progress and accumulation in science. But all three are joined in their emphasis upon the primacy of the contemporaneous in any study of ideas. Along with Emerson they seem to hold that men resemble their contemporaries more than they do their progenitors.

I, too, part company with Lovejoy, though reluctantly, as I grow more and more impressed with cataclysmic breaks in historical consciousness. Where Lovejoy rests his eye upon the elements that remain constant in the history of ideas, notwithstanding the different patterns and configurations in which they recur, I see those patterns and configurations as altering the ideas in an essential way, not as adventitious encasements of immutable thought. Yet I am not prepared to repudiate Lovejoy, to cut the threads to the past and hold that because there are important psychic ruptures there can be no filiations.

Since a historian of ideas cannot escape his historicity, any more than the practitioner of any other form of knowledge, the theoretical shift of men like Foucault, Kuhn, and Schorske away from Lovejoy's upright Jesse-tree of the history of ideas to a horizontal emphasis may reflect the different worlds in which they were born and reared. Lovejoy's generation—he was born in 1873—could still accept the duration and unity of Western European culture as a precondition of their thinking. Men coming along fifty years later, who have in the flesh experienced the sharp discontinuities of the past half-century, may be constrained to project their experience upon the past. Nostalgia for a less catastrophically dynamic world that may be able to feel again in its bones the unity and continuity of Western culture still colors my own historical perception, but it has long since ceased to determine my thinking.

ENDNOTES

[1]The projects are modeled on his thesis *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1660 à 1730*, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960).

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[3]Thomas Stanley, *The History of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (London: Printed for Humphrey Mosely and Thomas Dring, 1656), preface.

[4]Johann Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae, a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta*, 6 vols. (Leipzig: Weidemann and Reich, 1742–1767).

[5]*The History of Philosophy, drawn up from Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae by William Enfield*, 2 vols. (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1791).

[6]François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique, portatif* (London [Geneva]: 1764); *Dictionnaire philosophique, portatif. Nouvelle édition, revue, corrigée, & augmentée de divers articles par l'auteur* (1765); seventh edition, 1770, in two parts, *Dictionnaire philosophique, ou la Raison par alphabet, revue, corrigée, et augmentée par l'auteur.*

[7]Henri Tronchon, *La Fortune intellectuelle de Herder en France* (Paris: F. Rieder et Cie, 1920).

[8]Harald Høffding, *Den nyere Filosofis Historie*, 2 vols. (Copenhagen: P.G. Philipsen, 1894, 1895); *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie . . . Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers . . .*, 2 vols. trans. F. Bendixen (Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1895–1896); *A History of Modern Philosophy*, 2 vols., translated from the German edition by B.E. Meyer (London: Macmillan, 1900–1915); Emile Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie*, 9 vols. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1926–1949).

[9]Carl Lotus Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932).

[10]Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: a Study of the History of an Idea; the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936).

[11]Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

[12]Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1919).

[13]See, for example, George Boas, *The History of Ideas. An Introduction* (New York: Scribner's 1969), especially page 19.

[14]Max Lerner, *Ideas are Weapons: The History and Uses of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1939).

[15]Joseph S. Roucek, "A History of the Concept of Ideology," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 5 (4) (October 1944), pp. 487–488.

[16]See Lovejoy, *The Reason, the Understanding, and Time* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961); and *Reflections on Human Nature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).

[17]Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Was ist und was will die Geistesgeschichte: über Theorie und Praxis der Zeitgeistforschung* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1959); see especially chapter 2, "Die Wandlungen des Zeitgeistes," pp. 31–58.

[18]Leo Spitzer, "Geistesgeschichte vs. History of Ideas as Applied to Hitlerism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 5 (2) (April 1944), pp. 191–203; A.O. Lovejoy, "Reply to Professor Spitzer," *loc. cit.*, pp. 204–219. Lovejoy's paper to which Spitzer took exception, "The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas," had been published in the *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3 (3).

[19]Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, pp. 3–4.

[20]Leszek Kolakowski, *Świadomość religijna i więź kościelna:studia nad chrześcijaństwem bezwyznaniowym siedemnastego wieku* (Warsaw: Pánstwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1965); translated into French by Anna Posner, with the title

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[21]Lucien Goldmann, *Le Dieu caché: étude sur la vision tragique dans les Pensées de Pascal et dans le théâtre de Racine* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955).

[22]Michel Foucault, *Les Mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); English translation, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971 [c. 1970]).

[23]Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

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Stanley Hoffmann

A Note on the French Revolution and the Language of Violence

VIOLENCE WAS INDEED A MARK of the French Revolution. But we ought to distinguish between the sort of often quite horrid but spontaneous cruelty of individuals and crowds, and the organized, or at least attempted, system of terror which *Jacobinisme* tried to enforce. I am going to concentrate here on the question of *Jacobinisme*, and on what I would call the involuntary invention of totalitarianism during the French Revolution.

It may be useful to begin with some quotes from the two chief *Jacobins*—from Saint-Just and Robespierre. From Saint-Just, whose lapidary French is almost untranslatable: "Il est difficile d'établir une République autrement que par la censure inflexible de tous les crimes":[1] "It is difficult to establish a republic in any other way than inflexible censorship of all crimes." Then comes another famous remark of his during the trial of the king: "On ne peut point régner innocemment. . . . Tout roi est un rebelle et un usurpateur":[2] "One can't reign innocently. Every king is a rebel and a usurper"; also, "the republic begins where the tyrant ends."[3] Finally, also from Saint-Just:

> Si le peuple aime la vertu, la frugalité. . . si la pudeur rentre dans la cité, les contre-révolutionnaires, les modérés, et les fripons dans la poussière. . . je reconnais que vous avez fait une révolution. . . . Mais s'il arrive le contraire. . . si les vices triomphent, . . . si les supplices ne poursuivent point les conspirateurs cachés. . . il n'y a ni bonheur ni vertu à espérer pour la terre.[4]

Revised version of a presentation to a panel during Harvard's 350th anniversary, September 5, 1986.

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That is,

> If the people love virtue, frugality, if modesty returns to the city, if counter-revolutionaries, moderates and radicals bite the dust, I will admit that you've made a revolution. If vice triumphs, if punishment does not fall upon hidden plotters, there is no hope for happiness on earth.

One finds the same idea in one of Robespierre's greatest speeches, from which I quote, this time only in English:

> We want to substitute in our land immorality for egotism, probity for honor, principles for customs, ethics for propriety, the rule of reason for the tyranny of fashion, disdain for vice for disdain for misfortune, self-respect for insolence, spiritual grandeur for vanity, love of glory for love of money, good men for good society, merit for intrigue, genius for wit, truth for brilliance, human greatness for the pettiness of the great. . . .That is, all the virtues and all the miracles of the republic for all the vices and all the absurdities of the monarchy. . . .[5] In the system of the French Revolution what is immoral is impolitic, what is corruptive is counter-revolutionary. . . .[6]

What was the significance of this language? It has a number of features that one will find, of course, in other revolutions again. There is the underlying myth of unanimity and of unity, the idea that all the people would be united and transparent, open to one another, if it were not for the traitors, for the criminals. In this view, behind which lurks Rousseau, division and conflict are not natural at all. Division is a crime, and it is the product of plots, factions, and intrigues. This leads, inevitably, to the politics of paranoia. There are multiple kinds of enemies; there are new ones everyday, like mushrooms after the rain. And even though they belong to all imaginable categories, they all are part of a same system that can be dealt with only by purges.

And then, there is this view of "before and after," which is so strongly expressed by Robespierre in many of his speeches. Now, France is in the hell of war, the war of freedom against its enemies. But tomorrow, after the war has been won, there will be finally time for a constitution and for the regime, as he put it, of victorious and peaceful liberty. This was the ideal: a civic Republic of virtuous, frugal happiness; "la volupté d'une cabane et d'un champ fertile cultivé par vos mains."[7] Through this ordeal one will finally get to Nirvana. The reality, of course, was the manipulation of the many by

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the few, but those few saw themselves as the enlightened expression of the general will, the expression of the whole.

What is interesting about this language and this turn of events is not merely the rhetoric of the former and the horror of the latter; it is the question: Why and how did it all happen? Here, I do not find the various schools of history terribly enlightening. The traditional Marxist or neo-Marxist school puts all the emphasis on class relations; I think it has been proven wrong by many recent studies; this is much too simple an explanation. Tocqueville's much more political explanation focuses on process—the continuity of centralization in French history. But he does not explain this extraordinary rupture, not only between the Old Regime and the Revolution, but between the pre-*Jacobin* revolution and the *Jacobin* one. He never got to write his volume on the Revolution.

The new and fashionable emphasis on *mentalités* and culture — which sometimes reminds me of the expression of a famous French statesman that culture is what is left when everything has been forgotten—is fascinating, but it neglects to ask: Why *that particular* culture? Where did it come from? Why at that moment? Why in this particular hysterical form? This is what I would like to look at very briefly. One good way of starting is by contrasting the United States and France.

In the case of the American Revolution, one deals with a society that is relatively egalitarian and relatively democratic, where, as Paine wrote, no generation owed a debt to previous ones. In other words, it was liberated from the past. It was a society that showed no hostility whatsoever to its churches, and in which the language generally used was the language of rights and interests—a rather utilitarian language; a language that entailed no possiblity of conflict between individual rights, i.e. rights against the state, and popular sovereignty, because popular sovereignty was conceived as a very restricted power. It was restricted because of a common distrust of too strong a state, and because of common distrust of unimpeded majority rule. Hence the emphasis, in the American Revolution, on mutually balanced, almost self-neutralizing interests, on the independence of the representatives, on the need for judicial review, and so on. As a consequence, the questions and dramas in American political life were going to be on the one hand, how much community can there be with such an individualistic basis; and secondly, who shall

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have these rights? Will they be extended to the non-white minorities, in particular?

The French case is totally different. One starts with a feudal system that was in full transformation, but still there. One finds two intellectual traditions fighting a third one. The one they fight is the intellectual tradition of the Old Regime: undemocratic, absolutist, and centralizing. But this is being fought by a very uneasy coalition, which is best expressed by *l'abbé* Siéyès in his famous *brochure* of 1789 on the Third Estate.[8] It represents a very delicate coexistence of ideologies that will not last long. One is the ideology of negative liberty, itself an uneasy blend of reactionaries who support negative liberty against the monarchy, but only so that they can preserve their own aristocratic privileges from its occasional spurts of reformism, and of bourgeois or more progressive forces who would like negative liberty against the king, in order to dismantle all the privileges and all the barriers of the Old Regime. The other is the ideology that will be the decisive factor in the *Jacobin* experience, the Rousseauistic conception of positive liberty; the notion according to which the most important thing is the collective will of the nation, which nobody should resist. And there is, of course, an extraordinary tension from the beginning, except that Siéyès does not yet see it, between the defense of individual rights on the one hand, and the notion that the nation must have the final say against all opposition. When he deals with the state, his emphasis, unlike in the American conception, is not merely on consent and representation; it is on the will, on legislation. And what is reflected here is this extraordinary notion derived from Rousseau, that the general will is the only ethical will, whereas all private interests are fundamentally evil: an idea that one does not find on this side of the Atlantic.

Therefore the French dramas throughout French history are going to be, first of all, liberty versus the state. Liberalism in France has always been under siege, from the extreme right which does not accept individualism, and from the Rousseauistic, or *Jacobin*, left. The second French drama is going to be the endless battle with the Church, and the third is, of course, the great question addressed by the Revolution: How does one establish this nation? How does one create the modern citizen out of all the different *corps* and orders and regions and provinces representing the past? The *Jacobin* episode is essentially the culmination and the perversion of the Rousseauistic

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element. It is what I would call the involuntary invention of modern totalitarianism, which is secular and democratic. Totalitarian terror is first improvised, and subsequently rationalized—in words and as a system—because the fall of the Old Regime does not cleanse France of past evils, does not produce, in a spontaneous burst, the perfect nation and citizen. What has not emerged by itself will therefore have to be forged. If birth cannot be natural, it will have to be caesarean.

To be sure, totalitarianism is seen by the *Jacobins* themselves as temporary. Here, there are some interesting parallels with Marx: after the dictatorship of the proletariat comes the final anarchy; after the government of terror comes the happy reign of virtue. And the philosophy behind the French totalitarian system remains individualistic. The ultimate purpose, even of the *Jacobins*, one should never forget, was not a collectivistic society; it was a society that, in Crane Brinton's words, would have been the greengrocers' paradise: the society that would indeed flourish under the Third Republic.[9] Also, the *Jacobins* did not invent the single party; they merely came close to it, with the *Jacobin* committees.

The key question remains *why*. Why did they get there? Why did this delicate balance between negative liberty and the general will get broken decisively in favor of the Rousseauistic element? A first answer is provided by rhetoric: if one looks at the speeches of 1789 and 1790, one finds that the French Revolution was, from the beginning, embroiled in the language of contention. The resistance was too fierce, from many of the aristocrats, from the king, and from private interests here and there. So from the beginning the Revolution was a battle. As the battle became fiercer, the move from the strategic language of contention to the moral language of crimes and of holy war—war against external enemies, against internal traitors—was not so big a leap after all.

A second element was the extraordinary fall from illusions; for what is so striking is the strength of early illusions. One French historian has written about the original aspiration and push toward the future—the hope that somehow the new man, the new citizen, would be established quickly, because it would be self-evident to all Frenchmen that the new society of citizens would be the best thing for them, for it would be ethical *and* in their interest.[10] And yet, very quickly, what was discovered by the revolutionaries was that there is no such thing as self-evidence in politics; the past was too long; the

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resistances were too strong, so that the dream of the beginning, the dream that was expressed by one of the revolutionaries, Barère, in the following way—"Tout doit être nouveau en France, et nous ne devons dater que d'aujourd'hui" ("everything must be new in France, and everything must be dated today")—that dream faded very, very quickly.[11] And therefore, if what they had deemed self-evident did not reveal itself in all of its transparency, then they had to create it; this could only be done by elimination; in that respect the guillotine was the perfect symbol.

A last element, which multiplies the effect of this fall from illusion, is fear. When one reads the *Jacobins*, one has the sense of people living in deep fear—fear that the experiment will fail; fear that the foreign invaders will triumph; fear that the domestic enemies will win; fear that all those endless plots, all those conspiracies they felt vaguely in the shadows, would coalesce and overthrow their work. And the undercurrent in all of Robespierre's speeches is an undercurrent of despair. Basically, "the people" is naturally virtuous, but isn't virtue always in minority on this earth? "The people" is good, but it isn't good yet. We have to make it good, but will we succeed? Of course, they didn't. These are the reasons why the Revolution took that turn; and we are left with one last question: Why this particular ideology? Why not another one? After all, there are different totalitarian, or quasi-totalitarian, ideologies.

Part of the answer is simply the legacy of the Old Regime itself. The Old Regime was based on *la volonté une*—a single will. It happened to be the will of one man, the king. It was based on centralization. It compressed or suppressed intermediate bodies. It made religion into a crutch for the state. It persecuted dissenters and the unassimilable, like the Protestants. Essentially, what the *Jacobins* did was to stand the Old Regime on its head. The will of the nation replaced the will of one, and centralization—after a brief attempt at dismantling it—resumed with a vengeance. The state became the religion, and pluralism was once again exorcised. Whereas liberalism was the *opposite* of the Old Regime, *Rousseauisme*, the dream of community and general will, was the same as the Old Regime, but in *reverse*. Indeed, the second part of the answer to "why this ideology?" is the extraordinary strength of the Rousseauistic myth. Why Rousseau? Why did he have such a hold on minds? Perhaps because the myth of the general will, the myth of *The Social Contract*, was a salvationist

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myth. It gave a magic and mysterious recipe for how to create unity, uniformity, unanimity out of different fragments, how to transcend particular interests, how to assimilate ethics and politics. I think it was the unitary, transcending, and salvationist significance of Rousseau that was so fascinatingly strong. It appealed to Catholics in revolt against God, the Church, and the Old Regime, because it talked of virtue and redemption, but in a secular city. The myth of the general will provided those who believed in it with a sort of talisman, with the conviction that they could somehow, in a France splintered into thousands of fragments, transcend all those differences and create something not only new, but good at the same time.

Just as I started with a brief parallel between the French and the American revolutions, I will end with a remark comparing the *Jacobin* with the Soviet Revolution. There are enormous similarities. To be sure, the motor of the Russian Revolution was class warfare, but the proletariat was seen as a universal class, which would prevail once the enemies of that class were literally cut off. One finds the same contrast between the evil temporary state, which has to be purged, cleansed, purified, and the later stage. But the one big difference, it seems to me, is that the *Jacobins* stumbled into undeliberate, unplanned terror. Somehow, they never stopped believing that the days of tranquility, of the rights of man, of "une chaumière à l'abri du fisc" would come, and this explains why the first modern totalitarians were also the ancestors of the harmless *Radicaux* of the Third Republic.[12] This is why I called it "an involuntary invention." They were forced into terror by a combination of the beliefs that were so deep in them, and the hectic and heated circumstances in which France almost died in 1793; the lesson that Lenin, in particular, drew from its failure is that terror has to be deliberate, has to be planned, and has to last as long as necessary.

ENDNOTES

[1]Louis de Saint-Just, *Discours et Rapports* (Paris: Oeuvres Sociales, 1957), p. 142.
[2]Ibid., p. 66.
[3]See speech of December 27, 1792, in Michael Walzer, *Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI* (Ann Arbor, MI: Imprint of University Microfilms International).
[4]Saint-Just, *Discours et Rapports,* p. 166.

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[5]In Philip Dawson, ed. *The French Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 131.
[6]Ibid., p. 133.
[7]Saint-Just, op. cit., p. 165.
[8]J.P. Mayer, ed., *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat? and Siéyès* (Salem, NH: Ayer Co., 1982).
[9]Crane Brinton's *The Jacobins* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961) remains the best book on the subject.
[10]Mona Ozouf, in *L'école de la France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), part 1.
[11]Ibid., p. 33.
[12]Saint-Just, op. cit., p. 165.

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George Armstrong Kelly

Alphonse de Lamartine: The Poet in Politics

IN TWO YEARS THE WORLD WILL COMMEMORATE the bicentennial of the beginning of the French Revolution; a year after that will mark the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alphonse de Lamartine, who was much involved in its successor crisis of February 1848. Lamartine's life bestrode an epoch of violence in French society, as well as some of France's loftiest and most humdrum moments. He was not a connoisseur of the humdrum. He was, among other things, a poet, a noble, an academician, a historian, a diplomat, a deputy, an ex-Legitimist (i.e., defender of the Bourbon dynasty), a heterodox Catholic, an egoist, a humanitarian, an orator of renown, a revolutionary, and a person thoroughly disliked for being many of these things. There was nothing very ordinary about Lamartine. Perhaps the most ordinary thing that can be said in his behalf is that, in many ways, he passes for what we now describe as a "liberal." In the array of talents I have summarily given, it is probably the tension between Lamartine's liberalism and his poetry that is most interesting to our contemporaries. As a poet, Lamartine's credentials were hardly challenged in his own time; as a liberal politician, he was belittled by more conventional liberals—including some of the most astute, like Tocqueville—partly because his ideas and performances seemed to draw inspiration from his poetic sense of mystery and self-importance. He was, in the words of Charles de Rémusat, fellow deputy, fellow academician, and fellow liberal, "un homme dangereux."[1] My purpose here is to see why this was so—not simply in terms as brief and abstract as those I have so far presented,

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but with concrete literary and political reference—and to propose further questions about the role of not just the literary man, but the poet, in liberal and revolutionary politics.

The July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe (1830–1848) was generally held to be a "liberal" regime, stocked with the opposition personnel of the Bourbon Restoration and theoretically guided by a kind of Whig-bourgeois doctrine of their making. In 1848, when this regime, believed solid, melted into air, these liberals—whether of the government (Guizot) or of the opposition (Thiers and Barrot)—experienced a crisis of bewilderment. They had gained effective power in 1830, at "one of those blessed moments in history when everything is simple."[2] In February 1848, "M. Thiers and M. Barrot," Tocqueville comments mordantly, "were almost demented."[3] But he, too, was very sorely perplexed.

One of the vehicles of this dementia was the powerful rhetoric of Alphonse de Lamartine, who should have known how to remain a gentleman. M. de Lamartine, who, by liberal standards of taste and propriety, should not have let a revolution be made, was, nevertheless, himself a liberal by most available criteria. But he was also a poet. Plato had warned against poets.

Lamartine not only helped to make (or, better, channel) the February 1848 revolution; he was widely accused of causing it as well, notably by publishing his *Histoire des Girondins,* "whose crude colors," in Tocqueville's uncharitable language, "besmeared every imagination."[4] Lamartine's epic of the Great Revolution, conceived in 1841 and begun in 1843, occupied much of the prolific writer's time in the last years of the constitutional monarchy.[5] This work came cascading on the public between March and June of 1847. Together with almost simultaneous works by Michelet and Louis Blanc,[6] the *Girondins* focused the mind wonderfully on one of the forms that the gathering political crisis might take—dethronement—and on the possible courses that a subsequent revolution might follow. Liberals generally did not want to be reminded of their own origin in armed politics. In his powerful style, both heroic and pathetic, often cinematographic, Lamartine managed to rehabilitate Mirabeau, wring tears from the surviving mourners of Louis XVI, beatify the martyred Girondins, and even bestow national grace on the abhorrent Robespierre. Lamartine intended a conciliatory work for men of good will, but his was conciliatory only for the opposition.

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As the critic Sainte-Beuve wrote: ". . . something for all tastes . . . the papers of all persuasions have each got their appropriate fragment. . . ."[7]

Lamartine saw himself as a militant herald of harmony, the harmony of a "rational politics" as yet unrealized. Earlier, he had imagined renovation in "a small number of intelligences belonging by accident to all the shades of political opinion."[8] He was not so much trying to cover all bets as to commence a rather mystical process of reunion which, not altogether humbly, he had sought to shape as a "social party" since his earliest venture into electoral politics in 1831. Those ideas of fraternity and regeneration, common to dissident legitimists, radicals, and Romantics of the 1840s but unseemly to the men of the solid center (those who were, or hoped to become, the government), were based on a firm faith in popular religion and education. After his crashing downfall in June 1848 and to the end of his life, Lamartine would stave off his debts (for he practiced an aristocratic style of life) by writing homilies and biographies in this vein.[9] As for the *Girondins,* "do not read it," he cautioned his former political ally Comte Mathieu Molé. "It is written for the people. . . . My duty is to prepare the people and myself, for I will be the leader in a new society."[10]

It may be doubted that the *Girondins* was savored by large numbers of the working class, who read other things. It was, however, favorably mentioned in many of the papers that they did read, where Lamartine's prowess as an opposition deputy was also gingerly praised.[11] But many literate radical artisans undoubtedly read parts of the history in its serialized form; and it had a clearly dynamic effect on all those honest folk who felt angered and stifled by the political immobilism of Orleanist parliaments.

The notion that literature might cause history to happen, instead of merely reshaping it for moral reflection and sentimental delectation, did not occur to the men of the *juste milieu,* who themselves had once "used history" but now tended to think that historical writing settled history.[12] Hadn't that old *canard* that Voltaire, Rousseau & Co. had caused the Great Revolution's excesses been safely laid to rest? Had literature caused Bonaparte? Had it brought back the Bourbons? Had a book of Béranger's songs toppled them?

The rulers of July did not harbor any nagging Platonic fears of what George Steiner has called "a radical *irresponsibility* in the

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imaginings of writers, a radical moral-technical falsehood." They could appreciate the new colors and potencies of Romanticism without realizing that "where language is under the utmost pressure of fresh meaning, where it wrestles its way toward becoming literature, images of the state will well up."[13] Surrounded by an extravagant burst of literature, they could soberly believe that politics and poetics each had its role to play in mankind's profit and pleasure, but in separate compartments. They could not see their connivance—from on high or from below—for politics was in the Stock Exchange and the Chamber, while serious literature was in the academies and the libraries. There was, to be sure, one major exception: the press—and this was tended with some care and alarm. But the bourgeoisie indifferently stacked its shelves with Encyclopedists, Jean-Jacques, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Chateaubriand. . . . *Ut pictura poesis*, perhaps, *ut poesis politica* never. It was not seen that poetry might redramatize politics with the refracting mirror of a history of heightened emotion, exalting it or satanizing it, rather than merely keeping its distance. Even the astute Sainte-Beuve, himself a Romantic and a liberal of sorts, fell into the trap with Lamartine, whose poetry he had much admired.

> [Sainte-Beuve] could have wished that, while developing his poetic talent as widely, and even outrageously, as the nature of his genius carried him, he had remained in accord with himself in politics, faithful to his origins, his precedents, and to the order of opinions, doctrines, and decorum which, cultivated in his youth, were his natural climate.[14]

The trouble, indeed, did not start with some song of Béranger suddenly heard everywhere, or even with a play like Beaumarchais's *Figaro*. It started with religion, in the first blushes of the Restoration. Eventually the religious impulse would turn poetics into a mighty political juggernaut, adversarial and vatic at the same time. It was really a threefold operation. First of all, in attempting to restore their monarchy in an appropriately antediluvian style, the Bourbon loyalists politicized religion past the brink of sanity in a country that hoped, at bottom, for a fragile measure of concord. Catholic controversialists crossed swords with each other and with liberals and freethinkers in an often vengeful spirit, making the stakes of religion something of the highest political importance. Second (although it comes last in time), infusions of political capacity and mobilization

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animated unorthodox but deeply rooted populist religious expressions in the countryside and among the urban craftsmen.[15] Finally, poets and prose poets, beginning with that master of the new style, Chateaubriand, were making religion beautiful, mysterious, and sentimental, but political and national as well, with their mood capturing an ever greater part of the hungry imagination. Soon the Utopians, too, produced their religions, their oases of bizarre bliss in the deserts of labor and industry. Politicized, beautified, reinvented, mobilized, the religious impulse seemed supple and inexhaustible. But was it well under control, caught between the toils of poetry and politics, between prophecy and propriety?

Jacques Maritain has written: "By showing us where moral truth and the genuine supernatural are situated, religion saves poetry from the absurdity of believing itself destined to transform ethics and life: it saves it from overweaning arrogance."[16] Much of Romantic vatic poetry exceeded that restraint, taking on the appearance of a new religion (or a Catholicism painted with the brushstrokes of William Blake). As for the old religion, it was sterilized as a living force by its archaic political complicities. The rising religious impulse eventually became something like the Revolution itself (which all agreed had been basically an antireligious experience). It became—in its hetero-Catholic, eclectic, or antibourgeois expressions—a "religion of humanity," something that could unite imaginative opponents of the *juste milieu*. A new politics arose to transmit this religion, whether in the Nazarene simplicity of Lamennais's *Paroles,* the novel rituals of Enfantin, or the epic bursts of Lamartine, Hugo, and Vigny. Finally, history (not the bourgeois history of Mignet and Thiers, but the muscular history of Lamartine, Michelet, and Edgar Quinet) grafted this impulse to an interpretation of French reality—a reality which, if it had needed to, might have invented the slogan *"l'imagination au pouvoir":* Odilon Barrot, a lawyer, leader of the left opposition under Louis-Philippe, and first prime minister of the Second Republic of 1848, would indeed write that it was "an affair of imagination and not of reason."[17]

The radical difference between 1789 and 1848 is not just, as Marx and many others noted, that the latter immediately disclosed a copied theatricality. It is also that in 1848 a powerful religious current associated the symbol of the risen Christ with the messianic aptitude of the French people to redeem mankind in history—a kind

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of "liberation theology" before its time.[18] This poetry of liberation, at least for a short while, left only the losers, or the very prosaic, unaffected. As Timothy Clark writes: "In the first few weeks of March, there was a period of ecstasy, lyrical illusion, a comedy of high ideals. There was infinite hope in a future of union and brotherhood, a rhetoric which mixed religion and politics, a trust in science and industry. . . ."[19]

That is a brief account of how poetics and politics, the prophetic and the all-too-human, converged on a work like the *Histoire des Girondins* and, beyond it, on Lamartine's own republican dramatics. His role in this extravaganza was certainly conditioned by his serendipitous availability; as Lorenz von Stein, a resident German social theorist, puts it, "he was a good orator; his naiveté with regard to the social question was well known; he had a brilliant name; and he was ambitious."[20] But if he absorbed the theatricality of the occasion, he also helped write part of the script and summoned Paris to imitation. "Ordinarily," Sainte-Beuve wrote, "literature and theatre have seized upon great historical events to express and celebrate them; here history has undertaken to copy literature. In brief, one gets the feeling that a lot of things happened just because the people saw Dumas's *Le Chevalier de Maison Rouge* at the boulevard theatre and read *Les Girondins* by M. de Lamartine."[21] Thus, in capturing this mood, we must not fail to capture Lamartine, the poet-politician, for he spoke with a voice and thoughts of his own; not, as detractors often suggest, in vacuous tones of opportunism, or as the babbling oracle of historical forces he could not grasp.

Lamartine merits attention because he is one of the few examples we have of the poet not just engaged in political business, but in a position of power (Léopold Sédar Senghor and, in a marginal way, Gabriele d'Annunzio also come to mind). At an incandescent moment when poetry, politics, and religion briefly fused, he stood at the juncture of those overlapping imaginations. More should not be made of this point than it can bear, for it can be easily shown that the vocations of poet and statesman were distinct in Lamartine. Even in the period when his poetic powers were strongest (1820–1839), he reserved a large, perhaps even privileged place for his careers of diplomacy and politics: in the year leading up to the July revolution and long after, his letters to his bosom friend Aymon de Virieu are

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obsessed with political questions. Following his defeat for the Chamber in 1831, he traveled in the Middle East: in his part-reverie *Voyage en Orient* (1835), he sought poetic and religious renewal, yet he simply could not lay politics aside. Lamartine informed himself on a wide range of issues, including railway construction, that have little to do with his lyric talent. Yet, neither could the politician be summarily isolated from the poet, for the logic of the times permitted their consolidation in a single personality without distortion of the separate vocations. Hostile witnesses like Odilon Barrot dismissed Lamartine as a poet who had come barging naively and destructively into politics: "he was exclusively a poet; his misfortune and ours was that he also believed himself to be a statesman."[22] It would be fairer to say that he had developed the two missions in problematic tandem, a relationship requiring delicate explanation.

In 1830 Lamartine had written: "Poetry can be exalted or can lower itself to politics, but rarely as far as day-to-day politics [*la politique des circonstances*]."[23] Four years later, after his trip to the Middle East, he wrote a long essay, "Des Destinées de la Poésie," which further elaborates his thoughts. The new poetry—inspired for him by Chateaubriand and Madame de Staël[24]—will become "the music of reason" [*la raison chantée*]: "it will be philosophical, religious, political, social, just like the ages that the human race is about to traverse; but especially it will be intimate. . . ."[25] This poetry, described as the voice of God implanted in "certain men more fully human than the vulgar, *mens divinior,*"[26] will have two missions. It will point out, for the edification and shaming of society, "utopias, imaginary republics, cities of God, and will inspire the courage to try them and the hope to gain them." More modestly, it will also "follow the tendency of institutions and the press; it should conform to the people and become popular in the form of religion, reason, and philosophy."[27] Lamartine continues: "Poetry is the idea while politics is the fact. Just as the idea is above the fact, so poetry is above politics. But man does not live by ideals alone; the ideal must be embodied and translated into social institutions." At certain points in time, institutions are vigorous and self-nourishing; then thought goes its own way. At other moments, social practices are in desperate need of renewal. "My conviction," Lamartine declares, "is that we are in one of those great periods of reconstruction and social renewal. . . ."[28] He thus concludes that poetry has a divine and

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historic calling to guide a politics that has entered "the age of liberty," elsewhere described as the "époque évangélique" (the gospel age).[29] One can well understand why such language might make the legal mind of Odilon Barrot bristle; but it is still not demonstrated that Lamartine was nothing but an ethereal lyric politician.

Lamartine knew well how not to confuse "idea" and "fact" (also a Tocquevillian distinction), even though the priority was clear. His political vision might be understood as teleologically informed by his poetic ideals, as in his poem "Les Révolutions" (which is not an invitation to create them), where he addressed humanity:

> Vos siècles page à page épellent l'Evangile;
> Vous n'y lisiez qu'un mot, et vous en lirez mille;
> Vos enfants plus hardis y liront plus avant:
> Ce livre est comme ceux des sibylles antiques,
> Dont l'augure trouvait les feuillets prophétiques
> Siècle à siècle arrachés au vent.[30]

These lines, written in 1835, strongly recall a turn of phrase in the prose essay of 1831, "On Rational Politics": "humanity will write its book day by day, hour by hour, page by page; thought will go forth in the world with the speed of light. . . ."[31] But beneath the purple passages of that brochure there is some strict political analysis at the level of "facts."[32]

Even in the verses suggestively titled "Utopie," where the poet can thunder:

> L'homme inventa la tyrannie
> Pour qu'un seul exprimât ses droits,
> Mais au jour de Dieu qui se lève
> Le sceptre tombe sur le glaive,
> Nul n'est esclave, et tous sont rois! . . .[33]

He can also counsel patience:

> N'étendons pas le Temps sur le lit de Procuste!
> La résignation est la force du juste!
> La patience est sa vertu![34]

To conclude in a balanced fashion: "Il faut se séparer, pour penser, de la foule, / Et s'y confondre pour agir!"[35]

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Thus, poetic ideals establish the boundary of the imaginable, expressing Lamartine's "maximum program" for human regeneration, while themselves remaining bound to certain gradualistic, quasi-Christian restraints. Much more serious restraints are asserted with total clarity in the poet's politics—his innumerable acts, speeches, and judgments. His first electoral program is liberal: to wit, the following, announcing his first campaign: (1) freedom of the press; (2) freedom of religion, "which I love and venerate as the highest thought of humanity"; (3) "legal and progressive emancipation of education"; (4) enlarged communal and municipal liberties; (5) wide and proportional suffrage; (6) order, which "is to liberty as organization is to life"; (7) peace with honor, for war is "tithing with human blood"; (8) progress, defined as a "destiny of humanity . . . that will not compromise the stability of the present for the uncertainness of the future."[36] That range of values will not appreciably alter, although it becomes slightly radicalized in 1844–1848, only to retract once more in 1850–1851. Here Lamartine's defense of what might otherwise be called "bourgeois values"—property, religion, constitutionalism, a tempered suffrage, a ruling elite—and of ideals of the family and rural life is constant. In 1831 Lamartine saw his world hazardously entering the age of liberty. He did not foresee any arrival at "the age of virtue and pure religion" for another five or six centuries.[37] There is no reason to think that the vertiginous republicanism of 1848 caused him to change this view. It is certain that his utopianism (if it can be called that) is far more a moral idealism combining optimism and duty than it is an eschatological leap toward social perfection. If, in connection with the poetics of politics, one thinks of Lamartine (the same Lamartine whose worldly connections and strategies guided his ordinary politics) as a seer or as a bit of a messiah, this would be correct only insofar as it placed him, a man of excessive self-esteem, in a large company of prophets. But this was not explicitly the consequence of his poetry. Rimbaud has written, "The poet makes himself a seer by a long, prodigious, and rational *disordering* of *all the senses*. Every form of love, of suffering, of madness. He searches himself; he consumes all the poisons in him, and keeps only their quintessence."[38] That is not the kind of seer Lamartine was, nor does it express his aesthetic method. His vision, always distinct from his immediate political judgments, was created by a heightening, not a disordering, of the senses and by severe (one

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almost wants to say "classical") poetic exercise. There is a touch of William Wordsworth in Lamartine; of Rimbaud there is none.

We should also remember that the poetic gifts of Lamartine (and their accompanying social vision of a purified and liberated humanity achieving the work of God) would not have sufficed to bring him to center-stage prominence in 1848 had it not been for his still more relevant endowments of public presence and oratorical power. The first of these was, if anything, an aristocratic inheritance; the second was acquired and fine-tuned in election meetings, in the Chamber, in the Académie Française, and in other vehicles of society targeted by the radical revolutionaries. Lamartine's popular rhetoric was more than offensive to most of his parliamentary colleagues, even the most liberal. But those critics tended to forget that it was politics, perforce the politics of the July Monarchy, that had taught him facility in public address. Lamartine had always wanted "to speak from the window." But, as he was reminded by a distinguished older colleague: "To speak from the window, you must first be in the parliament."[39] His elocutionary power was no doubt considerable. As Richard Sennett writes, he knew how to make himself the hieratic conductor of a raging mob so artfully as to tame it: "The hidden power of a speaker like Lamartine is that he harnesses mystification. He has no text, and so escapes being measured by any outside standard of truth or reality."[40] The traditional politicians (in whose midst Lamartine had sat for fourteen years) were not only vexed and awed, but probably made jealous by these results. When confined to the relative safety of verbal dueling with practiced parliamentary artists, Lamartine's skill could be appreciated—but not when he used his golden throat to affect the dispositions of a popular uprising. He had once claimed that his "ideas did his thinking for him."[41] That was how he husbanded all his energy for effect. It was embarrassing to the decorum of liberal politics that, as by a conjurer's trick, those ideas could still or stir crowds, march and countermarch them.

Lamartine's adventures of February 1848 obviously transported his ego and made him unattractively vain in his hour of glory. When he published his account of the February Revolution, it had only one hero (and that hero's pupil, "the people"). Moreover, it was provocatively written in the third person (a literary strategy in which, it seems, only General de Gaulle has succeeded). Lamartine later suggested that this new personification was appropriate to describing

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an overwhelmingly public event.[42] But it was seen by his detractors (probably with reason) as a gesture of false modesty.

There were other aspects of swollen self-appreciation in this work (which, from other angles, also has many passages of great interest) that could not have soothed the helpless apostles of moderation. Lamartine was believed to be sentimental and chivalric, and it was hoped by some that his oratory could promote the Duchesse d'Orléans (the widow of the king's eldest son) to the regency and save the dynasty.[43] Sainte-Beuve, for example, imagined that Lamartine's ambition, insofar as it had any precise goal, would be sated if he were prime minister to the Régente.[44] More realistic commentators have generally agreed that Lamartine would have failed if he had tried this, for already a large and angry crowd had broken into the Chamber of Deputies, demanding the Republic. Lamartine himself believed that he had the power within his hands to declare Regency or Republic:

> Lamartine had only to say to the princess and her sons: 'Arise! You are the widow of that Duc d'Orléans whose death and memory the people revere in you! You are the children deprived of that father and adopted by the nation! . . . The ministers of your ancestor [Louis-Philippe] have soiled your heritage. The people now return it to you. They adopt you, they will be your ancestor. . . .'[45]

Lamartine claims to have had these words on his lips, these thoughts in his heart, tears in his eyes, but he stopped short. Reason prevailed over imagination: his politics above his poetry. He could not substitute a "politique de sentiment" for stern responsibility. The future would have had to pay dearly.[46] And so he made a speech proclaiming the Provisional Government and, by implication, the Republic.

Conceivably, this was a high-minded act of *raison d'Etat*, avoiding a worse revolution, perhaps on the spot. But some felt that Lamartine had already conspired with republican newspaper editors for a place in the new government.[47] Some also found it preposterous that he could claim to have been able to change the outcome. Certainly he was not, as he implies, the only speaker of note on this occasion—although no one doubted that he was the star.[48] Finally, his narrative is positively cloying.

Let us take another example. When the conference room of the Provisional Government at the Hôtel de Ville was later penetrated by an armed and resolute crowd, Lamartine alone was able to save the

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day by confronting their spokesman, "a young mechanic, the Spartacus of that army of intelligent proletarians," whose words were "of an impossible obstinacy" and who all the while held a carbine by the barrel with his right hand, banging the stock of the weapon on the floor to punctuate his phrases.[49] All Lamartine's colleagues—even the socialist Louis Blanc—had tried desperately to calm this son of the people, but only Lamartine could prevail:

> "You speak very well," he told him, pushing back his arm. "You speak better than I do. The people were well advised to choose you. But speaking well is not enough: You have to understand the language of reason which God gave to men of good faith and good will to make their points with each other, and to help rather than to destroy each other. Sincere speech is peace among men; stubborn silence is war. Do you want war and bloodshed? We will accept it; we vowed our lives; but when the war and bloodshed start, innocents will suffer!"
>
> —"Yes, yes! Lamartine is right! Listen to Lamartine!" shouted his comrades. . . .
>
> As Lamartine was talking, there was a visible struggle on the wild face of the proletarian orator between a shining intelligence that could not be concealed and the obstinacy of a brutal will that seemed to cast shadows. . . . Finally, intelligence and gentleness prevailed. He let his carbine fall to the floor and he began to weep. . . .[50]

Such was Lamartine's style of insinuating his exemplary courage, his powers of persuasion, his rectitude, and his control over events. Indeed, he could not be accused of lacking any of these qualities—for which many middle-class Parisians, threatened by the socialists, were duly grateful—but he would have been better advised to let his actions speak for themselves, as Cavaignac was later able to do. It should be added that when not so exalted, Lamartine was generous, hardly stooping to belittle his colleagues, whom he instead tried to convert to his spiritual conceptions of harmony. Unfortunately, his writing inspired neither gratitude nor admiration.

The politicians scarcely respected him by this time; they feared him; they conspired to reduce him to insignificance, and their memoirs would treat him severely, making his political ideas sound puerile. Much of this animus relates to Lamartine's cultivation of the radical Ledru-Rollin and his various intermittent overtures to men even further to the left.[51] But there was a more fundamental hatred of his style that needed only to bubble over the surface in 1848. If there

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was one thing Lamartine was not (despite some of his policies), it was bourgeois: his whole life's education, way of life, and temperamental responses were of another order of training. As Agulhon has put it, he was the exact antithesis of Adolphe Thiers, "bourgeois orléaniste chimiquement pur."[52] This, of course, makes it particularly difficult for Lamartine to seem a liberal. Yet his politics must be so described, for want of a better term. But now observe how illustrious liberals of the time regarded him.

Charles de Rémusat, whom we have mentioned, is one such liberal. His testimony is particularly interesting, because his memoirs are perhaps the richest and most reflectively satisfying document we have about French political life from the Restoration to the end of the Second Empire. Rémusat (who belonged to the left-center of the July Parliament, was married to Lafayette's granddaughter, and after 1848 became a good friend of Tocqueville) drew his many biographical portraits with skill, ponderation, and a normal lack of vindictiveness. But this is not so when he presents Lamartine.

First of all, Rémusat, whose tastes ran more to the eighteenth century, did not like Lamartine's poetry.[53] Yet the dislike went deeper, and grew quickly as Rémusat confronted Lamartine in the Chamber. It is to be presumed that the hostility was aggravated in 1842 (when Lamartine had unsuccessfully defended the conditional appointment of the Duchesse d'Orléans as Regent), for it is here that Rémusat's portrait is inserted. It reads in part,

> he thinks constantly of himself and only of himself. Wake him suddenly from the deepest sleep, give him the most surprising news, or the most tragic news, and only one thought will strike him—the role he might be called upon to play—and he will reply speaking only in terms of himself. . . . Lamartine has more elevation than morality, more dignity than rectitude, more honor than conscience, more intelligence than wisdom, more genius than reason. He is a dangerous man.[54]

Rémusat did not think of Lamartine as merely a flighty poet; he considered him an irresponsible egotist.

Barrot, the leader of the "dynastic opposition" and first prime minister of the Second Republic, did (as we have seen) regard Lamartine as a man who played politics on the lyre:

> He began by serving the Legitimists, he ended by being the main actor in a demagogical social revolution; he began by touching the most sensitive

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heartstrings, the most conservative feelings, and he ended by somehow sounding the trumpet of civil war. From his *Harmonies* to his praise of Robespierre in *Les Girondins,* there is a world of difference: only the flight of a poet could cross such spaces.[55]

Finally, there is the well-known judgment of Tocqueville, who, writing in the immediacy of 1848, is the most severe of all. After conceding that "the transcendental favour which was shown [to Lamartine as a savior] at this time was not to be compared with anything except, perhaps, the excessive injustice which he shortly afterward received," the author of *Recollections* delivers this cannonade:

I do not know that I have ever, in this world of selfishness and ambition in which I have lived, met a mind so void of any thought of the public welfare as his. I have seen a crowd of men disturbing the country in order to raise themselves: that is an everyday perversity; but he is the only one who seemed to me always ready to turn the world upside down in order to divert himself. Neither have I known a mind less sincere, nor one that had a more thorough contempt for the truth. When I say he despised it, I am wrong: he did not honor it enough to heed it in any way whatever.[56]

To those who took more impersonal and structural views of the happenings of 1848, Lamartine was either insignificant or fortuitous. He plays no role whatever in Marx's *Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850;* Ledru-Rollin is a sufficient symbol of republicanism. Lorenz von Stein has much more to say about Lamartine than Marx, and is generous about his character, but he treats Lamartine as the epiphenomenal incarnation of the mistaken opinion that political democracy can be made independent of the decisive play of interested forces in "civil society." "Lamartine," Stein writes,

understood the Republic as a poet, understood the public order as a citizen; but the social antagonism he did not understand at all. . . . As long as he remained in charge, hope prevailed that the February Revolution would not go beyond the limits set by political freedom. . . . Never did the social movement have a more suitable exponent as did the young Republic of France at this time; there was never a man who, like Lamartine, achieved prominence not so much because of his personal qualifications as because of the particular [i.e., highly unstable] constellation of the existing social conditions.[57]

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Lamartine is at least a citizen as well as a poet on Stein's reading. He is also naive about "the science of society" and, as it were, a "representative man" in that regard. He did not see that the age of merely political revolution had been made obsolete by the contours of the "social question." If this is so, was he unique in his blindness? Was Thiers or Ledru-Rollin (or, for that matter, Tocqueville) any more amply informed? It is conceivable that Lamartine understood more about economics (except for his own) than Rémusat, more about diplomacy than Guizot, and more about the plight of the laboring classes than Barrot. Allowance made for a certain self-intoxication from which Lamartine cannot be redeemed, there is a consistent pattern to his political ideas that encompasses his parliamentary and post-parliamentary career, and this pattern is "liberal." But it is not the liberalism of a "club" or one easily arrived at by professional or ancestral bent. It is in some ways a liberalism of principle, but it is also a liberalism of conjuncture. And it is not (perhaps to the detriment of French political evolution) a liberalism with progeny. If it is not a liberalism comfortable with class struggle or the determinism of social analysis, this does not distinguish it sharply from most other variants of the doctrine.

Did liberalism sit comfortably with this poet, this offspring of the Legitimists? The hallmark of a liberal is, one supposes, his dedication to "liberty." It is the repetitive sounding of that word in the texts of Constant and Tocqueville that confirms their political kinship. In the case of Lamartine, the appeal to liberty seems no less real, but it is not so luminous. It is a way, more than it is a station. It is troubled by a relationship with God, fortune, destiny, and frustration which, as part of the equipment of the Romantic artist, contributes to an occlusion of political wholeness or objectivity. We see this especially when Lamartine the poet defines liberty as a "mysterious phenomenon whose secret belongs to God alone, but whose witness is the conscience, and whose evidence is virtue."[58] Politics emanates from this "mysterious" moral liberty granted by God to man, and it is its most visible result, being itself neither a "mystery" nor a "skill," but "in the true and divine meaning of the word . . . morality, reason, and virtue!"[59] Yet this is not a politics or a liberty of the sort that is the daily fare of practical statesmen, Lamartine included. This liberty is something that wells from within, furnishing a metaphysical justification for the descent from prophecy to public affairs; the politics it

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threatens to produce are of the imaginative moment or the imaginary future.

Since this liberty is predicated from within (where God has planted it) and not as a more objectified relationship of men and things, its flow can be controlled from within, released in a gush or reduced to a trickle. It becomes a matter of upright feelings that can be frustrated. A quality that is both evangelistic and apocalyptic underwrites Lamartine's interpretation of liberalism. This is very far from the anchorage of both liberty and revolution in the bourgeois stirrings of the Middle Ages by liberal historians like Thierry and Guizot. Thus, like the Jacobins, Lamartine tends to moralize revolution in the form of disembodied virtue, while, unlike them, repudiating as "base" and "vile" its accompanying violence. Consequently he does not, like most liberals, make an unambiguous separation between 1789 and 1793 (although it is clear where his preferences lie); like Clemenceau, he is willing to regard the Revolution as a bloc because, in his theodicy, the Revolution itself is *en bloc* with revolutions since time out of mind, conspicuously the revolution of Christianity. Elements of this vision will later contribute to the scope of pardon he granted in the *Girondins,* which many liberals found unwholesome. "Whoever says revolution," Lamartine writes to Virieu, "says change, forward progress *(marche)* of ideas and things, ideas and principles of the new sociality."[60]

This soaring vision of revolutions embedded in the dynamic course of creation is naturally best expressed in the poetry:

> L'oeuvre toujours finie et toujours commencée
> Manifeste à jamais l'éternelle pensée:
> Chaque halte pour Dieu n'est qu'un point de départ. . . .[61]

> Quoi donc, ô mortels, vous annonce
> L'immuable que vous cherchez?
> Je ne vois que poussière et lutte,
> Je n'entends que l'immense chute
> Du temps qui tombe et dit "Marchez!"[62]

The essay "On Rational Politics" (1831) also treats the question of revolution at a lofty, teleological level, measuring the achievements of man in terms of his "social works" carried out according to what may be alternately called "human reason or the divine Word, or the

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gospel truth."[63] No man can reckon the time needed for the "social works": as an individual, he accomplishes his own "complete and independent work" in the process of "living, suffering, hoping, complaining, and dying," while humanity advances toward unknown destinies amid extensive, often violent change.[64] But in his "Résumé politique du *Voyage en Orient*" (1835), Lamartine is more specific regarding the events of his age:

> Human ideas have led Europe to one of those great organic crises of which only one or two other examples survive in the historical memory: epochs when a worn-out civilization cedes to another. . . . The French Revolution has been the tocsin of the world. Several of its phases are accomplished, but it is not over; nothing is ever over in these slow, inward eternal motions of the moral life of mankind. . . . As societies and ideas advance, the goal is always only a new point of departure. The French Revolution, which will later be called the European Revolution—for its ideas seek their level like water—is not just a political revolution, a transformation of power, a substitution of one dynasty for another, or of a republic for a monarchy. . . . What thoughtful man among us, what man of heart and mind, religion and hope. . . will not say to himself: "Je suis révolutionnaire"?[65]

Lamartine's further claim is that "we now begin to understand the providential plan of this great transaction between ideas and men . . . we understand our century; we glimpse a small part of the future. . . ."[66] France (and, in second place, England) are appointed to make the breach into the future; it is a "glorious and fateful mission," for France must go first and test all the perils of the undertaking.[67] These perils are only too evident to Lamartine: they result from a distortion of the just and proper boundaries of rights. The right of equality before the law has led to an "equality of pretensions and ambitions," rivalry, jealousy, and vengefulness. The right of free discussion in print has found its excess in confrontation and cynicism. The spread of education to the masses has fomented a kind of "vertigo of the mind" among persons ill-equipped to ponder ideas. Industrialization has begun to destroy the values of the family and of rural life. Selfish individualism, without scruple or charity, has produced a bitter class of proletarians determined to attack the foundations of property, "up to now the necessary condition of all society."[68]

If in Lamartine there is a commitment to revolutionary principles empowered by the poetic imagination, there is also a deep abhorrence

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of revolutionary action. It is, at the most profound level, a fear of fratricide. The abhorrence aligns Lamartine perfectly with the liberals of the July opposition; the fear of fratricide does not, for it presupposes a high valuation of "fraternity," which they did not share. Thus could Mme de Girardin write in 1847: "M. de Lamartine speaks [in the *Girondins*] of revolutionary ideas like a man who thinks he has found the secret of applying them without crimes, violence, or tempests."[69]

That was precisely Lamartine's dream—a dangerous dream for any statesman to harbor in a volatile world fraught with the unpredictable, whatever answers might be provided at the end of time. In Lamartine's defense it can be said that the dream began to be embodied only when he determined to write the *Girondins,* convinced that revolution was afoot and that he had an inevitable mission to control it and limit its damage. In December 1839 he had declared: "France is a country that has made its revolution and does not want to make another."[70] "I am not ... the partisan of revolutions," he told the Chamber on August 18, 1842.[71] By 1843 he had joined the left opposition as a very independent voice.

When revolution came in 1848, Lamartine had much to do with inflecting it in a theatrical and fraternal direction. He filled his lungs with whatever words seemed appropriate to this end. His situation and his continuous manufacture of rhetoric combined to fortify Lamartine's obstinate vision of himself as an indispensable and prophetic conciliator, a posture that in turn accounts for his confusing range of conduct as the dominant member of the Provisional Executive: ordering the mobilization of regular troops, yet holding secret conversations with Cabet and Barbès. In the force of his own person, he tried to reconcile the contradictions of his thought and impose that solution on the nation. Lamartine attempted to guide a revolution without being the chief of a revolutionary party, by trying to be a "ministry of all the talents" unto himself. June shattered his hopes and his policy, igniting the reprobation of both the "insensés" [madmen] and the "coquins" [scoundrels].

For all his urban heroics, Lamartine's view of a normal or normative human situation was based on the Romantic conviction that an idealized practice of local, family, and rural values could be restored to the French. It seems that the pull was in an entirely

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opposite direction—from province to city, from routine to "innovation," from "foyer" to uprootedness—although this would be still much intensified during the Second Empire.[72] But while Lamartine led the crowds of Paris to the conquest of a second republic, he was also the temporary hope of the rural regions of France during that episode. These included not only areas dominated by vestiges of the old society, but also ones with a radical tradition that had their own forms of estrangement from the capital. Lamartine received his own images of sound rural life from the Mâconnais of his birth.

He never renounced his social origin as a noble or, more properly, a *grand notable*.[73] A touching piece written for his *Conseiller du peuple* in 1850 illustrates his attitude. "Man," he writes, "takes pleasure in returning to his source, which is impossible for a river. That is because man has an intelligence, while the river is only a natural element."[74] The gist of the story concerns an experience Lamartine had at the age of ten, when, as an impressionable and well-read lad, he was taken hunting by his father and they paused at a farmer's cottage. The host refreshed them and then regaled them with bad verses of his own composition, obviously wanting to make an impression on the *seigneur* of Milly. His pride was elsewhere evident in his well-tilled land and his gardens. Lamartine *père* made this point quite clear to his son by telling him that the lines were verses and that their host was a poet.[75] It was a lesson that the future poet never forgot.

In his own verse, Lamartine often sang the praises of the countryside and its intimate stability:

> Oh! quand cette humble cloche à la lente volée
> Epand comme un soupir sa voix sur la vallée,
> Voix qu'arrête si près le bois ou le ravin,
> Quand la main d'un enfant qui balance cette urne
> En verse à sons pieux dans la brise nocturne
> Ce que la terre a de divin![76]

These pious and simple values of family and village are at the origin of liberty and order, in Lamartine's thought. In *Voyage en Orient* he declared, "the family is the second soul of humanity."[77] The devastation of this integrity was what was most to be feared from "the industrial movement."[78] In a later writing he attacked Fourierism: "Folly! Your dream is against nature and against human feelings, for

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you suppress the family in suppressing or emancipating all the love it inspires, and you suppress the virtue by suppressing the struggle between duty and passion!"[79] The family is not a bovine or unreflective enterprise. It is like the farm of Milly, whose head writes bad verses, but might write better ones and yet remain uncorrupted if he had a wider education. Lamartine even hoped that rural life could gradually reabsorb the shipwrecks and hazards of city life.

Nuanced by inherited and acquired disguises, Lamartine's political program had similarities to that of his last hero, Sir Robert Peel, who left Toryism to help found a modern and moderate liberal party, and to that of John Stuart Mill, whose views on democracy and intelligence were very much like those of Lamartine, minus religious eschatology and the pull of ruralism. The main difficulties surrounding Lamartine's proposals for France were, of course, his personality and his position in the crisis. But they were also anchored in the sensibility that generated his poetry. That implied, as Georges Poulet brilliantly documents, "a final vaporization of all forms . . . and the absolute centrifugalization of an horizon, beyond which it seems that the universe has taken flight."[80] Was Lamartine the "poet of pure space," also the "poet of empty space?"[81] After serried analysis, Poulet thinks not: for the repercussions of this distancing, this muting of all sounds, this paling of all colors, are balanced by a countervailing return toward the center. Yet the poet had trouble defending the center as a source of order against that overpowering pull toward diffusion. There is a parallel between this and the politics: Lamartinian society, too, becomes particles; it takes flight and loses concrete bearing in a gospel never quite made flesh, in a moderation always immoderately presented as the effusion of a soul, not the weary will of a majority.

Poets rarely come to power, no more than do philosophers—so rarely that it is perhaps not instructive to draw any conclusions when and if they do. Plato felt that they should not—that they should be banished from the city—because their web of fictions and *doxai* was inimical to truth and sound society. Yet Lamartine was a responsible, if unorthodox, deputy in a so-called liberal parliament; he was a revolutionary who responsibly limited the Revolution; and he was also an able foreign minister in the 1848 Provisional Government. What we might conclude from the case of Lamartine is that circumstances must fall just right in modern societies for poets to be

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summoned; that poets must have other, more conventionally redeeming qualities in order to be wanted; that their *doxai* will be no more harmful than other opinions or ideologies alive in the world; that their personalities will not be pleasing to the mundane, the prosaic, or competing prophets; and that their failures will often be ascribed to their poetry (paradoxically, by anti-Platonists). Plato's republic closed its gates to both poets and opinion; modern society is hospitable to opinion, but not to poetry.

ENDNOTES

[1]Charles de Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, 5 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1958–1967), vol. 4, p. 31.
[2]Ibid., vol. 2, p. 302.
[3]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Recollections* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 60.
[4]Ibid., p. 54.
[5]When Lamartine decisively joined the "opposition de gauche." See William Fortescue, *Alphonse de Lamartine: A Political Biography* (London: Croon Helm, 1983), p. 112ff.
[6]Jules Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution française* appeared in 1847, as did the first volumes of Louis Blanc's work of the same title.
[7]Charles-Augustin de Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries du lundi*, 15 vols. (Paris: Garnier frères, 1869–1876), vol. 11, p. 462.
[8]Lamartine, *Destinées de la Poésie*, in his *Oeuvres complètes*, 8 vols. (Paris: Gosselin, 1834), vol. 1, p. 70.
[9]Lamartine published two such collections: *Le Civilisateur*, between 1852 and 1854; and the *Cours familier de littérature* from 1856 to 1869. On this see Charles M. Lombard, *Lamartine* (New York: Twayne, 1973), pp. 72–94.
[10]Cited in Fortescue, *Alphonse de Lamartine*, p. 127.
[11]Ibid., p. 126.
[12]On "using" history, see Stanley Mellon, *The Political Uses of History: A Study of the Historians of the French Restoration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), passim; on "settling" it, see Maurice Agulhon, *L'apprentissage de la République*, 1848–1852 (Paris: Seuil, 1973), p. 7.
[13]George Steiner, "Language Under Surveillance: The Writer and the State," *New York Times Book Review*, 12 January 1986, p. 1.
[14]Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits contemporains*, 5 vols. (Paris: M. Lévy frères, 1870), vol. 1, p. 306.
[15]See Agulhon, *Apprentissage*, pp. 13–14; and Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830–1852* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 37–38.
[16]Jacques Maritain, "The Frontiers of Poetry," J.F. Scanlan, trans., in *Art and Scholasticism* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930), p. 109.
[17]Odilon Barrot, *Mémoires posthumes*, 4 vols. (Paris: Charpentier, 1875–1876), vol. 2, p. 73.
[18]See Frank Bowman, *Le Christ romantique* (Geneva: Droz, 1973) pp. 87–139.

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[19]T.J. Clark, *The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848–1851* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 11.

[20]Lorenz von Stein, *History of the Social Movement in France, 1789–1850*, K. Mengelberg, trans. (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1964), pp. 373–74.

[21]Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits*, vol. 1, p. 376.

[22]Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. 2, p. 34; for Lamartine's indignant rebuttal of that imputation, see his *Mémoires politiques*, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Chez L'auteur, 1860–1866) vol. 40, pp. 422–24.

[23]Lamartine's letter of 19 November 1830, *Correspondance générale*, vol. 1, p. 81.

[24]Lamartine, *Destinées*, p. 12.

[25]Ibid., p. 58; Maurice Levaillant, ed., *Lamartine: Correspondance générale de 1830 à 1848* (Paris: E. Droz, 1943–1948), vol. 1, p. 18.

[26]Ibid., p. 18.

[27]Ibid., p. 60.

[28]Ibid., p. 68.

[29]See *Sur la politique rationnelle*, in Lamartine, *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 37, p. 362.

[30]Lamartine, *Oeuvres poétiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 517–18: "Page by page your centuries spell out the Gospel; / You have hardly read a word, but thousands will be read; / and your doughtier children will read them! / This book is like those of the ancient sibyls / Whose auguries disclosed leaves of prophecy/ Age after age snatched from the wind."

[31]Lamartine, *Politique rationnelle*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 37, p. 357.

[32]There is a tightly reasoned early sketch of Lamartine's political program in the same work, pp. 370–80.

[33]Lamartine, *Oeuvres poétiques*, p. 1154: "Mankind invented tyranny / So that one alone might declare his rights, / But in God's new day dawning / The sceptre falls beneath the sword; / None is a slave, and all are kings. . . ."

[34]Ibid., p. 1156: "Do not stretch time on a Procrustean bed!/ Resignation is the just man's strength / And patience is his virtue!"

[35]Ibid., p. 1157: "We have to think outside the crowd, / And mix with it to act!"

[36]"To the electors of Bergues," 1831, in Levaillant, *Correspondance générale*, vol. 1, pp. 155–56.

[37]Lamartine, *Politique rationelle*, p. 364.

[38]In Oliver Bernard, trans., *Selected Verse of Rimbaud* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1962), p. 10.

[39]Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 37, p. 326. In a letter of 15 March 1835, the poet claims to have achieved his skill: "Je possède mon instrument, l'improvisation la plus spontanée et la réplique la plus nette, la plus abondante et souvent la plus foudroyante." ["I have control of my instrument, the most spontaneous improvisation and the neatest response, which is also the richest and the most striking."] Cited by Paul Quentin-Bauchart, *Lamartine, homme politique* (Paris: Plon, 1903), p. 25.

[40]Richard Sennett, *The Fall of the Public Man* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 237; see also pp. 228, 234. As Elias Regnault puts it in *Histoire du gouvernement provisoire* (Paris: Lecou, 1850): "En l'absence de toute autorité, il gouverne par l'autorité de la parole; à la foule mûgissante, il jette les effusions de son coeur; aux passions déchaînées, il impose des leçons de morale." ["In the absence of any authority, he rules by the authority of the word; to the mumbling crowd he hurls the outbursts of the heart; on those unleashed passions he imposes moral teachings."]

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[41]Ernest Legouvé, *Lamartine* (Paris: Hetzel, 1876), p. 36.
[42]See Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 37, p. 31.
[43]He had vigorously supported the claim of the Duchesse to the provisional regency in 1842; see Fortescue, *Lamartine*, p. 97.
[44]Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits*, vol. 1, p. 377. See also Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, p. 551.
[45]See Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 37, p. 201.
[46]Ibid., pp. 202–3.
[47]e.g., Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. 2, p. 36.
[48]See Tocqueville, *Recollections*, pp. 50–53.
[49]See Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, pp. 356–57.
[50]Ibid., pp. 363–64.
[51]See Quentin-Bauchart, *Lamartine*, pp. 258–69.
[52]Agulhon, *Apprentissage*, p. 42.
[53]Rémusat, *Mémoires*, vol. 1, pp. 453–54. The poem is found in Lamartine, *Oeuvres poétiques*, pp. 1085–92.
[54]Rémusat, *Mémoires*, vol. 4, p. 31.
[55]Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. 2, p. 36.
[56]Tocqueville, *Recollections*, pp. 117–18. Consider also Victor Cousin's remark, recorded from a conversation in which Tocqueville was also involved: "I have known only two men who were really ambitious; they were Lamartine and Guizot; the rest have been only vain. Lamartine, however, is both." *Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior*, M.C.M. Simpson, ed., 2 vols. (London: H.S. King, 1872), vol. 1, p. 45.
[57]Stein, *Social Movement in France*, p. 374.
[58]Lamartine, "Avertissement" to *La chute d'un ange* (Paris: Hachette, 1913), p. viii.
[59]Lamartine, *Politique rationnelle*, p. 361.
[60]Letter of March 24, 1831 in Levaillant, *Correspondance générale*, vol. 1, p. 134.
[61]Lamartine, "Les Révolutions," in *Oeuvres Poétiques*, p. 512: "Ever finished and ever newly started / Our work reveals eternal thought: / God sees each pause as a beginning. . . ."
[62]Ibid., p. 516: "What makes you think to find, O mortals, / The unchanging you have sought? For I see only dust and struggle, / I hear only the vast descent / Of time falling, which says: 'March on!' "
[63]Lamartine, *Politique rationelle*, p. 363.
[64]Ibid., p. 364.
[65]Lamartine, "Résumé politique," in *Voyage en Orient* (Paris: Hachette, 1856), p. 496.
[66]Ibid., p. 497.
[67]Ibid., p. 498.
[68]Ibid., pp. 499–500.
[69]Vicomte de Launay [Delphine Gay de Girardin], *Lettres parisiennes* (Paris: Librairie nouvelle, 1856), letter IV, 4 April 1847.
[70]Lamartine, *La France parlementaire*, 6 vols. (Paris: Lacroix, Verboeckhoven, 1864–1865), vol. 2, p. 290.
[71]Ibid., vol. 3, p. 258.
[72]On uprootedness and demographic pressures in Paris, see Roger L. Williams, *The French Revolution of 1870–1871* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 32–33, 40–41.
[73]Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 40, p. 422.
[74]Lamartine, *Conseiller du Peuple* (Paris: Administration, 1850), p. 27.

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[75]Ibid., p. 32.
[76]"La cloche du village," in Lamartine, *Oeuvres poétiques*, p. 1160: "Oh! When that humble bell with its slow peal / Reaches like a sigh across the valley, / Its voice stops short in the woods and gulleys; / When the hand of a child that swings this urn / Pours all that is divine on earth / With pious sounds into the evening breeze."
[77]Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient*, p. 35.
[78]"Résumé Politique" to *Voyage en Orient*, p. 500.
[79]Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques, Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 40, p. 214.
[80]Georges Poulet, *Les métamorphoses du cercle* (Paris: Plon, 1961), p. 186.
[81]Ibid., p. 189.

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Lincoln C. Chen

The AIDS Pandemic: An Internationalist Approach to Disease Control

SINCE THE FIRST CASES of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) were reported in the United States in 1981, the AIDS epidemic has commanded increasing public attention and concern. According to the United States Center for Disease Control, 31,982 cases of AIDS had been reported by March 1987.[1] An overwhelming number of these cases were among homosexual and bisexual men, intravenous drug abusers, and those exposed to contaminated blood products. Female victims, less than 10 percent of the total, were predominantly heterosexual partners of men from these high-risk groups. Given the long latency period between initial infection and the onset of clinical disease, these AIDS cases represent only the tip of the iceberg of subclinical infections. Probably more than one million Americans have been exposed to and infected by the AIDS virus, and most of the 270,000 AIDS victims projected for 1991 are already infected.[2]

In just six years, AIDS has emerged as one of the gravest public health threats of this century. In the absence of a vaccine or more effective antiviral drugs, information and education campaigns to alter high-risk sexual and drug abuse behavior are the only measures currently available to control the disease, in addition to the screening of blood products. As these disease control efforts are pushed forward, the related issues of human rights and legal and ethical standards will become increasingly complex and contentious. Public fears, often bordering on mass hysteria and fueled by intense media coverage, have already generated pressures for compulsory testing,

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invasion of privacy, or physical isolation of infected carriers. Workplace policies toward AIDS-afflicted employees, eligibility for life insurance, and health-care structures will all be profoundly strained.

BIOLOGY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY

AIDS is caused by a retrovirus called the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).[3] After entering the bloodstream, HIV attacks T4 lymphocytes—white blood cells that play a central role in regulating the immune system. A special enzyme, reverse transcriptase, transforms the genetic materials of the virus into DNA, which can be integrated into the chromosomes of the host's cells. Henceforth, whenever host cells reproduce, the new cells contain the HIV genes. HIV infection is irreversible and lifelong. Disease is caused by the destruction of the host's immune system. T4 lymphocytes are killed, and thus fail to generate the chemical signals necessary for the production of antibodies to neutralize foreign invaders. Clinically, AIDS patients present with severe weight loss caused by opportunistic infections, diarrhea, neurological symptoms, and/or a rare cancer called Kaposi sarcoma.[4]

The epidemiology of HIV is dominated by person-to-person transmission from an apparently healthy carrier to another person.[5] Four routes of transmission have been confirmed: sexual intercourse, blood products, needles and skin cuts, and mother to unborn or newborn child. HIV has been isolated from blood, semen, vaginal and cervical secretions, saliva, tears, breast milk, and urine.[6] The bulk of transmission is via sexual intercourse (vaginal, oral, and anal). Although the efficiency of various routes is unknown, male-to-male, male-to-female, and female-to-male transmission all have been documented. Half of the newborns of HIV-positive mothers become infected.[7] In adults, the latency period from infection to clinical disease varies from six months to five or more years. Within five years, 10 to 30 percent of infected persons will develop AIDS, while another 20 to 50 percent will suffer milder AIDS-related symptoms. In other words, at best 70 percent and at worst only 20 percent of infected persons will remain completely healthy five years after infection. AIDS is fatal: 50 percent of the victims die within eighteen months and 90 percent within five years. In children, the latency period is briefer, and clinical disease and death are earlier.

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Two epidemiologic patterns of AIDS are observed. In North America, over 90 percent of cases are among homosexuals, bisexuals, hemophiliacs, and those exposed through intravenous drug abuse or contaminated blood products. In Africa, there are as many female as male cases and the age distribution is bimodal, concentrated among adults and newborn children. Heterosexual and mother-to-child transmission are the predominant modes of spread. Interestingly, whereas Haiti initially had the male-predominant North American pattern, an equal male–female ratio (African pattern) is gradually evolving.

GLOBAL PANDEMIC

Although three quarters of the world's AIDS cases have been reported from the United States, AIDS is a global disease. By March 1987, ninety-nine countries had reported 44,652 cases to the World Health Organization (WHO).[8] As these cases were voluntarily reported and because testing is not available in many countries, the actual number of AIDS cases is estimated to exceed 100,000 worldwide. This clinical case level implies some 300,000 to 500,000 infected persons with milder AIDS-related symptoms, and perhaps five to ten million asymptomatic carriers.[9]

Although AIDS has been reported from all continents, its geographic distribution is uneven. In the United States, AIDS is concentrated in those cities where large numbers of high-risk individuals reside. In New York, 58 percent of heroin addicts have antibodies demonstrating previous exposure to the AIDS virus, and in San Francisco 49 percent of the homosexual population is seropositive.[10] Brazil (1,012 cases), Canada (926 cases), and Haiti (785 cases) contain the bulk of the other reported AIDS cases in the western hemisphere.[11]

AIDS cases are scattered throughout most countries of western Europe, such as France (1,221 cases), West Germany (959 cases), and the United Kingdom (686 cases). Only 103 cases in twelve countries have been reported in Asia. In China and India, conservative sexual patterns are likely to limit disease spread. Widespread female and male prostitution in Southeast Asia (Thailand and the Philippines in particular) may facilitate rapid disease spread in these

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countries. There are also economic implications, as much of the prostitution caters to international tourism.

Especially pernicious is AIDS in Africa.[12] Countries in central and eastern Africa are the worst affected—Zaire, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and the Congo. Fewer cases have been reported in western and southern Africa, although there are disturbing signs that the disease is spreading there as well. AIDS appears to be concentrated in newborns and among adults of both sexes in urban centers. Heterosexual and mother-to-child transmission are the predominant modes of spread. The explosive character of AIDS in Africa suggests that other factors may be faciliating transmission. Sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea and syphilis are highly prevalent in Africa, and it has been postulated that lesions in the reproductive tract caused by these diseases enhance the efficiency of AIDS transmission.[13]

Surveys in central African countries demonstrate the high prevalence of infection by HIV. In Kinshasa, Zaire, about 10 percent of pregnant women in hospitals were seropositive; 4 to 15 percent of women and children utilizing hospitals in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia were positive; and 30 to 40 percent of clients attending sexually transmitted disease clinics in Lusaka, Zambia, were positive.[14] Whereas only 4 percent (out of a sample of 58) of female prostitutes in Nairobi were positive in 1981, 67 percent (out of 535) were positive by 1985.[15]

These surveys are of special population subgroups and thus may be unrepresentative. But even conservative projections suggest that AIDS in Africa will extract a substantial mortality toll. About 40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's population live in countries where the prevalence of HIV seropositivity is already substantial, and about one third of the population at risk will be infants potentially exposed by perinatal transmission.[16] AIDS could increase childhood and overall mortality in central Africa by at least 20 percent.[17] The impact on mortality in young adults could be at least three times as great, or 60 percent higher than current levels. These deaths would include a disproportionate number of urban adults, resulting in the loss of educated and skilled people from these societies.

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HISTORICAL EPIDEMICS AND AIDS

Parallels have been drawn between AIDS and the catastrophic infectious diseases of human history. During the fourteenth century, the Black Death (plague) caused many deaths and influenced the course of European history. The introduction of measles and smallpox into previously unexposed populations during the age of world discovery led to explosive epidemics among non-immune populations. Some claim that colonial conquest was facilitated by these imported health disasters in several instances. During the last century, six great pandemics of cholera swept across Europe, three times successfully crossing the Atlantic into North America.

These epidemics and contemporary AIDS share several features. All generated widespread fear, in spite of the fact that other causes of death were more numerous. In nineteenth-century England, cholera deaths were consistently exceeded by deaths due to endemic diseases such as typhoid, measles, diarrhea, and respiratory infection.[18] Yet cholera, because of its sudden onset, was more dramatic and frightening. The concentration of deaths among healthy, productive adults (rather than children or the elderly) and the vulnerability of the elites despite their privilege no doubt contributed to the terror. Epidemics have usually occurred at times of sociopolitical turmoil, large-scale population movements, or rapid changes of institutional and administrative structures.[19] Indeed, rapid social change may have facilitated epidemics by altering the quiescent equilibrium between pathogen and host in localized settings. Finally, xenophobia between nonexposed and exposed groups invariably intensified during epidemics. Irrespective of their efficacy, various measures to impede the movement of people and goods between communities and nations were repeatedly imposed in attempts to slow or stop the spread of disease. Even before the plague-producing bacterium was identified, for example, European ships returning from ports where plague had been reported were quarantined.

The AIDS pandemic differs from historical health disasters in several fundamental respects, however. Each of these infectious organisms has its own unique biology and epidemiology, and the HIV virus that causes AIDS is no exception. Crucial features specific to AIDS are lifelong infection, long latency period, and asymptomatic

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transmission.[20] The AIDS pandemic, more importantly, has demonstrated unprecedented speed and breadth in spreading internationally. Whereas each of the great cholera pandemics took nearly two decades to sweep across Europe, AIDS has reached a hundred countries within half of a decade. In most of these countries, AIDS appears to be firmly entrenched, reflecting both the character of the virus as well as the nature of global society today. Equally rapid has been the response of modern scientific research. After the first cholera pandemic in the nineteenth century, it took nearly fifty years for John Snow to demonstrate in 1850 that cholera was a waterborne disease, and another thirty years for Robert Koch to identify the causative agent. Five years of AIDS research contributed by scientists from around the world has generated an impressive stock of biological and epidemiologic knowledge. The question is whether scientific advance, changes in human behavior, and stronger social organizations—all of which require international cooperation—will help humankind meet the AIDS challenge.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF AIDS CONTROL

The biology of HIV and the epidemiology of AIDS indicate three possible approaches to disease control: (1) preventing and treating AIDS through vaccine and drug development; (2) interrupting person-to-person transmission through changes in sexual behavior, avoidance of high-risk practices, and elimination of contaminated blood products; and (3) slowing or preventing spread between populations through reporting, surveillance, and quarantine/isolation.

International cooperation is essential to the success of each of these measures. An AIDS vaccine is desperately needed, and the pace and yield of vaccine research will depend on an open international exchange of information, biological materials, research results, and collaborative studies. Sharing program evaluations that indicate what does and does not work in behavioral modification interventions could improve control efforts in different settings. International reporting and surveillance can only be achieved through voluntary participation by sovereign governments. International guidelines, scientifically based, are generally well-received by the public. In the case of AIDS, they would certainly be welcomed by authorities under pressure to institute involuntary testing, disclosure of test results, or

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quarantine. In democratic societies, the only way to ensure that unscientific policies are not implemented is to educate the public. Finally, the AIDS pandemic illustrates the emergence of global health interdependence, wherein the self-interest of advanced countries may be inextricably linked to health conditions globally, and particularly in developing countries.

Research and Vaccine Development

Viral vaccines usually consist of harmless variants of an antigenically similar virulent virus. Prior immunization of the harmless variant stimulates antibody production that protects the host if and when the pathogen attacks. Development of an AIDS vaccine is difficult because the genes determining the outer protein coat of the virus mutate rapidly, making potential new vaccines obsolete. Currently, research is focused on developing antigens to stimulate antibodies against the virus at specific invariant portions of the protein coat, the virus's inner core, or the exterior viral protein that attaches to cell receptors and enables the virus to penetrate the cell. An optimistic forecast is that an AIDS vaccine is at least three to five years away. Because the technology would prevent but not cure the infection, a new vaccine would not benefit those already exposed to HIV.

The history of AIDS research demonstrates that the studies of scientists from many countries have resulted in a rapid accumulation of knowledge, yet also shows that fierce international competition and cross-cultural misunderstandings may have generated unproductive controversy. Much of the debate over scientific credit reflects a struggle over prestige. Given the enormity of the AIDS problem, however, academic honor is related to the race for patent rights to products and techniques that promise enormous commercial profits.

When the first clinical cases of AIDS were recognized as a distinct clinical syndrome in 1981, few believed that an infectious agent was involved. Theories of causation postulated that immune deficiency was caused by the use of amyl nitrates or exposure to multiple sperm sources. Two years later, HIV was identified and isolated by scientists at the Pasteur Institute in Paris and the National Cancer Institute in the United States.[21] By mid-1984, diagnostic methods for AIDS antibody detection had been developed. More recently, the entire genetic sequence of perhaps twenty different isolates of HIV has been deciphered.

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Spurred by the theory that the virus originated in Africa, some foreign scientists pursued the study of HIV antibodies in stored blood specimens of Africans.[22] According to their findings, AIDS infection in Africa may have begun nearly twenty years ago. Unfortunately, miscommunication and insensitivity to the implications of such theories provoked African resentment. Theories that the disease had originated in monkeys and then transferred to humans, and that African promiscuity promoted the disease's spread, no doubt contributed to the bitterness. So too did the exclusive concentration of external resources on AIDS research and control. The focused allocation of health resources on AIDS confirmed African cynicism that health threats to people in developed countries completely overshadowed the long list of neglected health problems that have chronically plagued Africa.[23]

These transcultural tensions dominated the unofficial agenda of the recent international scientific meeting on AIDS at Brazzaville in the Congo. Such tensions could undermine international cooperation in AIDS research and control. Cooperation will be essential for reporting and surveillance, for better understanding of disease transmission, and—most critically—for the eventual conduct of field trials to determine the efficacy of various vaccine candidates.[24]

Changes of Behavior and Practices

Until an effective vaccine is developed, AIDS control will depend primarily on information and education to alter high-risk patterns of sexual and drug abuse behavior. The purpose of educational campaigns should be to provide accurate information, to reduce unnecessary fears, and to dispel myths. Abstinence, fewer and more steady sexual partners, and the use of condoms would all reduce sexual transmission of AIDS. The only effective means of reducing AIDS among infants is through contraception among HIV-positive women or prevention of infection in mothers before pregnancy.

There is probably no more neglected area of research than the field of health behavior. The field encompasses human behavior that may help prevent or treat illness, as well as human activities that affect health, such as nutritional and sexual behavior. Very little is known about how interventions can influence health-related behavior. Few program experiences have been assessed, and the relevance of programs successful in one location to another setting is uncertain. More

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information about successful interventions in different settings, both nationally and internationally, is needed.

Interruption of AIDS transmission is also dependent on the screening of blood products. In the United States, mass screening of blood products and the inactivation of the AIDS virus by heat treatment have already been instituted nationally. At $6 per unit tested, the total cost is about $80 million annually. These screening costs are minuscule in comparison to the hospital costs of caring for AIDS patients, which average at least $45,000 per case per year. By 1991, the annual medical bill for AIDS in the United States will rise to between $6 and $12 billion.

The economics of blood screening in poor countries is discouraging. Screening costs in the United States are greater than the total health budgets of most developing countries. Treating ten AIDS cases in the United States costs more than the total budget of one of the largest hospitals in Zaire. To protect health in developing countries such as Africa, as well as to reduce disease export, international development assistance funds have been increased to help support AIDS diagnostic laboratories and screening programs. As developing countries will never be able to absorb the full costs of AIDS diagnostic and control programs, long-term international mechanisms are needed to ensure adequate financing.

Reporting, Surveillance, and Quarantine

Two customary measures for controlling infectious disease are the identification of infected persons and the prevention of spread to others. These public health measures can be voluntary or involuntary. Issues related to enforcement may operate at the individual, group, or national level. Identification and containment are controversial because of potential conflicts between public health and individual human rights, privacy, and liberty. While different in complexion, these conflicts are all fundamental and inescapable. Their resolution reflects the sociopolitical, cultural, and ethical values of a society.

Few health crises in this century have provoked such emotion as AIDS. That the disease is fatal, attacks healthy adults, favors no class, and is primarily transmitted through sexual contact no doubt adds intensity to the viewpoints. In the United States, controversy surrounds the issues of voluntary versus involuntary testing for HIV

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exposure and the confidentiality of test results. Thus far, involuntary testing has been rejected as administratively and financially infeasible. Mandatory testing has been confined to armed forces personnel and registered female prostitutes in Nevada. At the international level, pressure for the certification and testing of foreign travelers has escalated. The death from AIDS of a Japanese prostitute who serviced foreign customers provoked a xenophobic reaction in Japan. In India and several European countries, foreign students with positive blood tests have been expelled from some schools. The fact that most of these students were black Africans led to diplomatic protests against apparent racism. In March 1987, member states of the European Economic Community convened in the Netherlands to consider the screening of travelers. Fortunately, nearly all countries are following the WHO recommendation that certification and testing of international travelers is neither warranted nor effective.[25]

Historical experience has repeatedly demonstrated the failure of compulsory testing to identify subjects with sexually transmitted disease.[26] Also ineffective has been the application of quarantine/isolation measures for population containment of infectious diseases that are characterized by subclinical carriers (that is, carriers who manifest no symptoms of the disease). Syphilis and gonorrhea were controlled in England during World War I through free walk-in clinics that guaranteed anonymity. Mandatory testing or the violation of confidentiality might have carried the consequences of social ostracism and financial loss. Compulsory enforcement could have driven the diseases underground and encouraged the avoidance of diagnosis and treatment. In this century the quarantine of people and goods from cholera-infested areas consistently failed to slow or stop the spread of the disease. Cholera, like AIDS, has many more silent asymptomatic carriers than clinically apparent cases, and asymptomatic carriers can be a major source of transmission.

Health Interdependence

The AIDS pandemic refutes the commonly held assumptions that modern science has enabled humankind to conquer the infectious diseases and that the health of privileged people in advanced countries can be divorced completely from public health problems in poor countries. An "isolationist" approach to AIDS control, therefore, would fail. An approach that would seek to regulate and restrict the

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movement of people across American borders would be unenforceable. Such a strategy would address neither the epidemiology of the disease nor the nature of our contemporary world. The speed and intensity of the AIDS pandemic vividly underscore the high degree to which nations of the world have become interconnected, through international communications, travel, and relationships. AIDS will surely not be the last health threat to cross national boundaries and threaten heretofore unexposed populations.

Another unwise approach would be the the launching of a "crash" global AIDS eradication program, along the lines of the highly successful smallpox eradication program of the 1970s. Of course, an effective AIDS vaccine would have to be developed. Even without a vaccine, AIDS control and containment may be possible, but the likelihood of complete eradication is poor, even if an effective AIDS vaccine were already available. The epidemiology of smallpox is completely different from that of AIDS. Patients with smallpox are clinically identifiable even by laypersons, and are infective for brief periods of time; transmission between human hosts is slow. The smallpox vaccine is highly effective, cheap, stable, and leaves a visible scar that serves as evidence of inoculation. Administration of the vaccine using disposable bifurcated needles around the first identified (index) case can completely interrupt the transmission chain. The smallpox eradication strategy of the 1970s focused on surveillance and containment through cluster immunizations around index cases, which interrupted transmission of the disease and ultimately led to its elimination. The epidemiologic features of AIDS, in contrast, are much less favorable: AIDS infection is lifelong; there is a long latency period between infection and clinical disease; and most of the transmission is by asymptomatic but infected carriers. These characteristics make AIDS eradication highly improbable, even if a vaccine that provided complete protection were to be developed.

A sensible American strategy against AIDS would recognize that disease control is the primary responsibility of the countries affected by the disease. Thus, national efforts are a necessary but insufficient first component of global control. National efforts, however, can be strengthened through international cooperation along several fronts. AIDS reporting, surveillance, information sharing, and the development of international guidelines require strong intergovernmental cooperation. Like its sister agencies in the United Nations, the WHO

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has its share of failings, but it is undoubtedly one of the strongest specialized intergovernmental agencies in the UN system. If the WHO did not exist, a similar agency would have to be created to fulfill the unique role that it plays in the global control of AIDS. Given the critical role of the WHO, the United States government has indeed been shortsighted in withholding its full share of contributions to the WHO budget this year.

In addition to intergovernmental actions by the WHO, private cooperative efforts should be encouraged. Particularly useful would be international research cooperation involving the academic, corporate, and foundation communities. One example of private initiative is the Independent International Commission on Health Research for Developing Countries, funded by a consortium of foundations and agencies from Europe, North America, and Japan. The Commission, which will begin work in mid-1987, will consist of leading scientists and policy-makers who will review health problems in developing countries, recommend actions on research needs and gaps, and facilitate cooperative efforts. The Commission's mandate is not simply to produce a report, but to provide scientifically based advocacy for concrete actions to strengthen international health research. An early item on the Commission's agenda will be to determine how to strengthen research and efforts to control AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

An internationalist strategy to control AIDS would be based on the recognition that the health of Americans is inextricably linked to the health of poor people in developing countries. This principle applies to a range of health problems, not just AIDS. Endemic health problems such as diarrhea, respiratory infection, malnutrition, and unwanted fertility require an accessible and competent health and family-planning infrastructure to deliver services. Even if an effective AIDS vaccine were available today, global AIDS control would be handicapped by developing countries' inability to deliver the vaccine to needy populations. This is precisely the challenge that current international health, child survival, and family planning programs funded by UNICEF, UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population Activities), and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) are attempting to overcome. Simple, low-cost, effective health technologies (such as oral rehydration for diarrhea, and vaccines against the common infections of childhood) are already

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available. So too are basic services for family planning and maternal and reproductive health. The successful application of such technologies, including an AIDS vaccine, would require the development of a stronger capacity to administer these technologies.

Foreign military aid is often justified as being essential to national defense. More crucial and far easier to justify in our self-interest is humanitarian assistance in support of health, child survival, and family planning programs in developing countries. International agencies such as the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, and USAID, however imperfect, represent important international assets. They deserve stronger political and financial support from the American people and government. The activities supported by these agencies offer the dual advantage of promoting humanitarian goals while simultaneously protecting the long-term health of Americans in an increasingly interrelated world.

ENDNOTES

The author is grateful to Richard Cash, David Hunter, Michael Reich, Joe Potter, and Michael Stoto, all of Harvard University, for their contributions to the ideas developed in this paper.

[1]World Health Organization, "AIDS Information Update," Geneva, 19 March 1987.

[2]There are no scientifically valid estimates of the true level of HIV seropositivity in any population. All estimates are biased because of the population sampled. Crude estimates of asymptomatic HIV-positive persons are usually based on presumed ratios of the number of asymptomatic cases to each case of clinical AIDS.

[3]J. Mann, "Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): A Global Challenge," *World Health* (November 1986), pp. 12–15.

[4]Most AIDS patients develop opportunistic infections or cancers and die because of a weakened immune system. Opportunistic infections are so called because they would not be problematic among healthy people. Typical opportunistic infections are cryptococcal meningitis, central nervous system toxoplasmosis, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, tuberculosis, herpes simplex, oral candidiasis, and cryptosporidiosis.

[5]J.W. Curran et al., "The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects," *Science* 229 (1985), pp. 1352–57.

[6]Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, "AIDS: A Public Health Crisis," *Population Reports* 14 (July–August, 1986), pp. L193–L227.

[7]The mode of mother-to-child transmission could be due to transplacental transfer, contamination during the birth event, contamination of breast milk, or some combination of all three routes.

[8]WHO, "AIDS Information Update," Geneva, 19 March 1987.

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[9]These global estimates suffer from the same limitations described in endnote 2 for the United States.

[10]T.J. Spira et al., "Prevalence of Antibody to Lymphadenopathy-associated Virus among Drug-Detoxification Patients in New York," *New England Journal of Medicine* 311 (7) (16 August 1984), pp. 467–468. Also, United States Centers for Disease Control, "Update: Public Health Service Workshop on Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III Antibody Test," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 34 (31) (9 August 1985), pp. 477–478.

[11]AIDS in the western hemisphere is dominated by the American pattern of a predominance of adult male victims, suggesting primary spread in the homosexual and intravenous drug abuse communities. An entirely different age and sex pattern of disease is found in Africa, suggesting heterosexual, skin-cut, and mother-to-child transmission.

[12]T.C. Quinn et al., "AIDS in Africa: An Epidemiologic Paradigm," *Science* 234 (1986), pp. 955–63.

[13]The role of other sexually transmitted diseases in facilitating AIDS transmission is only one of several hypotheses. Chancroid, herpes, and other skin lesions could cause open genital sores, possibly permitting the virus to enter the bloodstream. Another theory relates to the high use of contaminated needles and scarification (skin cuts for cosmetic purposes) in Africa.

[14]A comprehensive summary of seroprevalence surveys worldwide is contained in *Population Reports* (see endnote 6).

[15]P. Piot et al., "Retrospective Seroepidemiology of AIDS Virus Infection in Nairobi Populations" (abstract), submitted to the International Conference on AIDS, Paris, June 23–25, 1986. Also, N. Simonsen et al., "Longitudinal Study of a Cohort of HTLV-III/LAV Infected Prostitutes in Nairobi," presented at the International Conference on AIDS, Paris, June 23–25, 1986.

[16]D. Hunter, private communications, Harvard School of Public Health, April 1987.

[17]J. Potter and M. Stoto, private communications, Harvard School of Public Health, April 1987.

[18]R. Pollitzer, *Cholera* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1959).

[19]W.H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976).

[20]E.D. Acheson, "AIDS: A Challenge for the Public Health," *Lancet* 1 (1986), pp. 662–66.

[21]The United States–French scientific disagreement over the discovery of the HIV appears to have been resolved at the highest levels of the two governments. A chronology of events has been accepted by both sides, and patent rights and royalties have been amicably agreed upon.

[22]J. Tinker and R. Sabatier, "AIDS: The Hidden Enemy," *Development International* (January/February 1987), pp. 22–27.

[23]Initially, few demographic estimates had been made of the relative importance of AIDS in relation to other diseases in Africa. Preliminary projections by J. Potter and M. Stoto at Harvard University suggest that AIDS looms as a major cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa. Its significance is already comparable to major killers such as malaria, tetanus, diarrhea, respiratory infections, and malnutrition. Given its rapid spread, it is possible that AIDS could soon surpass all of these other diseases.

[24]Any AIDS vaccine candidate would need to be tested among different populations in multiple sites. A Center for Disease Control team in Zaire is establishing a

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longitudinal follow-up study of a population of some 50,000 with the possibility that such a study population would be an excellent base for vaccine trials.

[25]International guidelines from the WHO indicate that certification for international travel is ineffective, expensive, and unwarranted. Thus far, only Saudi Arabia has instituted certification requirements for international travelers.

[26]A.J. Zucherman, "Would Screening Prevent the International Spread of AIDS?" *Lancet* 2 (1986), pp. 1208–09. Also, R. Porter, "History Says No to the Policeman's Response to AIDS," *British Medical Journal* 293 (1986), pp. 1589–90.

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